Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 71

Number 3

2019

Inefficient Litigation over Forum: The Unintended Consequence of
the JVCA’s “Bad Faith” Exception to the Bar on Removal of
Diversity Cases After One Year
E. Farish Percy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
E. Farish Percy, Inefficient Litigation over Forum: The Unintended Consequence of the JVCA’s “Bad Faith”
Exception to the Bar on Removal of Diversity Cases After One Year, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 595 (2019),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 7100000000000000 SPRING 20190000000000000000 NUMBER 3

INEFFICIENT LITIGATION OVER FORUM: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF THE JVCA’S
“BAD FAITH” EXCEPTION TO THE BAR
ON REMOVAL OF DIVERSITY CASES
AFTER ONE YEAR
E. FARISH PERCY*
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................... 596
I. The Origins of the One-Year Bar and the Bad Faith Exception ............ 601
A. The One-Year Bar ........................................................................... 601
B. Gamesmanship by Plaintiffs ............................................................ 602
C. The Tedford Equitable Exception .................................................... 603
D. The ALI Proposal ............................................................................ 605
E. The Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act .................................. 606
II. Removal/Remand Law and Plaintiff Forum Manipulation .................. 612
A. Removal and Remand Basics for Diversity Cases........................... 612
B. Forum Manipulation by Plaintiffs .................................................... 614
1. Strategic Joinder ........................................................................... 615
2. Fraudulent Joinder ........................................................................ 617
3. Fraudulent Procedural Misjoinder ................................................ 619
4. Manipulation of the Amount in Controversy ............................... 621
III. Statutory Meaning and Judicial Interpretation of the Bad Faith
Exception .................................................................................................. 621
A. Circuit Court Opinions Applying the Exception ............................. 623
B. District Court Opinions Applying the Exception............................. 625
* Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Distinguished Lecturer and Professor of
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law.

595

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

596

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:595

1. Evidentiary Standard .................................................................... 625
2. Strategic Joinder ........................................................................... 626
3. Fraudulent Joinder ........................................................................ 629
4. Fraudulent Procedural Misjoinder ................................................ 632
5. Manipulation of the Amount in Controversy ............................... 633
IV. Critique of the Bad Faith Exception ................................................... 636
A. Bright-Line Rule Versus Case-by-Case Analysis............................ 636
B. Relative Value of Litigation over Jurisdiction Versus the Merits ... 637
C. Bad-Faith Removals by Defendants ................................................ 638
D. Litigation Costs Incurred to Meet the “Actively-Litigating”
Proxy .................................................................................................... 640
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 640
Introduction
Congress enacted the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act (“JVCA”)
on December 7, 2011,1 amending numerous removal and venue statutes
within the Judicial Code. The JVCA has been described as the “the most
far-reaching package of revisions to the Judicial Code since the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990.”2 The JVCA was intended to “bring[] more
clarity to the operation of Federal jurisdictional statutes”3 and to decrease
the amount of time wasted “determining jurisdictional issues at the expense
of adjudicating underlying litigation.”4
The JVCA’s provisions dealing with removal and remand of civil cases
are likely to be critically important because they will affect everyday
practice in state and federal courts. In light of the widespread and
prominent nature of removal/remand litigation in contemporary civil
1. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 11263, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The House
Report candidly admits that due to more pressing agenda items in 2010, no hearings were
held to evaluate House Bill 4113. Instead of going through the formal vetting process, major
stakeholder groups were given the opportunity to identify controversial provisions, which
were then reportedly deleted. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 2 (2011). Although a hearing
was held in 2005 with respect to an earlier version of the bill, the plaintiffs’ bar did not have
representation at the hearing. See Arthur D. Hellman, Another Voice for the “Dialogue”:
Federal Courts as a Litigation Course, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 772 (2009) [hereinafter
Hellman, Another Voice].
2. Arthur Hellman, The Federal Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Is Now Law,
JURIST-FORUM (Dec. 30, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/arthur-hellmanjvca.php [hereinafter Hellman, JVCA Is Now Law].
3. H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 1.
4. Id. at 2.
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litigation, the provisions will affect everything from run-of-the-mill torts
cases to complex products liability cases and insurance litigation.5 Although
many commentators agree that the JVCA clarifies certain aspects of
removal law and resolves some circuit court splits over removal issues,6
others have criticized certain JVCA provisions for adopting bad policies or
failing to adequately clarify critical aspects of removal law.7 Of the various
5. See John E. Goodman, The Route to Federal Court Clarified: Congress Amends
Removal Statutes, CORP. COUNS. (Law Journal Newsletters, Philadelphia, Pa.), Mar. 2012,
at 3, http://media.lockelord.com/files/Uploads/Documents/LJN_NLCOR_2012_03_01.pdf
(describing the JVCA’s removal provisions as the most significant); E. Farish Percy, The
Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in the Wrong Direction, 62
VILL. L. REV. 213, 213 n.1 (2017) [hereinafter Percy, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act]
(citing statistics indicating that 466 federal district court opinions in 2015, 461 federal
district court opinions in 2014, and 509 federal district court opinions in 2013 referenced
“fraudulent joinder” and likely involved the district court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s motion
to remand); E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Cases to Federal
Court Based upon Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 191-93 (2005) (discussing
the dramatic increase in removal/remand litigation concerning fraudulent joinder)
[hereinafter Percy, Making a Federal Case of It]; E. Farish Percy, The Tedford Equitable
Exception Permitting Removal of Diversity Cases After One Year: A Welcome
Development or the Opening of Pandora’s Box?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 146, 147-48 (2011)
(discussing the increasing frequency of intense forum selection battles in civil litigation)
[hereinafter Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception]; Hellman, JVCA Is Now Law, supra
note 2 (discussing the centrality of removal/remand litigation and concluding that “[f]rom
a litigation perspective, the most important elements of the JVCA are those relating to
removal jurisdiction and procedure”).
6. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 5, at 1; (concluding that the JVCA resolved some
circuit court splits over removal issues); Stephen Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, Delay,
Manipulation, and Controversy: The Impact of the 2012 Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 on
the Battles for Removal of Cases to Federal Court, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 633, 656 (2013)
(concluding that the amendments address certain types of forum manipulation by plaintiffs
and add greater structure to removal/remand law).
7. See, e.g., William Baude, Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 33, 35-36 (2012) (critiquing the Act because it does
not: (i) provide a rule when state law permits but does not require the plaintiff to demand a
specific amount of damage in the complaint; (ii) define or explain the preponderance of the
evidence standard for demonstrating the amount in controversy; or (iii) address the fact that
it is difficult to know whether and when a case is removable, making it hard to comply with
the removal deadlines); Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant
Lawsuits, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 50, 95-112 (2012) (criticizing the codification of the lastserved defendant rule and arguing that the rule was adopted in response to an overstated fear
of forum manipulation by plaintiffs); Jayne S. Ressler, Removing Removal’s Unanimity
Rule, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1391, 1430-31 (2013) (criticizing the codification of the rule of
unanimity because it provides an opportunity for forum manipulation by plaintiffs); Nathan
A. Lennon, Note, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Congress Has Codified the Tedford
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JVCA provisions revising removal/remand procedure,8 this Article focuses
on the JVCA’s bad faith exception to the bar on removal of diversity cases
more than one year after commencement in state court.
Prior to the JVCA amendment, § 1446(b) prohibited removal of a case
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction more than one year after
commencement of the case in state court.9 The one-year bar was intended to
minimize the inefficiency created when cases are removed after substantial
progress in state courts, which requires a second judge to become familiar
with the case and often results in delay of final resolution.10 In addition to
curtailing the inefficiency caused by late removals, the one-year bar made it
possible for some plaintiffs to prevent removal within the one-year period
by manipulating removal jurisdiction. A plaintiff, for example, might
conceal the true amount in controversy in a case involving complete
diversity until expiration of the one-year period or sue a diverse defendant
and join a non-diverse or in-state defendant and refuse to settle with or
dismiss the jurisdictional spoiler until after expiration of the one-year
period.11 Although some federal courts recognized an equitable exception to
the one-year bar, most determined that the one-year bar was jurisdictional
rather than procedural, and therefore not subject to an equitable exception.12
In an effort to prevent or at least curtail plaintiffs’ forum manipulation
and to reduce litigation over forum,13 Congress passed the JVCA and
amended § 1446 to prohibit removal of a case on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction more than one year after commencement “unless the district
court finds that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in order to prevent a
defendant from removing the action.”14 Ironically, and in keeping with the
law of unintended consequences,15 the JVCA’s bad faith exception to the
Equitable Exception, but Will Inconsistent Applications of “Bad Faith” Swallow the Rules?,
40 N. KY. L. REV. 233, 243 (2013) (pointing out that the statute does not define bad faith and
that district courts will almost certainly apply the exception inconsistently).
8. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text discussing the various JVCA
amendments in greater detail.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. IV. 2010) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)
(2012)).
10. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of the one-year bar.
11. For a discussion of the manner in which plaintiffs have manipulated the one-year
bar so as to prevent removal, see infra notes 129-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2012).
15.
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bar on removal of diversity cases more than one year after commencement
has not reduced wasteful litigation over jurisdiction. Instead, it did just the
opposite: it increased inefficient litigation over forum while only
marginally preventing plaintiffs’ bad-faith forum manipulation. Moreover,
it created a perverse incentive for defendants to manipulate the forum by
wrongfully removing cases based upon the exception for the purpose of
delaying the eventual resolution of the litigation in state court while forcing
plaintiffs to expend greater resources.16 Of the 160 cases analyzed by the
author that have been removed to federal district court based upon the
JVCA’s bad faith exception, the district court found bad-faith forum
manipulation by the plaintiff in only twenty-four cases.17 The other 136
The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that
actions of people—and especially of government—always have effects that are
unanticipated or ‘unintended.’ Economists and other social scientists have
heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, politicians and popular opinion
have largely ignored it.
Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.
org/library/Enc1/UnintendedConsequences.html (last visited July 6, 2018).
16. See Theodore Eisenberg and Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in the Tort Reform
Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 553 (2005)
(observing that defendants may remove cases to force their less well-financed opponents to
incur additional litigation expense); Christopher Terranova, Erroneous Removal as a Tool
for Silent Tort Reform: An Empirical Analysis of Fee Awards and Fraudulent Joinder, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799, 799-800 (2008) (discussing a study which indicated that
defendants are much more likely to remove cases involving individual plaintiffs rather than
corporate plaintiffs, “perhaps because such plaintiffs suffer more from delay and added
cost”). Defendants also benefit from delays in the resolution of tort litigation because they
are generally not required to pay interest on non-economic damages.
17. The author conducted a Westlaw search on August 8, 2018, of all federal district
court opinions: (i) containing the terms “bad faith” and “1446(c)”; and (ii) decided between
January 7, 2013 and June 30, 2018. The search yielded 634 cases. Table A includes 136
opinions in which the district court remanded the case back to state court after finding
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff manipulated removal jurisdiction in bad faith. The 136
cases include cases in which the JVCA did not apply because the case was commenced
before January 7, 2012; however, the district court applied the Tedford equitable exception
(discussed at infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text) and made findings regarding the
removing defendant’s allegation of plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation. In addition, two
of the 136 opinions involved multiple removals of separate mesh implant cases. In re Boston
Sci. Corp., No. CV-15-06764 et al., 2015 WL 6456528, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015)
(remanding sixty-two separate cases) (Case No. 78 in Table A); In re Boston Sci. Corp., No.
CV-15-6666-PA et al., 2015 WL 5822582, at *1, *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2015) (remanding
102 separate cases) (Case No. 79 in Table A). Rather than treat these as 164 remanded cases,
the author has treated them as two remanded cases for purposes of the statistical analysis.
Table B includes twenty-four cases in which the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion
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cases were remanded back to state court based upon insufficient evidence
of plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation. In other words, eighty-five
percent of the cases removed based upon alleged bad faith were eventually
remanded to state court.18
Robert Merton, an American sociologist, first articulated the law of
unintended consequences in his article entitled “The Unanticipated
Consequences of Purposive Social Action.”19 Merton categorized
unintended consequences as beneficial, merely detrimental, or perverse.20
He further identified a desire for immediate action and ignorance as two
causes of unintended consequences.21 A desire for an immediate response to
a perceived problem may compel a person or a governing body to act or
legislate based upon incomplete information.22 Acting upon incomplete
information, ignorant to all of the facts, makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to accurately predict and anticipate unintended consequences.23
Congress, acting out of a desire to curtail plaintiffs’ manipulation of the
one-year bar, and protect diverse defendants’ right to remove, enacted the
bad faith exception to the one-year bar without fully considering or
exploring its efficacy or the manner in which such an exception would
to remand based upon a finding of bad-faith forum manipulation. Table C includes 179 cases
that were removed more than one year after commencement but were decided on grounds
other than the bad-faith exception to the one-year bar. Table D includes 283 cases that did
not involve removal based upon diversity jurisdiction more than one year after
commencement. Table E includes twelve cases that did not fall into any of the above four
categories. Of the 160 cases in which the district court made findings regarding the
plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation, the district courts found insufficient evidence of
such manipulation in 136 cases. January 7, 2013 was the first possible date on which the
bad-faith exception could be triggered because the JVCA applies to cases commenced in
state court on or after January 7, 2012. See infra note 94.
18. Prior to the enactment of the one-year bar, this author conducted a similar study of
cases removed based upon the Tedford equitable exception. That study indicated that more
than eighty-three percent of cases removed based upon the exception were remanded back to
state court. See Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 178-83.
19. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1
AM. SOC. REV. 894 (1936); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need for Truly Systemic
Analysis of Proposals for the Reform of Both Pretrial Practice and Evidentiary Rules: The
Role of the Law of Unintended Consequences in "Litigation" Reform, 32 REV. LITIG. 201,
214 (2013); Norton, supra note 15.
20. Merton, supra note 19, at 895; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 214; Norton,
supra note 15.
21. Merton, supra note 19, at 900; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 214-15;
Norton, supra note 15.
22. See Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 214-15.
23. Id.
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encourage defendants to engage in improper forum manipulation by
wrongfully removing cases based upon the exception. Now that the bad
faith exception has been in effect for more than six years, it is possible and
prudent to evaluate its effectiveness. Part I of this Article examines the
legislative history of the one-year bar and the JVCA’s bad faith exception
to the one-year bar. Part II reviews removal/remand law and explores the
primary methods by which plaintiffs manipulate jurisdiction in order to
improperly prevent removal. Part III reviews the manner in which courts
have interpreted and applied the bad faith exception to the various types of
plaintiff forum manipulation. Part IV critiques the bad faith exception and
considers whether it effectively prevents plaintiffs’ bad-faith forum
manipulation. The Article concludes by arguing that Congress should
eliminate the bad faith exception because: (1) it increases inefficient
litigation over forum; (2) it only marginally protects diverse defendants’
right to remove; (3) it creates perverse incentives for plaintiffs to retain
jurisdictional spoilers past the one-year mark and engage in meaningless
discovery for the sole purpose of satisfying the inquiry into whether they
have actively litigated the claim against the spoiler; (4) it lacks definitional
clarity and so invites defendants to erroneously remove for strategic gain;
(5) it creates perverse incentives for defendants to engage in bad-faith
forum manipulation by removing based upon frivolous allegations that the
exception applies; (6) it allows defendants to strategically remove once
litigation in state court takes an unfavorable turn; and (7) it is largely
unnecessary given that most plaintiff forum manipulation is either evident
from the outset of litigation or can be discovered within the one-year
period.
I. The Origins of the One-Year Bar and the Bad Faith Exception
A. The One-Year Bar
The bar on removal of diversity cases more than one year after
commencement in state court was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) in 1988
when Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act.24 The one-year bar was part of an overall effort to reduce the federal
caseload and to prohibit removal “after substantial progress has been made
in state court.”25 The amendment sought to curb the inefficiency of

24. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44-45, 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
6005, 6033. Although the Judicial Conference originally proposed abolishing diversity
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requiring a second judge to become familiar with a case after a state court
judge’s significant involvement and to avoid the wasteful “delay and
disruption” that late removals cause, particularly removals of cases nearing
or in the midst of trial.26 At the time of enactment, Congress was aware that
the one-year bar would invite plaintiffs to engage in tactical gamesmanship
in an effort to defeat removal but determined that the administrative and
economic benefits of the absolute one-year bar outweighed the cost of
plaintiff forum manipulation.27
B. Gamesmanship by Plaintiffs
In contemporary civil litigation, whether a federal district court may
properly exercise jurisdiction over a case that has been removed from state
court based upon diversity is “[o]ne the most hotly contested procedural
issues,”28 as evidenced by the extent of removal/remand litigation in federal
district courts.29 The intensity with which plaintiffs and defendants litigate
the issue of forum is due to the actual and perceived benefits plaintiffs can
derive by keeping their case in state court and defendants can derive by
successfully removing to federal court.30 Given the stakes at issue, it is not
jurisdiction, the 1988 Act curtailed diversity jurisdiction by raising the jurisdictional amount
from $10,000 to $50,000. Id. at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5985-86.
26. Id. at 44-45, 72, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6005, 6033.
The amendment addresses problems that arise from a change of parties as an
action progresses toward trial in state court. The elimination of parties may
create for the first time a party alignment that supports diversity jurisdiction.
Under section 1446(b), removal is possible whenever this event occurs, so long
as the change of parties was voluntary as to the plaintiff. Settlement with a
diversity-destroying defendant on the eve of trial, for example, may permit the
remaining defendants to remove.
Id. at 72, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6032-33; see Percy, The Tedford Equitable
Exception, supra note 5, at 156.
27. See Burns v. Windsor Ins., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 n.12 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Congress has
recognized and accepted that, in some circumstances, plaintiff[s] can and will intentionally
avoid federal jurisdiction.”).
28. Michael W. Lewis, Comedy or Tragedy: The Tale of Diversity Jurisdiction Removal
and the One-Year Bar, 62 SMU L. REV. 201, 206 (2009).
29. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 191-93; see also Hellman,
Another Voice, supra note 1, at 768 (arguing that removal/remand litigation is so frequent
that the “law and strategy of removal should be a pervasive part of a Federal Courts
course”).
30. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 581, 599 (1998) (discussing empirical research indicating that defendants experience
an actual benefit in cases removed based upon diversity in comparison to cases originally
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surprising that plaintiffs and defendants engage in various strategies to
secure the more favorable forum. Plaintiffs will structure their cases in an
attempt to avoid removal,31 and defendants will remove cases and oppose
plaintiffs’ motions to remand, even when there is no basis for removal
jurisdiction.32 Although forum shopping may be viewed as “tactical
chicanery” by some,33 many argue that forum shopping in a manner
consistent with governing law is not only permissible, but expected and
responsible.34 The difficulty lies in drawing the line between permissible
and responsible forum shopping versus impermissible and unfair forum
shopping.
C. The Tedford Equitable Exception
In 2003, when deciding Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co.,35 the Fifth
Circuit recognized an equitable exception to the one-year bar in cases
filed in federal court based upon diversity); Lewis, supra note 28, at 206 (“[B]oth the
plaintiff and the defense sides of the bar generally believe that defendants derive a
significant advantage by removing a case to federal court.”); Paul Rosenthal, Improper
Joinder: Confronting Plaintiff’s Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2009) (“Forum selection is often the most important strategic
decision a party makes in a lawsuit.”). Defendants’ and plaintiffs’ shared perception of a
difference in outcome likely produces a real difference in outcome given that settlement
agreements are influenced by perceived advantages or disadvantages of the forum. See
Percy, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, supra note 5, at 213; Rosenthal, supra, at 50-51.
31. See Erik B. Walker, Keep Your Case in State Court, TRIAL, Sept. 2004, at 22
(instructing plaintiffs’ lawyers regarding methods to resist removal and keep litigation in
state court).
32. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 228-29 (acknowledging that defendants are
incentivized to wrongfully remove cases “on the gamblers’ chance” that removal might be
successful).
33. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1446, 28 U.S.C.A. §
1446 (West 1996) (commenting that the one-year bar may “invite tactical chicanery”).
34. See Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 56-57; see also Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping?
What’s Wrong with That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 25-26, 60 (2005) (arguing that lawyers
should engage in permissible forum selection); Georgene M. Vairo, Is Selection Shopping?,
NAT’L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at A16 (arguing that forum shopping is only improper when the
choice of forum is “frivolous”); see also Forrest v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01855JAR, 2017 WL 3087675, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017) (stating that even though
“[p]laintiffs clearly sought to secure an advantageous forum in the state court and joined
certain Plaintiffs for the very purpose of avoiding federal jurisdiction over this case,” such
joinder was not in bad faith because it was permissible under existing law) (Case No. 25 in
Table A); Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1273 (D.N.M. 2014) (“There is
nothing wrong with plaintiffs having a preference for state court, nor is there anything
invidious or ‘bad faith’ about using deliberate tactics to defeat federal jurisdiction.”).
35. 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).
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where the plaintiff manipulated removal jurisdiction.36 There, plaintiffs
Jaretta Tedford and Maria Castro filed suit in Texas state court seeking to
recover for injuries caused by their ingestion of the prescription drug,
Rezulin.37 The plaintiffs named Warner-Lambert, the diverse drug
manufacturer, and Dr. Johnson, a non-diverse and in-state physician who
had treated Castro but not Tedford.38 Warner-Lambert moved to sever
Tedford’s claims from Castro’s claims and to transfer Tedford’s claims to a
court in her county of residence.39 Aware that Warner-Lambert intended to
remove once the claims were severed, Tedford amended her complaint to
add Dr. DeLuca, a non-diverse and in-state physician who had prescribed
Rezulin to Tedford.40 The state court severed the claims and transferred
Tedford’s claims to another state court.41 Upon transfer, and before
expiration of the one-year period for removal, Warner-Lambert removed,
arguing that Tedford had fraudulently joined DeLuca.42 The federal district
court granted Tedford’s motion to remand, presumably finding that DeLuca
had not been fraudulently joined.43
Two days after the expiration of the one-year period, Tedford filed a
Notice of Nonsuit of Dr. DeLuca, which she had executed and transmitted
to DeLuca two days prior to the expiration of the one-year period.44
Warner-Lambert removed the case to federal district court a second time,
alleging that Tedford had wrongfully manipulated removal jurisdiction.45
Tedford argued that the timing of her dismissal of DeLuca was due to 1) her
desire to keep a preferential trial date to which Warner-Lambert had agreed
but to which DeLuca had objected and 2) her counsel’s consultation with
DeLuca’s counsel regarding DeLuca’s lack of moral culpability.46 The

36. Id. at 428-29.
37. Id. at 424.
38. Id. at 424-25.
39. Id. at 425.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. In order to determine whether a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a non-diverse
defendant, district courts within the Fifth Circuit must determine whether the plaintiff has a
reasonable possibility of recovering from the non-diverse defendant. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent.
R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the different fraudulent joinder
tests used by courts, see Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 220-24.
43. Tedford, 327 F.3d at 425.
44. Id. at 427-28.
45. Id. at 425.
46. See Brief of Appellant at 4-5, Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1-582). Tedford also claimed that, although she had signed the nonsuit
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district court denied Tedford’s motion to remand, finding an equitable
exception to the one-year period.47
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that “[s]trict application of the oneyear limit would encourage plaintiffs to join non-diverse defendants for 366
days simply to avoid federal court, thereby undermining the very purpose of
diversity jurisdiction.”48 Noting that it had previously determined the oneyear bar was procedural rather than jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit
determined that legislative amendment was unnecessary and explicitly
recognized an equitable exception to the one-year bar in cases where the
“plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the statutory rules for determining
federal removal jurisdiction.”49 Although the Fifth Circuit and other federal
courts found the one-year bar procedural and subject to an equitable
exception, the large majority of federal courts interpreted the one-year bar
as jurisdictional, and therefore not subject to an equitable exception.50
D. The ALI Proposal
In 2004, the American Law Institute proposed numerous revisions to the
Judicial Code.51 It concluded that the one-year bar “invites contrivance to
frustrate defendants’ legitimate rights of removal by a variety of stratagems,
and may operate unfairly even when the plaintiff has good-faith reasons to
use litigation tactics that render an action temporarily nonremovable.”52 The
ALI recommended that the one-year bar be completely removed from §
1446(b) and that § 1447(b) be amended to provide that, if a case is removed
based upon diversity more than one year after commencement, then “the
district court may in the interest of justice remand the action to the State
court from which it was removed.”53 The ALI proposal would have
before expiration of the one-year period, DeLuca did not immediately agree to sign it and
did so only after negotiation. Id. at 22 & n.6.
47. Tedford, 327 F.3d at 424. The federal district court certified its order for
interlocutory appeal. Id.
48. Id. at 427.
49. Id. at 428-29. The Fifth Circuit approvingly cited the American Law Institute’s draft
proposal to amend the removal statutes so as to entirely eliminate the one-year limitation but
grant district courts discretion to remand cases that are removed more than one year after
commencement “in the ‘interest of justice.’” Id. (quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION
PROJECT 157–58 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3 1999). For a discussion of the ALI’s
final proposal, see infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
50. See Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 160-66.
51. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT (AM. LAW INST. 2004) [hereinafter AM.
LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT].
52. Id. at 466.
53. Id. at 463, 466.
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required a plaintiff to file a motion to remand “in the interest of justice”
within thirty days of removal.54 The ALI acknowledged that the “in the
interest of justice” standard would grant district courts broad equitable
discretion,55 but argued that district courts could look to cases construing
the “in the interest of justice” standards in § 1404 and § 1406 of the venue
transfer statutes for guidance on construing the proposed revision.56 District
court opinions interpreting the “in the interest of justice” standard in the
venue statutes, however, have failed to produce a uniform and predictable
standard and have invited meritless motions to transfer venue that only
serve to delay litigation on the merits.57 The ALI also suggested that district
courts should consider “all the circumstances pertaining to the case,”
including “federalism concerns and efficient judicial administration as well
as the conduct and convenience interests of the parties.”58 The ALI proposal
failed to indicate how such factors should be weighed and failed to
articulate what conduct of the parties should be considered. Nor did it
indicate whether the plaintiff’s conduct had to amount to bad-faith forum
manipulation.59
E. The Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
At the same time the ALI was working on its proposed revisions to the
Judicial Code, the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial
Conference of the United States made recommendations to clarify existing
law and “increase judicial efficiency.”60 The committee recommended
seven specific revisions, including “creat[ing] an exception to the current
one-year period for removal upon a showing of plaintiff’s deliberate nondisclosure of the amount in controversy.”61 In November 2005, a House

54. Id. at 463-64.
55. Id. at 471.
56. Id. at 467. Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer venue to any other
district where the case could have been brought “for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). Section 1406(a)
authorizes a district court to transfer a case lacking venue to a district where the case could
have been brought “in the interest of justice.” Id. § 1406(a).
57. See Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 169.
58. AM. LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 51, at 471.
59. For a more extensive critique of the ALI proposal, see Percy, The Tedford Equitable
Exception, supra note 5, at 166-70.
60. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (2003).
61. Id. at 23.
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Judiciary Subcommittee held a hearing on legislation that included the
revisions proposed by the Judicial Conference.62 Three witnesses testified.
In her prepared statement introduced into the record, Judge Janet C. Hall,
a member of the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction, stated that the
exception to the one-year bar would resolve the spilt among courts over
whether the bar was jurisdictional or procedural and would allow courts to
recognize an exception based upon equitable factors.63 When questioned
whether the one-year bar should be abolished, Judge Hall responded that
the one-year bar was desirable to avoid removal of cases well underway in
state court and that recognizing an exception would best address forum
manipulation.64 Getting to the salient issue, Representative Schiff asked
whether there was any middle ground between recognizing an equitable
exception that was likely to create satellite litigation over forum and the
bright-line rule created by the one-year bar.65 Judge Hall responded that the
contours of the equitable exception could be derived from existing case law,
pointing to a similar exception to statutes of limitation.66
Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, also
testified about plaintiffs’ stratagems to improperly defeat removal
jurisdiction but cautioned that an equitable exception to the one-year bar
would “lead to innumerable fights over what constitutes equitable
considerations” and advocated abolishing the one-year bar.67
Law professor Arthur Hellman testified regarding the way the one-year
bar encouraged gamesmanship but suggested that the best way to eliminate
the gamesmanship was to completely do away with the one-year bar.68 He
indicated that creating an exception to the one-year bar would only be a
“modest improvement on current law.”69 In his prepared statement,
Hellman indicated that an exception focusing on plaintiff’s bad-faith
manipulation would encourage defendants to “paint plaintiffs’ litigation
tactics in the blackest colors” and would require courts to assess the
“blameworthiness of counsel’s actions.”70 He argued that neither exercise
62. Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005).
63. Id. at 12 (prepared statement of Judge Hall).
64. Id. at 59-60 (testimony of Judge Hall).
65. Id. at 67 (question of Rep. Schiff).
66. Id. (testimony of Judge Hall).
67. Id. at 50-51 (testimony of Richard Samp).
68. Id. at 16 (testimony of Professor Hellman).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 33 (prepared statement of Professor Hellman).
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was a “good use of judicial resources nor a good way of starting a
litigation.”71 Hellman predicted that the exception would create satellite
litigation over forum.72 In addition, Hellman supported the use of
declarations regarding the amount in controversy as one way to effectively
reduce the gamesmanship encouraged by the one-year bar.73
After the hearing, the Judicial Subcommittee promulgated an early
version of the JVCA, but the bill was not reported out of committee.74
Another version of the bill was introduced in the House in November
2009.75 The bill was intended to “bring more clarity to the operation of
jurisdictional statutes” because the current law forces judges “to waste time
determining jurisdictional issues at the expense of adjudicating the
underlying litigation.”76 The bill would have amended § 1446 to retain the
one-year bar “unless equitable considerations warrant removal,” and to
specify that “[s]uch equitable considerations include whether the plaintiff
has acted in bad faith, whether the defendant has acted diligently in seeking
to remove the action, and whether the case has progressed in State court to
a point where removal would be disruptive.”77 The bill further provided that
in diversity cases removed more than one year after commencement, “a
finding is made that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual
amount in controversy to prevent removal . . . shall be deemed an equitable
consideration . . . that warrants removal.”78
The bill also attempted to alleviate some of the difficulty in determining
the amount in controversy. The bill authorized the use of declarations.79 It
provided that, if a plaintiff files a binding declaration in state court within
the complaint or in addition to the complaint stipulating that the plaintiff
will not seek or accept an award greater than $75,000, then the case should

71. Id.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Id. at 43.
74. Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act of 2006, H.R. 5440, 109th Cong. (as
introduced in House, May 22, 2006).
75. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th
Cong. (as introduced on Nov. 19, 2009).
76. 156 CONG. REC. H7163 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement by Rep. Smith, who
sponsored the bill).
77. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th
Cong. § 105(b)(3)(D) (as introduced on Nov. 19, 2009).
78. Id. § 105(b)(5)(B).
79. Id. § 104(a).
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not be removed as long as the plaintiff abides by the declaration.80 The bill
further provided that, in cases where the plaintiff in good faith demands a
specific sum below the amount in controversy requirement and state law
forbids recovery of an amount greater than the amount demanded, “the
[amount] demanded shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.”81 In
cases in which the plaintiff does not demand a specific sum or demands a
specific sum but state law permits recovery of damages in excess of the
amount demanded, the defendant may remove but will be required to prove
the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.82
The House Judiciary Committee held no hearings or mark-up sessions on
the bill due to the “press of legislative business.”83 Instead, the committee
“work[ed] closely with the judiciary and various stakeholders” to review
and amend the bill informally.84 An amended version of the bill passed the
House in September 2010,85 which limited removal after one year to cases
in which the “plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant
from removing the action.”86 The bill was then referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which did not act on it before the end of the 111th
Congress.87
The bill was reintroduced in January 2011 in largely the same form as
had been approved by the House in 2010.88 Again, the Judiciary Committee
did not conduct hearings or formally evaluate the bill, instead relying upon
the informal vetting of the earlier bill.89 Although there was little debate,
the three representatives who spoke prior to the vote each indicated that the
bill was intended to reduce litigation over forum so that judges could focus

80. Id. The bill also authorized a plaintiff to file a declaration in the federal district court
within thirty days of removal. See id. § 104(b).
81. Id. § 105(b)(4).
82. Id.
83. 156 CONG. REC. H7163 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement by Rep. Smith, who
sponsored the bill).
84. Id.
85. 156 CONG. REC. H7161-64 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (debate on and passage of bill
by House).
86. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2010, H.R. 4113, 111th
Cong. § 103(b)(2)(C) (as voted on by the House on Sept. 28, 2010).
87. 156 CONG. REC. S7783 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (receipt of bill in Senate and
reference to Senate Judiciary Committee).
88. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, 112th
Cong. (as introduced on Jan. 24, 2011).
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 2 (2011).
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on the merits of the litigation.90 The Committee did not discuss the concern
raised at the hearing on the earlier version of the bill that the exception
would create satellite litigation over forum while only modestly curtailing
forum manipulation.91 The bill was approved by the House in February
2011,92 passed by the Senate in November 2011,93 and signed into law on
December 7, 2011. The bad faith exception applies to cases commenced in
state court on or after January 7, 2012.94
As amended by the JVCA, § 1446(c)(1) provides that a case may not be
removed based upon diversity more than one year after commencement
“unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in
order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.”95 Section
1446(c)(3)(B) provides that, if “the district court finds that the plaintiff
deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent
removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith.”96 In addition to creating
the bad faith exception to the one-year bar, the JCVA also made other
changes to removal/remand law.97 The JVCA amendments regarding the
90. “The . . . Act brings more clarity to the operation of jurisdictional statutes and
facilitates the identification of the appropriate State or Federal court where actions should be
brought. Judges believe the current rules force them to waste time determining jurisdictional
issues at the expense of adjudicating the underlying litigation.” 157 CONG. REC. H1369
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement by Rep. Smith, who sponsored the bill). “The
legislation addresses the inefficient rules which judges have identified [that require them to]
spend considerable time deliberating jurisdictional issues instead of analyzing the case’s
facts and applicable laws.” Id. at H1369 (statement by Rep. Johnson). Representative Lee
also suggested that the “efficient administration of justice” would be facilitated by clear
rules that require judges to spend less time determining jurisdictional issues so that they may
focus on the merits of the case before them. Id. at H1369 (statement by Rep. Lee).
91. 157 CONG. REC. H1367-70 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010). See supra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns about satellite litigation.
92. 157 CONG. REC. H1367 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011).
93. 157 CONG. REC. S8074 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2011) (Senate approving bill after
technical amendments).
94. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-63, § 205(2)(B), 125 Stat. 758, 765.
95. Id. § 103(b)(3)(C), 125 Stat. at 760.
96. Id.
97. With respect to removal of civil cases, the JVCA revised the formerly problematic
“separate and independent” claim provision of § 1441(c). Pursuant to the amended version
of § 1441(c), a case involving a federal question claim and an unrelated state claim may be
removed in its entirety, after which the district court shall sever and remand the state claim.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2012). The JVCA also addressed removal of civil cases involving
multiple defendants by codifying the rule of unanimity requiring all properly joined and
served defendants to join in the removal and by adopting the “last-served defendant” rule for
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amount in controversy are pertinent to an evaluation of the bad faith
exception because the amendments impact the degree to which plaintiffs
may manipulate the amount in controversy to prevent removal. As amended
by the JVCA, § 1446(c)(2) provides that the sum demanded in good faith in
the complaint establishes the amount in controversy unless: (i) the plaintiff
also seeks nonmonetary relief; or (ii) the plaintiff seeks monetary relief but
state law prohibits a plaintiff from demanding a specific sum or permits
recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded.98 In the case of
either exception, the district court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.99
Prior to the JVCA, district courts employed a variety of standards to
assess whether the amount in controversy requirement had been met.100
Some courts required the removing defendant to prove to “a legal certainty”
that the amount was met.101 Others required the defendant to prove the
amount by “some reasonable probability.”102 Still others only required that
the defendant prove that it was “not legally certain” that the amount fell
below the amount in controversy requirement.103 The majority of courts
required defendants to prove that the damages sought exceeded the
jurisdictional threshold “by a preponderance of the evidence.”104 In
codifying the “preponderance of the evidence standard,” the JVCA not only
clarified the burden but also made removal easier in those jurisdictions that
had previously used the “legal certainty” test.
The JVCA also clarified that in cases not initially removable because the
amount in controversy is uncertain, the defendant may conduct discovery in
state court and may, subject to the one-year bar, remove a case within thirty
days of receipt of a “pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it
may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable.”105 Specifically, the JVCA broadened the definition of “other
paper” to include discovery responses and information in the state court

purposes of establishing the thirty-day deadline for removal of cases involving defendants
who are served on different dates. Id. § 1446(b)(2).
98. Id. § 1446(c)(2).
99. Id.
100. See 14C CHARLIE ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3725.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012).
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record regarding the amount in controversy.106 Notably, the provision that
would have allowed the use of declarations to establish the amount in
controversy, which would have decreased litigation over forum, was
deleted from the legislation as part of the informal vetting process designed
to remove provisions considered controversial by advocacy groups.107
II. Removal/Remand Law and Plaintiff Forum Manipulation
In order to effectively critique the JVCA’s bad faith exception to the
one-year bar, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of current
removal/remand law as well as the primary methods by which plaintiffs
attempt to manipulate removal jurisdiction.
A. Removal and Remand Basics for Diversity Cases
A case may be removed from state to federal court based upon diversity
jurisdiction if the case is within the original diversity jurisdiction of the
federal district court and there is no properly joined and served defendant
who is a citizen of the forum state.108 Pursuant to § 1332 of the Judicial
Code, federal district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over cases
between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.109 The statute has long
been interpreted to require complete diversity.110
In order to effect removal, all properly joined and served defendants
must join in the notice of removal.111 The notice is to be filed in the federal
district court in the district in which the state court case is pending and must
contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal and must be
signed in accordance with Rule 11.112 The Supreme Court has held that a
defendant’s notice of removal must only contain “a plausible allegation that
the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.”113 If the
106. Id. § 1446(c)(3)(A); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 16 (2011) (explaining that the
JVCA clarifies that a defendant can pursue discovery in state court in order to establish the
amount in controversy).
107. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 2-3; see also Baude, supra note 7, at 38 (stating that
binding declarations would have been a “welcome reform”).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b).
109. Id. § 1332.
110. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
112. Id. § 1446(a). Pursuant to Rule 11, the attorney’s or party’s signature on the notice
of removal certifies that there is some evidentiary and non-frivolous legal basis for the
removal. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
113. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
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plaintiff or the court challenges the defendant’s allegation regarding the
amount in controversy, the defendant must submit evidence establishing
that the threshold amount is met.114 After filing the notice of removal in the
district court, the defendant(s) must file the notice with the state court clerk
and serve the notice on adverse parties.115 Removal is effective upon the
filing of the notice with the state court clerk, at which point the state court
is deprived of jurisdiction.116
If the case stated by the initial pleading is removable, then the
defendant(s) shall file the notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of
the initial pleading.117 If the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, but the case later becomes removable, then the defendant(s)
shall file the notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of the pleading,
motion, order or other paper that reveals removability.118 The JVCA
clarified that such “other papers” that might reveal removability include
information in the state court record regarding the amount in controversy
and discovery responses obtained while the case was pending in state
court.119 Pursuant to the “voluntary/involuntary” rule, a case may become
removable by a plaintiff’s voluntary act, such as dismissing the sole nondiverse defendant.120 A case does not become removable if the non-diverse
defendant is dismissed by the state court over the objection of the
plaintiff.121
Plaintiffs may move for remand based upon lack of subject matter
jurisdiction at any time before a final judgment but must move for remand
based upon other defects, including procedural defects, within thirty days of
the filing of the notice of removal.122 In recognizing the bad faith exception
114. Id. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) provides that removal is proper based upon a
defendant’s assertion that the threshold amount is met “if the district court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy [requirement is met].”
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
116. See id.
117. Id. § 1446(b)(1).
118. Id. § 1446(b)(3).
119. Id. § 1446(c)(3)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 16 (2011).
120. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 207 (discussing the origins,
justifications for, and application of the “voluntary/involuntary” rule).
121. See id. at 210-11. Pursuant to the voluntary/involuntary rule, courts have remanded
cases involving complete diversity created by involuntary dismissals, such as (i) summary
judgment in favor of the jurisdictional spoiler; (ii) directed verdict in favor of the spoiler;
(iii) dismissal of the spoiler for failure to state a claim; and (iv) dismissal of the spoiler based
upon the statute of limitations. Id.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The requirement of complete diversity is jurisdictional. The
requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and cost, is
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to the one-year bar, Congress intended to clarify that the one-year bar was
procedural rather than jurisdictional.123
As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the defendant bears the burden
of proving jurisdiction.124 Given that federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and because of the federalism concerns that are raised when a
federal court exercises removal jurisdiction based upon diversity, removal
statutes are strictly construed.125 Based upon similar reasoning, many courts
recognize a presumption against removal and hold that any doubt with
respect to removal jurisdiction should result in remand.126 If a case is
remanded, then the district court may order the removing defendant to pay
the plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs upon finding that the defendant lacked
an “objectively reasonable basis” for removal.127
B. Forum Manipulation by Plaintiffs
The primary methods by which plaintiffs manipulate removal
jurisdiction are: (1) by improperly joining and retaining a non-diverse or instate defendant; and (2) by obfuscating or concealing the fact that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.128 Admittedly, the absolute oneyear bar made it easier for plaintiffs to manipulate removal jurisdiction
because plaintiffs could avoid removal as long as their manipulation was
jurisdictional. The requirement that all properly joined and served defendants join in the
removal is procedural, as is the thirty-day period in which to remove.
123. See Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1256 (D.N.M. 2014); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 15.
124. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (holding
that the removing defendant must overcome the presumption against jurisdiction that arises
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction).
125. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (highlighting
that federalism concerns and Congressional intent to restrict removal jurisdiction require
strict construction of removal statutes); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (holding
that courts must strictly construe statutes conferring diversity jurisdiction in “[d]ue regard
for the rightful independence of state governments”). Serious federalism concerns are raised
when a federal court decides novel or ambiguous issues of state law. See Percy, The Tedford
Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 154-56 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction deprives
states of their right to develop and define state common law and to apply and interpret state
statutes and further arguing that federal courts often mis-predict state law when making Erie
guesses).
126. See, e.g., Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir.
2018); Brazell v. Waite, 525 F. App’x 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2013); Russell Corp. v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012); see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S.
132, 141 (2005) (interpreting § 1447(c)).
128. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
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not detected before expiration of the one-year period. For example, in cases
having complete diversity where the true amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000, plaintiffs could demand a sum less than the jurisdictional amount
in the original pleading and conceal the true amount in controversy until
after expiration of the one-year period.129 Likewise, plaintiffs could sue a
diverse defendant and improperly join non-diverse or in-state defendants
for the sole purpose of defeating removal jurisdiction and then dismiss such
defendants after expiration of the one-year period.130 Plaintiffs engage in
different types of improper joinder in an effort to defeat removal. This
Article distinguishes between fraudulent joinder, fraudulent procedural
misjoinder, and strategic joinder.
1. Strategic Joinder
Some courts have found that improper strategic joinder occurs when a
plaintiff sues a diverse defendant and joins a non-frivolous claim against a
non-diverse or in-state defendant without any intention of seriously
pursuing the claim against the jurisdictional spoiler and for the sole purpose
of defeating removal.131 The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, if
it had passed, would have codified this type of strategic joinder as a type of
fraudulent joinder if the district court were to find that “objective evidence
clearly demonstrates that there is no good faith intention to prosecute the

129. See, e.g., Brown v. Descheeny, No. 03:09-cv-21-HTW-LRA, 2010 WL 1141156, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 22, 2010) (noting the plaintiff in a collision case demanded only
$74,000 from the defendant in the complaint, but more than two years after case was filed,
plaintiff designated experts claiming the plaintiff had sustained permanent injuries and sent
defendant a demand letter for $100,000); Brower v. Staley, Inc., No. 2:05CV212PA, 2006
WL 839469, at *1-2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2006), aff’d, 306 F. App’x 36 (5th Cir. 2008)
(noting the plaintiff in a collision case demanded less than $75,000 from the defendant in the
complaint but then amended the complaint more than one year after commencement to seek
additional damages).
130. See, e.g., In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1355, 2007 WL 1668752, at
*1 (E.D. La. June 6, 2007) (noting that the plaintiff, without justifiable explanation,
dismissed the non-diverse defendants more than three years after the case was filed in state
court and had never propounded discovery to them, had not deposed them, and had not
offered expert opinions against them); Brooks v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No.
401CV00008-PB, 2003 WL 22037730, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 20, 2003) (explaining that
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the non-diverse defendant more than two years after the case
was filed in state court without having propounded any discovery and without having taken a
default judgment against the non-diverse defendant).
131. See Katherine L. Floyd, The One-Year Limit on Removal: An Ace up the Sleeve of
the Unscrupulous Litigant?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1073, 1082 (2008).
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action against [the spoiler] or to seek a joint judgment including [the
spoiler].”132
When a plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant as a party to invoke
enhanced discovery options, such joinder is not considered improper even if
the plaintiff has no intention of obtaining a judgment against the nondiverse defendant.133 In addition, most courts do not consider joinder
improper simply because the non-diverse defendant is judgment-proof.134
Prior to the JVCA, in those jurisdictions recognizing an equitable exception
to the one-year bar, many courts found improper strategic joinder in cases
where the plaintiff sued a diverse defendant, joined a non-frivolous claim
against a non-diverse or an in-state defendant, and then dismissed the nondiverse or in-state defendant after expiration of the one-year period without
offering sufficient explanation for the conduct.135 In these cases, the courts
essentially inferred that the plaintiff strategically joined the non-diverse
defendant for the sole purpose of defeating removal. In determining
whether the plaintiff strategically joined the spoiler and then dismissed the

132. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. sec. 2, §
1447(f)(2)(D).
133. See AM. LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 52, at 466 (stating that it is
not improper to join a non-diverse party in order to take of advantage of enhanced discovery
options for parties as opposed to non-parties, even if the plaintiff has no interest in pursuing
the claim against the non-diverse party); E. Kyle McNew, Note, Are Rules Just Meant to Be
Broken: The One-Year Two-Step in Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1315, 1363 (2005) (same).
134. See, e.g., Navarrette v. A.S. Horner, Inc., EP-16-CV-370-PRM, 2017 WL 1536086,
at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2017) (stating that if there is a reasonable basis for the claim
against the spoiler, “the motive for joining such a defendant is immaterial, even when the
defendant is judgment-proof”); Carter v. Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co., Civil Action No.
209CV066-P-A, 2010 WL 324438, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 20, 2010) (same); Myers v. Air
Serv. Corp., Civil Action No. 1:07CV911, 2008 WL 149136, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 9, 2008)
(same).
135. See, e.g., Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 425-26 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003).
In Tedford, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in improper forum
manipulation of this sort because the plaintiff did not pursue discovery from the in-state
physician, dismissed the in-state physician immediately after the expiration of the one-year
period, and did not reasonably explain the timing of the dismissal to the court’s satisfaction.
Id. at 427. The court discredited the plaintiff’s explanation for the timing of her dismissal of
the non-diverse doctor. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. Plaintiff claimed that
she had non-suited the in-state physician in order to preserve a preferential trial date to
which Warner-Lambert had agreed and because her lawyer had consulted with the
physician’s attorney and had determined that the physician was not morally culpable.
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5, Tedford v. Warner Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).
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spoiler after expiration of the one-year period without sufficient
explanation, courts have considered:
(i) the plaintiff’s failure to serve the jurisdictional spoiler, (ii) the
plaintiff’s failure to obtain a default judgment against the
jurisdictional spoiler, (iii) the plaintiff’s failure to propound
written discovery requests to the spoiler, (iv) the plaintiff’s
failure to depose the spoiler, (v) the plaintiff’s failure to
designate an expert witness in support of the claim against the
spoiler, and (vi) the plaintiff’s failure to respond in opposition to
a dispositive motion made by the spoiler.136
Applying the JVCA, courts have found bad-faith forum manipulation in
similar instances.137
2. Fraudulent Joinder
The Supreme Court has long held that a plaintiff’s fraudulent joinder of a
non-diverse defendant will not defeat removal jurisdiction.138 Although
defined in slightly different ways by the circuit courts, fraudulent joinder
occurs when the plaintiff sues a diverse defendant and joins what is
essentially a frivolous claim against a non-diverse or an in-state
defendant.139 In cases involving fraudulent joinder, the diverse defendant
may remove the case to federal court despite the lack of complete diversity,
at which point the federal court then dismisses the fraudulently joined nondiverse or in-state defendant, thereby creating removal jurisdiction based
upon complete diversity.
“Even though the term ‘fraudulent joinder’ suggests” a subjective
standard focused on the plaintiff’s intent, “no circuit court has adopted a
test” that turns on the plaintiff’s subjective intent140 and Supreme Court
136. Percy, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, supra note 5, at 249 (citing various
cases) (footnotes omitted).
137. See, e.g., Lawson v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 4:13-cv-923-O, 2014 WL 1158880,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2014) (Case No. 19 in Table B); Forth v. Diversey Corp., No. 13CV-808-A, 2013 WL 6096528, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (Case No. 20 in Table B).
138. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 183 (1907).
139. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 216-20 (discussing the
various circuit court standards used to define fraudulent joinder). The Fifth Circuit defines
fraudulent joinder as joinder of a non-diverse or in-state defendant from whom the plaintiff
has no reasonable possibility of recovery. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568,
573 (5th Cir. 2004).
140. See AM. LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 52, at 515; Percy, Making a
Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 217.
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precedent indicates that the plaintiff’s motive for joining the non-diverse
defendant is immaterial if there is a reasonable basis for the claim against
the non-diverse defendant.141 Most courts use one of the following tests:
(i) the “reasonable basis for the claim” test, requiring the
removing defendant to prove there was no reasonable basis for
the claim against the non-diverse defendant at the time it was
filed; (ii) the “no possibility of recovery” test, requiring the
removing defendant to prove there is no possibility the plaintiff
will recover from the non-diverse defendant; (iii) the “no
reasonable possibility of recovery” test, requiring the removing
defendant to prove there is no reasonable possibility the plaintiff
will recover from the non-diverse defendant; and (iv) the “failure
to state a claim” test, equating fraudulent joinder with failure to
state a claim.142
In order to determine whether the non-diverse defendant has been
fraudulently joined, most district courts will consider the pleadings and
only pierce the pleadings to consider extrinsic evidence in limited
circumstances to ensure that the jurisdictional inquiry does not subsume
determination of the merits.143 For example, the Fifth Circuit held that it is
only appropriate for a district court to pierce the pleadings when the
plaintiff has omitted or misstated discrete facts (facts unrelated to the merits
of the claim against the diverse defendant) that would determine whether
the non-diverse defendant had been fraudulently joined.144 Similarly, the
Third and Tenth Circuits limit piercing of the pleadings,145 and the Fourth

141. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 318 (1909) (holding that where there was a
reasonable basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the non-diverse defendant, “no motive could
make his choice a fraud”). For additional cases, see Percy, Making a Federal Case of It,
supra note 5, at 213 n.177.
142. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 216 (footnotes omitted).
143. Id. at 224-29.
144. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Instances in which piercing would be appropriate
include when a plaintiff asserts a products liability claim against a diverse drug manufacturer
and also names: (i) an in-state doctor who did not treat the plaintiff or prescribe the drug in
question to the plaintiff; or (ii) an in-state pharmacist who did not fill the prescription at
issue for the plaintiff. Id. at 574 n.12 (citing Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 648-49 (5th Cir.
2003)).
145. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that if
piercing is permissible, which the court did not decide, the piercing must be very limited);
Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he federal
court will [not] pre-try, as a matter of course, doubtful issues of fact to determine
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and Eleventh Circuits have cautioned against extensive piercing of the
pleadings that would convert the jurisdictional inquiry into a substantive
one.146 Since the JVCA’s adoption of the bad faith exception, courts have
found bad faith justifying removal more than one year after commencement
in cases where the plaintiff fraudulently joined the jurisdictional spoiler.147
3. Fraudulent Procedural Misjoinder
Fraudulent procedural misjoinder was first recognized by the Eleventh
Circuit in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp.148 and occurs when a
plaintiff asserts non-frivolous claims against a diverse and a non-diverse
defendant in the same case in state court even though the state joinder rules
provide no reasonable basis for joinder.149 For example, fraudulent
misjoinder occurs when a plaintiff who has suffered injuries from two
separate automobile accidents sues the diverse driver who caused the first
accident and the non-diverse driver who caused the second accident in the
same lawsuit even though the accidents are unrelated and joinder of the
claims is unsupported by procedural rules. Similarly, fraudulent procedural
misjoinder occurs when a plaintiff who is diverse from the defendant joins a
plaintiff who is not diverse from the defendant, defeating complete
diversity, when there is no reasonable basis for the plaintiffs to join in the
same case under the state’s joinder rules.150 In cases involving fraudulent
removability; the issue must be [one] capable of summary determination and be proven with
complete certainty.”).
146. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc. 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999); Crowe v.
Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
147. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-780-A, 2017 WL 4481168
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017) (Case No. 1 in Table B); In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
No. 16-cv-02408, 2016 WL 4264193 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) (Case No. 6 in Table B).
148. 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d
1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
149. See E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569 (2006) [hereinafter Percy, Emerging Fraudulent
Misjoinder Doctrine] (discussing the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine and arguing that the
joinder rules of the forum state should be used to determine whether there has been
fraudulent misjoinder). But see Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The
Improper Party Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 781 (2006)
(discussing the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine and arguing that the federal joinder rules
should be used to determine whether there has been fraudulent misjoinder).
150. For example, assume that plaintiff A, a Mississippi citizen, joins with plaintiff B, a
New York citizen, in the same lawsuit in Mississippi state court. Further assume that each
plaintiff asserts unrelated products liability/drug defect claims against the sole defendant, a
drug manufacturer that is a citizen of New York. If the joinder of the plaintiffs in the same
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procedural misjoinder, the diverse defendant may remove the case to
federal court, at which point the district court will sever the misjoined
claims and remand any claims over which it has no subject-matter
jurisdiction.151
If the defendants move to sever the case in state court based upon
misjoinder and the severance in state court creates removability, then the
voluntary/involuntary rule prevents removal in some jurisdictions because
removal jurisdiction was not created by a voluntary act of the plaintiff.152
Some jurisdictions, however, have distinguished between state-court orders
severing claims and state-court orders dismissing claims and have found the
voluntary/involuntary rule inapplicable to severance orders.153 In response
to these cases, commentators have argued that courts should recognize the
fraudulent procedural misjoinder doctrine rather than recognizing an
exception to the voluntary/involuntary rule because a state court’s order
severing claims does not equate to a finding of egregious procedural
misjoinder as required by Tapscott.154
As has been previously argued by this author and others, fraudulent
procedural misjoinder is a variant of substantive fraudulent joinder that
should be recognized by all federal courts in order to preserve diverse
defendants’ right to remove.155 If fraudulent procedural misjoinder were
widely recognized, it would obviate the need to recognize an exception to
the voluntary/involuntary rule when a state court’s severance order creates
diversity jurisdiction. The defendant would not have to move for severance
in the state court because the defendant could simply remove the entire case
lawsuit is clearly prohibited by the existing Mississippi joinder rules, the plaintiffs have
committed fraudulent procedural misjoinder.
151. Although the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine has yet to be recognized in all
jurisdictions, it would effectively protect diverse defendants’ right to remove in cases
involving egregiously misjoined parties. See Percy, Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder
Doctrine, supra note 149, at 588-90 (arguing that recognition of the fraudulent misjoinder
doctrine is necessary to protect the right to remove).
152. See, e.g., Matteo v. Progressive Advanced Ins., Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-5012,
2012 WL 13018245 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 27, 2012).
153. See, e.g., Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2006);
Hamilton v. Morehouse, Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-459-H, 2010 WL 3810190 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 23, 2010).
154. See, e.g., Jeff Fisher, Everybody Plays the Fool, Sometimes; There's No Exception
to the Rule: Procedural Misjoinder Is Not an Exception to the Voluntary-Involuntary Rule,
60 BAYLOR L. REV. 993, 1017-20 (2008).
155. See Percy, Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine, supra note 149; Hines &
Gensler, supra note 149; Jason Harmon, Procedural Misjoinder: The Quest for a Uniform
Standard, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1429 (2014).
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to federal court based upon fraudulent procedural misjoinder. Widespread
recognition of the doctrine would obviate the need for fraudulent procedural
misjoinder to be considered bad-faith forum manipulation under the JVCA
because removal based on fraudulent procedural misjoinder is almost
always possible at the outset of litigation or within the one-year period.156
4. Manipulation of the Amount in Controversy
Applying the JVCA, courts have found bad faith in instances in which
the plaintiff concealed the true amount in controversy. For example, in
Calvary Baptist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Co.,157 the district
court found bad faith on the part of the plaintiff where the plaintiff
indicated it was seeking less than $75,000, was unresponsive to defendant’s
discovery requests regarding damages, and clarified that it was seeking
damages of $90,503.66 more than one year after commencement.158 Given
the myriad methods by which plaintiffs manipulate forum, it is necessary to
consider whether the bad faith exception to the one-year bar is necessary to
prevent each variant of manipulation and whether the exception will
affectively do so.
III. Statutory Meaning and Judicial Interpretation
of the Bad Faith Exception
The JVCA does not clearly or comprehensively define what constitutes
bad faith.159 It simply provides that a district court must make two factual
findings in order to find removal proper: (i) that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith; and (ii) that the plaintiff’s bad faith was for the purpose of preventing
removal.160 The legislative history indicates that the exception was intended
to be limited in scope and to grant district courts discretion to allow
156. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
157. No. CIV-15-1283-M, 2016 WL 543239 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2016) (Case No. 9 in
Table B).
158. Id. at *2; see also Taylor v. Foremost Ins. Co., No. 5:15-CV-00164(LJA), 2016 WL
11083156, at *5 (M.D. Ga. June 24, 2016) (Case No. 7 in Table B) (finding bad faith where
the plaintiff amended the complaint to increase the damages sought pursuant to a property
insurance policy from $73,500 to $150,000 more than one year after commencement in state
court).
159. See McAdam Props., LLC v. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC, 290 F. Supp. 2d
1279 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (Case No. 9 in Table A) (“There is very little authority on what ‘bad
faith’ means in the context of the statute.”); Johnson v. HCR Manorcare LLC, No. 1:15-cv00189, 2015 WL 6511301, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015) (Case No. 77 in Table A)
(“The contours of the bad faith exception are murky in the Fourth Circuit.”).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (2012)
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removal after one year based upon sufficient findings.161 Notably, the
JVCA amended § 1446(c)(3)(B) to provide that if “the district court finds
that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in
controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith.”
The Act provides no more guidance regarding what constitutes bad faith. It
does not indicate whether fraudulent joinder or fraudulent procedural
misjoinder may constitute bad faith. Given that the JVCA was meant to
codify the exception recognized in Tedford, presumably improper strategic
joinder may constitute bad faith.
Not only does the JVCA suffer from definitional omissions, but also its
sole definition of bad faith is problematic because it equates a plaintiff’s
deliberate failure to disclose the actual amount in controversy with bad
faith. Many states do not require plaintiffs to demand a specific sum in the
complaint.162 Some states even forbid plaintiffs from demanding a sum
certain.163 Absent an obligation or duty under state law to reveal the true
amount in controversy, it is difficult to see how a plaintiff’s deliberate
failure to disclose an amount constitutes bad faith. Such a duty might be
triggered by serving discovery requests on the plaintiff or state court rules
requiring the plaintiff to file a disclosure regarding the amount of damages
sought.
In addition to definitional lack of clarity, the JVCA amendments also
create procedural confusion. The Act provides that a case may not be
removed more than one year after commencement unless the federal district
court finds the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The Act’s bad
faith exception fails to recognize that the district court cannot make such
findings until the case has been removed. Removal is accomplished by
filing the notice of removal in federal district court, providing written notice
to all adverse parties, and filing a copy of the notice with the state court. 164
At that point, the state court is deprived of jurisdiction.165 Thus, in reality,
the statute does not limit removal to those cases in which bad faith actually
occurred. Instead, it invites removal in any case in which the defendant is
willing to allege bad-faith forum manipulation by the plaintiff. Defendants

161. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 15 (2011).
162. See Baude, supra note 7, at 34; Lewis, supra note 28, at 225-26 (discussing the
various state pleading rules and noting that, in the large majority of state courts, plaintiffs are
not required to allege an amount in controversy that would satisfy the federal threshold).
163. See Lewis, supra note 29, at 225-26.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2012).
165. Id.
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have every incentive to remove based upon alleged bad faith,166 even if they
think the case will eventually be remanded to state court because removing
delays eventual resolution,167 forces the plaintiff to expend resources
litigating the issue of proper forum, and creates only minimal exposure to
sanctions for improper removal.168 As one court concluded, “the bad faith
exception is a recipe for many more improper removals” that will “produce
significant judicial inefficiency and needless friction between federal and
state courts.”169
The JVCA does not indicate whether a plaintiff’s bad faith may be
inferred from objective evidence, whether the bad faith must be egregious,
whether the court may consider the motives of plaintiff’s counsel,170 what
evidentiary standard applies to the bad faith finding, or what evidence the
district court may consider when determining bad faith. Given the
numerous issues left unresolved by the JVCA itself, court interpretation of
the various provisions will have significant impact.
A. Circuit Court Opinions Applying the Exception
Only two circuit courts have addressed the JVCA’s bad faith exception.
In Chavez v. Time Warner Cable, LLC,171 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
166. In many of the analyzed cases, the defendant(s) removed the case multiple times.
See Case Nos. 12, 19, 32, 34, 40, 61, 75, 76, 79, 81, 89, 90, 94, 97, 103, 107, 110, 113 and
132 in Table A (nineteen of the 136 cases that were remanded—fourteen percent).
167. In many of the cases that were remanded, the case had been pending in federal
district court for more than six months after removal. See Case Nos. 2, 4, 5, 11, 16, 18, 37,
42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 55, 62, 69, 81, 84, 85, 100, 101, 110, 111, 125, 127, 134 and
136 in Table A.
168. See Emily L. Buchanan, A Comity of Errors: Treading on State Court Jurisdiction
in the Name of Federalism, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2013) (noting the payoff to a
defendant for improper removal “can be well worth the risk” because sanctions are rarely
imposed); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 16, at 553; Percy, The Tedford Equitable
Exception, supra note 5, at 182; see also Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225,
1263, 1282 (D.N.M. 2014) (observing that it will be difficult for defendants to prevail on a
bad-faith removal but relatively easy for defendants to concoct a bad faith argument and
escape sanctions upon remand, and noting that the vague and nebulous bad faith standard
invites and encourages improper removals). In the cases that were remanded to state court
after the defendant improperly removed based upon alleged bad faith, the district court
sanctioned the removing defendant in only thirteen of 136 cases (less than ten percent of the
remanded cases). See Case Nos. 6, 14, 21, 45, 58, 59, 65, 69, 86, 92, 123, 133 & 134 in
Table A; see also sources cited supra note 16.
169. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1263.
170. Inquiry into motives of plaintiff’s counsel would intrude into their “work product
and private litigation strategy.” Id.
171. 728 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2018).
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lower court’s finding of bad faith, holding that the “district court did not
clearly err in determining that Chavez’s counsel acted in bad faith” by
asserting PAGA claims in state court, deleting the PAGA claims after the
first removal (thereby securing remand back to state court because the
damages fell below the jurisdictional threshold), and then adding the PAGA
claim once back in state court after expiration of the one-year period.172 The
court did not define or explicate the bad faith exception.
In Hill v. Allianz Life Insurance Co.,173 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding of bad faith, noting that “[the plaintiff], in bad faith,
concealed information about his alleged damages.”174 The district court
found no reasonable or plausible explanation for the plaintiff’s delay in
amending the complaint to seek damages above the jurisdictional
threshold.175 The district court noted that plaintiff’s original complaint
demanded more than $15,000 but less than $75,000.176 It rejected plaintiff’s
explanation that some of the additional damages were only discovered in
response to a subpoena issued after the one-year period, concluding that
“any amount of reasonable diligence” by the plaintiff would have
uncovered the basis for plaintiff’s amended complaint seeking damages
above the jurisdictional threshold.177 The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss
this aspect of the district court’s holding nor did it explain or clarify the bad
faith standard. Future elucidating guidance from appellate courts is unlikely
because remand orders based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or
procedural defects are generally not reviewable on appeal.178

172. Id. at 647. The district court held:
Th[e] sequence of events suspiciously resembles a ploy to evade removal by
waiting out the clock. Compounding matters further, Plaintiff failed to provide
any explanation for the suspicious timing of his amendments or the decision to
omit the PAGA claim until just after the one-year limitation had expired. Based
on these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s bad faith equitably tolls the oneyear limitation, rendering Defendants’ removal timely.
Chavez v. Time Warner Cable LLC, CV 12-5291-RGK (RZX), 2016 WL 7647559, at *8
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016) (Case No. 10 in Table B).
173. 693 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2017).
174. Id. at 856.
175. Hill v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
176. Id. at 1278.
177. Id. at 1283.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012).
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B. District Court Opinions Applying the Exception
1. Evidentiary Standard
The JVCA does not indicate the evidentiary standard by which the
removing defendant must prove plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation. In
Iqbal v. Normandin Transit, Inc.,179 the court held that the removing
defendant must prove plaintiff’s bad faith by clear and convincing
evidence.180 Other courts have held: (i) that to prove bad faith, a defendant
must “bear[ ] an arduous burden that requires evidence of forum
manipulation;”181 (ii) that defendants’ “‘bad faith’ arguments [must] meet
the heavy burden [] required to overcome a motion to remand;”182 and (iii)
that the “[d]efendant ‘carries a heavy burden of persuasion in making this
showing’ that Plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal.”183 Other
courts generally hold that the removing defendant bears the burden of
proving removal jurisdiction and that removal statutes should be strictly
construed due to the federalism concerns raised by the exercise of removal
jurisdiction based upon diversity.184 At least one court, however, has
questioned “how aggressively the presumption against removal should be
applied” given that the exception was intended to “protect access to a
federal forum.”185 The court concluded that the “defendant must present
strong, relatively compelling evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the
plaintiff’s subjective intent.”186 Given this incongruity, Congress should, at
a minimum, clarify the applicable evidentiary standard.

179. No. 15-CV-746-A, 2016 WL 3563218 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016) (Case No. 63 in
Table A); see also Forth v. Diversey Corp., No. 13-CV-808-A, 2013 WL 6096528, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (Case No. 20 in Table B).
180. Iqbal, 2016 WL 3563218, at *1.
181. Ramirez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-CV-09131, 2015 WL 4665809, at *3
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 6, 2015) (Case No. 82 in Table A).
182. Williams v. 3M Co., No. 7:18-CV-63-KKC, 2018 WL 3084710, at *5 (E.D. Ky.
June 22, 2018) (emphasis omitted) (Case No. 1 in Table A).
183. Hart v. Target Corp., No. CV 17-11267 (SRC), 2018 WL 447616, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan.
17, 2018) (quoting Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992)) (Case
No. 10 in Table A).
184. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. Ltd., No. 3:13CV150 DPJ-FKB,
2013 WL 7863752 (S.D. Miss. May 2, 2013) (Case No. 130 in Table A).
185. Holman v. Coventry Health & Life Ins., No. CIV-17-0886-HE, 2017 WL 5514177,
at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 17, 2017) (Case No. 12 in Table A).
186. Id.
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2. Strategic Joinder
The district courts that have applied the bad faith exception to strategic
joinder have done so in varied methods, but “two prevailing standards have
emerged.”187 The district court’s decision in Aguayo v. AMCO Insurance
Co.188 is by far the most detailed opinion addressing the exception’s
application to strategic joinder. There, a murder victim’s family sued the
non-diverse murderer and other non-diverse defendants allegedly
responsible for the murder along with a diverse insurer that had provided
uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle used by the murderer
immediately before he shot the victim.189 Almost two years after the case
was filed in state court and just six days before the case was set for trial
there, the plaintiff dismissed the murderer, who was the sole remaining
non-diverse defendant.190 Two days prior to trial, the diverse insurer
removed, alleging that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith because they did not
actively pursue the claims against the non-diverse defendants.191
Noting that the JVCA is silent with respect to what constitutes improper
strategic joinder, the district court adopted a two-pronged standard. First,
“the [c]ourt inquires whether the plaintiff actively litigated [the claim]
against the [jurisdictional] spoiler.”192 Failure to actively litigate constitutes
bad faith.193 Active litigation against the spoiler raises a presumption of
good faith that may be rebutted by direct evidence of plaintiff’s bad faith
already within the removing defendant’s possession.194
The court acknowledged “that [the] active litigation inquiry is a proxy
for” the plaintiff’s subjective intent.195 The inquiry is over-inclusive
because plaintiffs may have legitimate reasons to keep a non-diverse
defendant in the case even though the plaintiff is not actively litigating
against that defendant.196 It is also under-inclusive because a plaintiff can
prevent removal by actively litigating against a jurisdictional spoiler even if

187. Williams, 2018 WL 3084710, at *3 (Case No. 1 in Table A).
188. 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D.N.M. 2014).
189. Id. at 1229-31.
190. Id. at 1231.
191. Id. at 1231-32.
192. Id. at 1262.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1262-63 (indicating that no discovery regarding bad faith would be permitted
after removal).
195. Id. at 1274.
196. Id. at 1276.
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the plaintiff’s sole goal is to prevent removal.197 With respect to the second
part of the test, the court noted that the subjective inquiry into whether the
plaintiff acted in bad faith “is a difficult test for courts to apply and runs the
risk of putting the plaintiffs’ attorneys on the stand and asking them about
their litigation strategy.”198 The court then found that the plaintiffs had
actively litigated the case against the murderer and other non-diverse
defendants well past the one-year mark.199 The court further found that the
insurer produced no direct evidence to rebut the presumption of good
faith.200
The Aguayo court acknowledged that, in response to the active-litigation
proxy for bad faith, plaintiffs will simply retain the non-diverse defendant,
“jump[] through the hoops of actively litigating in state court,”201 and will
almost always be able to justify such retention on grounds other than forum
manipulation.202 The court also expressed concern that the amorphous bad
faith exception would encourage defendants to remove improperly for
strategic advantage.203
While several district courts have adopted Aguayo’s two-pronged
inquiry,204 others have rejected the Aguayo framework for public-policy
reasons, concerned that the active-litigation proxy will force plaintiffs to

197. Id. at 1274.
198. Id. at 1264.
199. Id. at 1263.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1274.
202. Id. at 1264. Justifications might include: (i) “leveraging the claims against the [nondiverse] defendant to encourage the defendant to testify on the plaintiff’s behalf;” (ii)
obtaining greater discovery by virtue of the non-diverse defendant’s status as a party rather
than a non-party; and (iii) preventing the diverse defendant from raising an “empty chair”
defense by attempting to shift blame to an absent non-diverse tortfeasor. Id. at 1265; see also
Plaxe v. Fiegura, No. 17-1055, 2018 WL 2010025, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2018) (“The
empty-chair defense is a well-recognized ‘trial tactic in a multi-party case whereby one
defendant attempts to put all the fault on a defendant who . . . settled before trial or on a
person who was . . . no[t] named as a party.’” (quoting Empty-Chair Defense, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 484 (9th ed. 2009))) (Case No. 4 in Table A).
203. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1263.
204. See, e.g., Massey v. 21st Century Centennial Ins., No. 2:17-CV-01922, 2017 WL
3261419, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. July 31, 2017) (Case No. 3 in Table B); Bristol v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 4:16-CV-01649-JAR, 2016 WL 6277198, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2016) (Case No.
57 in Table A).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

628

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:595

retain non-diverse defendants needlessly and engage in meaningless
discovery with respect to their liability.205 One district court held that
the Aguayo test has the potential to deter plaintiffs from
dismissing defendants they realize are not necessary, as well as
force plaintiffs to request meaningless discovery to avoid the
exception being exercised. Both risks increase the cost of
litigation and could prolong and complicate the litigation
process. Limiting the availability of the exception, rather than
expanding it, would alleviate these concerns. The exception
should only be afforded to those defendants who were helplessly
stuck in state court because of the demonstrable bad faith
conduct of the plaintiffs.206
Rather than follow Aguayo’s two-pronged test, some district courts have
inquired whether the plaintiff engaged in intentional conduct (action or
inaction) to deprive the defendant of the right to remove.207 In two such
cases, there was direct evidence that the plaintiff kept the spoiler in the case
past the one-year period for the express purpose of defeating jurisdiction. In
Comer v. Schmitt, counsel for the non-diverse defendant had informed
counsel for the diverse defendant that plaintiff would not consummate the
settlement agreement until after the one-year period because plaintiff did
not want the diverse defendant to remove.208 Similarly, in Hiser v. Seay,
plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that he did not finalize the settlement terms
with the jurisdictional spoiler until after expiration of the one-year period in
an effort to keep the case in state court.209 It is unlikely that direct evidence
of plaintiffs’ expressed intent will be available in many cases.
The bad faith exception is unlikely to be very effective in curtailing badfaith strategic joinder because plaintiffs will simply maintain their claims
against the jurisdictional spoiler and engage in the minimal effort necessary
to actively litigate the case against the spoiler until a global settlement is
reached or the state court dismisses the spoiler, triggering the operation of

205. See, e.g., Dutchmaid Logistics, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-857, 2017 WL
1324610 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017) (Case No. 43 in Table A).
206. Id. at *3.
207. See, e.g., Comer v. Schmitt, No. 2:15-CV-2599, 2015 WL 5954589, at * 4 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 14, 2015) (Case No. 12 in Table B); Hiser v. Seay, No. 5:14-CV-170, 2014 WL
6885433, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2014) (Case No. 16 in Table B).
208. Comer, 2015 WL 5954589, at *4.
209. Hiser, 2014 WL 6885433, at *3.
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the voluntary/involuntary rule preventing removal.210 Thus, the exception
will have the deleterious effect of forcing plaintiffs to refuse to settle with
the spoiler when they otherwise might do so, imposing additional costs “on
the plaintiff, the spoiler, and the state court.”211 If the plaintiff agrees to
settle with a spoiler after one year, the plaintiff might exact a settlement
premium from the spoiler, given that the settlement value of the plaintiff’s
claim against the diverse defendant will likely decrease upon removal.
3. Fraudulent Joinder
Many courts have held that fraudulent joinder does not constitute bad
faith because fraudulent joinder is usually resolved by analyzing whether
there is a reasonable basis for the claim against the spoiler without
reference to the plaintiff’s subjective intent, whereas the statutory bad faith
exception requires some kind of intentional conduct by the plaintiff.212
Although some courts have recognized the plaintiff’s fraudulent joinder as
bad-faith prevention of removal, they did so without addressing whether the
plaintiff took any intentional action that prevented the defendant from
removing within the one-year period, given that fraudulent joinder rests
upon the obvious deficiency in the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler.213
As courts have recognized, if fraudulent joinder alone constitutes badfaith prevention of removal under the statute, the purpose of the statute
would be defeated because defendants could strategically manipulate
jurisdiction by waiting to see how things in state court develop and then
removing based on fraudulent joinder when the state court litigation takes

210. See Aguayo v. AMCO Ins., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1277 (D.N.M. 2014); Percy, The
Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 185-86.
211. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1277.
212. See McAdam Props., LLC v. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC, 290 F. Supp. 3d
1279, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (“[S]tatutory bad faith requires some sort of intentional
misconduct by the plaintiff, not just fraudulent joinder.”) (emphasis omitted) (Case No. 9 in
Table A); Ramirez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-CV-09131, 2015 WL 4665809, at *4 n.3
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 6, 2015) (observing that “the bad faith standard under [§] 1446(c)(1)
differs from the standard for proving fraudulent joinder, which can be satisfied where ‘there
is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the instate defendant in state court’” and that “[a]n unsuccessful claim is not necessarily brought
in bad faith.” (quoting Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc. 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999)) (Case
No. 82 in Table A); Ehrenreich v. Black, 994 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288-89 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(Case No. 120 in Table A).
213. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-780-A, 2017 WL 4481168
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017) (Case No. 1 in Table B); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
VI), No. 16-cv-02408, 2016 WL 4264193 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) (Case No. 6 in Table B).
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an unfavorable turn.214 That is just what happened in Godoy v. WinCo
Holding, Inc.215 On the eve of trial and just after having lost its motion for
summary judgment in state court, the defendant removed the case more
than one year after commencement.216 The district court granted plaintiff’s
motion to remand, finding that plaintiff had acted in bad faith by naming a
jurisdictional spoiler as a defendant even though the claim against the
spoiler was administratively time-barred.217 Although the court observed
that defendant could have removed based upon fraudulent joinder within
the one-year period, it held that defendant had no “affirmative duty to do
so.”218
Contrary to the court’s assertion, the thirty-day time period for removal
of cases that are initially removable and the thirty-day time period for those
cases that later become removable triggers the defendant’s duty to remove
based on fraudulent joinder.219 If fraudulent joinder can be ascertained from
the complaint, the defendant must remove within thirty days of service or
receipt of the complaint.220 Otherwise, if fraudulent joinder is not evident
based on the complaint, the defendant must remove “within thirty days after
the defendant” receives “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which [fraudulent joinder] may first be ascertained.”221
In Fruge v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP,222 the court rejected
defendant’s claim of strategic joinder, noting that the plaintiff had ardently
pursued the claims against the non-diverse defendants and had kept those
defendants in the case well after the one-year period expired.223 The court
also noted that if the non-diverse defendants had been fraudulently joined,

214. See, e.g., McAdam Props., LLC, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 1291.
215. No. 5:15-CV-01397-ODW-SP, 2015 WL 6394474 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) (Case
No. 11 in Table B).
216. Id. at *1.
217. Id. at *3-4.
218. Id. at *3.
219. See Taylor Newman Cabinetry, Inc. v. Classic Soft Trim, Inc., 436 F. App’x 888
(11th Cir. 2011) (finding defendant’s removal based upon fraudulent joinder six months
after commencement untimely because defendant did not remove within thirty days of the
date on which fraudulent joinder could have been first ascertained).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (2012).
221. Id. § 1446(b)(3).
222. No. 2:14-CV-2382, 2015 WL 4134992 (W.D. La. July 7, 2015) (Case No. 85 in
Table A).
223. Id. at *3.
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as argued by the removing defendant, then the defendant should have
removed the case within the one-year period.224
In Hall v. Leisure Time Products, Inc.,225 plaintiff sued several
defendants, including one non-diverse LLC, for injuries allegedly caused by
hardware used to support a child’s swing set.226 During a deposition
conducted after the expiration of the one-year period, the non-diverse
LLC’s designated representative testified that it had no responsibility for
the product at issue and, in response, the plaintiff non-suited the nondiverse defendant.227 The diverse defendants removed. The district court
remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff.228 The court noted that the plaintiff had not strategically withheld
any information from the defendants and that the defendants could have
alleged fraudulent joinder as a basis for removal from the outset.229 The
court further noted that the diverse defendants had ample opportunity to
engage in discovery prior to the expiration of the one-year period in order
to establish that the non-diverse LLC had been fraudulently joined.230
In Steele v. Pro-Tech Foundation Repair and Leveling, LLC,231 the
district court remanded the case after finding that the plaintiff’s agreement
to dismiss the non-diverse defendant nine years after commencement was
not bad faith.232 It also rejected the removing defendant’s argument that the
non-diverse defendant had been fraudulently joined.233 Moreover, it held
that if the plaintiff had fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant, then
the diverse defendant should have removed at the outset of litigation.234 It
held that the “bad faith [exception] is not intended to allow a defendant to
sit on its hands waiting for a plaintiff to dismiss a non-diverse party, even if

224. Id.
225. No. 3:14-CV-465, 2014 WL 5019687 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2014) (Case No. 103 in
Table A).
226. Id. at *1.
227. Id. at *4-5.
228. Id. at *6.
229. Id. at *5.
230. Id. at *6.
231. No. 18-542, 2018 WL 1603506 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2018) (Case No. 6 in Table A).
232. Id. at *3 (“If the Court found that Plaintiff acted in bad faith by dismissing a nondiverse party at this stage of the litigation, it would open the floodgates to allow for removal
of every case where a non-diverse defendant is dismissed.”).
233. Id. at *4.
234. Id. at *3.
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the defendant had been allegedly fraudulently joined, or as Defendant put it,
joined in bad faith.”235
Given that, in the large majority of cases, fraudulent joinder is either
evident from the face of the complaint or easily discoverable within the
one-year period, fraudulent joinder alone should not constitute bad-faith
forum manipulation.236 Equating fraudulent joinder with bad-faith forum
manipulation ignores the statutory requirement of subjective intent and also
makes it possible for defendants to remove strategically after the one-year
period when the litigation in state court takes a negative turn.
4. Fraudulent Procedural Misjoinder
Some courts have entertained arguments that plaintiffs’ fraudulent
procedural misjoinder constitutes bad-faith forum manipulation.237
However, such arguments do not comport with the logic behind fraudulent
joinder rules. While fraudulent joinder is usually evident from the outset of
a case, fraudulent procedural misjoinder is more regularly apparent from
the face of the complaint; it does not require any evaluation of the merits of
the plaintiff’s claims against the spoiler and instead only considers whether
procedural joinder is proper pursuant to court joinder rules and existing law
regarding personal jurisdiction and venue. Widespread recognition of the
fraudulent procedural misjoinder doctrine would serve to protect diverse
defendants’ right to remove.238 Just as with fraudulent joinder, though,
notice of removal based upon fraudulent procedural misjoinder must be
filed within thirty days after receipt of the complaint if fraudulent
procedural misjoinder is evident from the face of the complaint or within
thirty days after receipt of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other
paper from which it first may be ascertained that the case involves
fraudulent procedural misjoinder.239 Given that fraudulent procedural
235. Id. at *4. The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiff pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). Id. at *5.
236. See Floyd, supra note 131, at 1093-94 (observing that “fraudulent joinder does not
prevent removal” and arguing that “fraudulent joinder is discoverable within one year”).
237. See, e.g., Moody v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17CV2029 HEA, 2018 WL 1397534
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2018) (remanding the case after finding that plaintiff’s joinder of nondiverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not frivolous under existing law predating
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)) (Case No.
8 in Table A); Johnson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2007-SNLJ, 2017 WL
4356900 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (same) (Case No. 15 in Table A); see also Case Nos. 20,
22 and 25-31 in Table A (holding the same).
238. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012).
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misjoinder will almost always be discernable based on the complaint or
easily discoverable within the one-year period, fraudulent procedural
misjoinder should not constitute bad-faith forum manipulation under the
JVCA.
5. Manipulation of the Amount in Controversy
District courts have found that plaintiffs have improperly manipulated
removal jurisdiction by failing to disclose the true amount in controversy in
ten cases since the enactment of the bad faith exception.240 In some of these
cases, the district court found bad faith because the plaintiff amended the
complaint to seek damages above the threshold amount after expiration of
the one-year period without sufficient explanation for the timing of the
increased demand.241
Some of the cases, however, appear to be wrongly decided because: (i)
the plaintiff revealed information indicating that the threshold amount was
met prior to expiration of the one-year period, (ii) the plaintiff had no duty
in state court to disclose the amount in controversy, or (iii) the plaintiff had
a reasonable explanation for the increased demand for damages after
expiration of the one-year period. In Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics,
LLC,242 a plaintiff who had been injured in a collision sued diverse
defendants in state court and alleged that the damages at issue were less
than $50,000.243 The plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering, lost
wages, and medical expenses.244 Within the one-year period, the plaintiff
supplemented her discovery responses to indicate medical expenses of more
than $91,000, past lost wages in an unspecified amount, and the need for
future surgery at an unspecified cost.245 After expiration of the one-year
period, plaintiff’s counsel sent a settlement-demand letter for $575,000.246
The parties unsuccessfully mediated the case.247 The day after the failed
mediation, the defendants removed.248 Even though the plaintiff disclosed
damages exceeding the threshold amount during discovery within the one240. See Case Nos. 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 22, 23, & 24 in Table B.
241. See, e.g., Hill v. Allianz Life Ins. of N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
(Case No. 17 In Table B), aff’d, 693 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2017); Carey v. Allstate Ins.,
No. 2:13-CV-2293, 2013 WL 5970487 (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2013) (Case No. 22 in Table).
242. 920 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (Case No. 24 in Table B).
243. Id. at 1310.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1310-11.
246. Id. at 1311.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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year period, the district court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in
failing to amend her complaint to allege greater damages.249 The court cited
no state law or rule requiring the plaintiff to amend the complaint.
In Patel v. Kroger Co.,250 the court found that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith by failing to respond to the defendant’s request for a settlement
demand within the one-year period.251 The court did not articulate why the
plaintiff had a duty to respond to the defendant’s request. Nor did the court
find that the plaintiff had provided inaccurate information in response to
interrogatories regarding incurred medical expenses.252 Instead, the court
held that the defendant had no duty to investigate the amount in controversy
until receipt of a pleading, motion, or other paper indicating that the
threshold requirement had been met.253
Given that state law often imposes no duty on the plaintiff to reveal the
true amount in controversy, many courts have held that defendants have an
obligation to engage in discovery, triggering a duty on the part of the
plaintiff to respond accurately. In Alvarez v. Areas USA LAX, LLC,254 the
plaintiff sued the defendant for wrongful termination, alleged that the
amount in controversy exceeded $25,000, and “sought back pay, front pay,
damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, . . . attorneys’ fees,” and
statutory penalties.255 The court found no bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff, holding instead that the defendant should have conducted
discovery regarding damages.
Defendant was certainly on notice that there was a very strong
likelihood that Plaintiff’s damages would exceed $75,000.
Despite this notice and for some unknown reason, Defendant
never specifically asked Plaintiff whether he sought more than
$75,000 in damages, never asked Plaintiff to stipulate that he

249. Id. at 1316.
250. No. 1:13-CV-02901-JOF, 2013 WL 12068988 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2013) (Case No.
21 in Table B).
251. Id. at *3-4.
252. The court noted that Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 3 triggered plaintiff’s response
regarding medical expense to date. The court further noted that the record did not contain a
copy of the interrogatory. Id. at *3 n.1. The court did not find that plaintiff failed to respond
adequately to the interrogatory. Nor could it have so found in the absence of knowing the
exact information requested by the interrogatory.
253. Id. at *3.
254. No. CV 15-5033-JFW, 2015 WL 5050520 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2015) (Case No. 80
in Table A).
255. Id. at *3.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2

2019]

THE JVCA’S BAD FAITH EXCEPTION

635

sought less than $75,000 in damages, and never directly raised
the issue of removal with Plaintiff.256
The court further held that if the defendant believed that the plaintiff’s
discovery responses were insufficient, then the defendant “could have and
should have filed a motion to compel discovery well within a year of the
commencement of this action.”257
Similarly, in Lujan v. Alorica, Inc.,258 the district court remanded the
case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in bad faith because the plaintiff’s
claim for damages (lost wages) at the time the case was filed could not have
exceeded $75,000.259 The court also noted that the defendant failed to
attempt to discover the amount in controversy until well after one year had
passed and found that the defendant’s lack of vigilance further supported
remand.260
Likewise, in Huffman v. Draghici,261 the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the plaintiff concealed the true amount in controversy.262 It
explained that the “[d]efendants [did] not present evidence that they
specifically asked Plaintiff about the amount in controversy or about
removal, nor [did] they show[] that Plaintiff declined to furnish them with
that information upon request.”263
In Vallecillo v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Financial, Inc.,264 the
plaintiffs sued a diverse bank for fraud, negligence, abuse of the elderly,
and misrepresentation.265 In response to discovery conducted within the
one-year period, the “[p]laintiffs admitted that the amount in controversy
did not exceed $75,000.”266 The plaintiffs offered to settle the case for less
than $75,000 during the initial phase of litigation.267 More than two years
after commencement, the plaintiffs revealed they were seeking $175,000 in
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. EP-15-CV-355-KC, 2016 WL 8857008 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2016) (Case No. 65 in
Table A).
259. Id. at *7.
260. Id. at *9.
261. No. 2:16-CV-446, 2017 WL 4296966 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2017) (Case No. 16 in
Table A).
262. Id. at *3.
263. Id.
264. No. 5:16-CV-935-DAE, 2017 WL 9935522 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2017) (Case No. 2
in Table B).
265. Id. at *1.
266. Id. at *3.
267. Id.
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damages.”268 The defendant removed.269 The district court found bad faith
on the part of the plaintiffs.270 It rejected the plaintiffs’ explanation for the
timing of their increased demand, finding the explanation that they had
erred in acting pro se insufficient to negate the inference of bad faith that
arises from an increased demand outside of the one-year period.271 In so
ruling, the court cited no precedent for its holding that an inference of bad
faith arises when the plaintiff increases his or her demand more than one
year after the commencement of proceedings. Given that there are
numerous legitimate reasons to amend a complaint to seek greater damages
after expiration of the one-year period, presuming bad faith from such an
amendment seems contrary to the statute’s requirement that a district court
find the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal.272
Labelling a plaintiff’s manipulation of the amount-in-controversy
requirement as bad faith under the JVCA is not warranted given that few
cases have been successfully removed on this basis.273 Additionally,
diligent defendants should be able to discover the amount of damages at
issue within the one-year period, particularly given that the JVCA clarified
that “other paper” includes discovery materials in state court.274 Although
plaintiffs may evade removal in some instances by intentionally concealing
the true amount in controversy when they have an obligation to disclose it,
the cases are few in number and do not warrant the excessive litigation
caused by recognition of the exception.
IV. Critique of the Bad Faith Exception
A. Bright-Line Rule Versus Case-by-Case Analysis
As with any rule that is not clearly defined and requires an in-depth,
factual inquiry into a party’s motive on a case-by-case basis, a critical issue
is whether the additional litigation and unpredictability that will be created
by such a standard achieves sufficient benefits to warrant foregoing a
268. Id.
269. Id. at *1.
270. Id. at *3.
271. Id.
272. In some cases, for example, a plaintiff’s future medical expenses may increase
based upon new information. In addition, damages may increase as a result of the delay in
litigation.
273. Of the 160 cases analyzed In Tables A & B, only twelve were successfully removed
based upon bad faith manipulation of the amunt-in-controversy. See Case Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9,
10, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in Table B.
274. See Plitt & Rogers, supra note 6, at 655-56.
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bright-line rule. As demonstrated by this author’s analysis of the 160 cases
applying the bad faith exception, the exception has created a significant
amount of litigation while only marginally protecting defendants’ right to
remove. Although an absolute one-year bar would inevitably permit
plaintiffs to engage in some instances of bad-faith forum manipulation, its
efficiency and predictability outweigh the marginal benefit achieved by the
bad faith exception to the one-year bar, given that, in the large majority of
cases, the defendant should able to discover the plaintiff’s manipulation
within the one-year period and remove the case.
The large number of erroneous removals based on plaintiffs’ alleged
bad-faith forum manipulation has created an eighty-five percent remand
rate, which increases the overall cost of litigation and imposes substantial
and unnecessary costs on state court systems due to the disruption of statecourt proceedings. This author’s case analysis legitimizes Congressman
Schiff’s concern that the absolute one-year bar might be preferable to the
bad faith exception, given that the bad faith exception has dramatically
increased litigation over forum and requires detailed factual inquiry into the
plaintiff’s subjective motive in every case.275
B. Relative Value of Litigation over Jurisdiction Versus the Merits
The JVCA’s bad faith exception has increased litigation over forum, an
unintended consequence that runs counter to the JVCA’s central purpose of
decreasing litigation over forum so that judges can focus on the substantive
merits of the case.276 Extended litigation over forum does not only subject
the parties to additional cost and delay; it also exacts a “toll on the judicial
system” by requiring additional judicial resources and time, potentially
impacting parties in other cases before the same court.277 Removal after

275. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
276. Congress clearly expressed a preference for a bright-line rule that would decrease
litigation over forum even though it might not perfectly prevent a defendant’s right to
remove. In 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), Congress prohibited appellate review of most district court
orders remanding a removed case back to state court. Similarly, in 1988, Congress enacted
the requirement that a plaintiff file a motion to remand based on a procedural defect within
thirty days of removal to avoid “shuttling a case between two courts that each have . . .
jurisdiction.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 72 (1988); see also Percy, The Tedford Equitable
Exception, supra note 5, at 159-60.
277. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1488-89
(2011).
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substantial progress in state court also creates inefficient duplicative work
for the courts.278
C. Bad-Faith Removals by Defendants
One of the JVCA’s perverse unintended consequences is that it has
encouraged bad-faith removals by defendants. Although some of the 136
cases that were remanded based on insufficient evidence of bad-faith forum
manipulation involved non-frivolous allegations that the plaintiff engaged
in bad-faith forum manipulation, many of the remanded cases actually
involved bad-faith forum manipulation by defendants who had no
reasonable basis to allege bad-faith forum manipulation by the plaintiff.
In Brown v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,279 the plaintiff sued a diverse
employer and a non-diverse employee and the employer urged the plaintiff
to dismiss the non-diverse employee after expiration of the one-year
period.280 The employer conceded that all actions by the employee were
within the scope of employment, assured the plaintiff that the employee
would cooperate and would not need to be subpoenaed, and represented that
“the case has now been pending for more than one year [and] cannot be
removed even if there is complete diversity.”281 In other words, the
defendant deceived the plaintiff into dismissing the spoiler after the oneyear period and then argued that plaintiff’s dismissal was in bad faith.
In Angus v. John Crane Inc.,282 the plaintiffs sued a diverse defendant
and joined non-diverse defendants.283 Plaintiffs dismissed the last remaining
non-diverse defendant upon reaching a $10,000 settlement agreement with
that defendant more than one year after commencement of the case.284 The
diverse defendant removed, arguing the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith by
fraudulently joining the non-diverse defendants.285 The district court found
no evidence that plaintiffs acted in bad faith by joining the non-diverse
defendants. Instead, the court found that defendant’s removal was
“objectively unreasonable” and apparently in bad faith, given that defendant

278. Id. at 1488.
279. No. A-17-CA-00733-SS, 2017 WL 4316104 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2017) (Case No.
17 in Table A).
280. Id. at *1.
281. Id.
282. No. 16-cv-03532-JST, 2016 WL 4423379 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (Case No. 58
in Table A).
283. Id. at *1-2.
284. Id. at *2.
285. Id.
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removed the case four days prior to trial.286 The court ordered the defendant
to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys fees and costs incurred by the wrongful
removal.287
Likewise, in Johnson v. HCR Manocare LLC,288 the defendant removed
the case approximately one week before trial, alleging that the plaintiff had
fraudulently joined the non-diverse nursing home administrator in a case
against the diverse nursing home.289 Although the court found no fraudulent
joinder, denied the administrator’s motion for summary judgment, and
remanded the case,290 resolution by trial or settlement was delayed because
trial dates drive settlement negotiations and, presumably, the case had to be
reset for trial at a later date.291 Defendants in other cases have improperly
removed shortly before trial, thereby securing strategic delay.292
Similarly, the bad faith exception allows defendants to remove
strategically after an unfavorable ruling in state court. In Mintz & Gold LLP
v. Daibes,293 a law firm sued its former client in state court, seeking more
than $75,000 in damages.294 More than four years later, the appellate court
entered an order directing the trial court to enter partial summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.295 Two days later, the defendant removed based on
diversity jurisdiction and asserted bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.296
286. Id.
287. Id. at *3.
288. No. 1:15CV189, 2015 WL 6511301 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015) (Case No. 77 in
Table A).
289. Id. at *1.
290. Id. at *1, *5.
291. Michael A. Hamilton & Claudia McCarron, Helping Clients Meet Challenges in a
New Environment, in INSURANCE LAW 2010: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES
FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR (Aspatore Books 2010), 2010 WL 561458, at *6 (observing that
firm trial dates cause parties to settle); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay
in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 240 (1997) (observing that an
approaching firm trial date encourages settlement).
292. See, e.g., Aguayo v. AMCO Ins., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1231 (D.N.M. 2014)
(remanding upon insufficient evidence of plaintiff’s bad faith after defendant removed just
two days prior to trial); Kuepper v. Terragroup Corp., No. CV 13-00264-RGK(MRWx),
2013 WL 12205042 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013) (remanding upon insufficient evidence of
plaintiff’s bad faith after defendant removed just three weeks before trial) (Case No. 132 in
Table A). Ellen Bloomer Mitchell, Improper Use of Removal and Its Disruptive Effective on
State Court Proceedings, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 59, 106 (1989).
293. No. 15 CIV 1218(PAE), 2015 WL 2130935 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015) (Case No. 92
in Table A).
294. Id. at *1.
295. Id. at *2.
296. Id.
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The district court remanded, finding no evidence that the plaintiff acted in
bad faith because the case was removable based on the original
complaint.297 The court further noted that the defendant was apparently
engaged in improper forum shopping, given that it removed the case
immediately after the trial court was ordered to enter summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff.298 Similarly, in Godoy v. WinCo Holding, Inc.,299 the
defendant could have removed within the one-year period based on
fraudulent joinder but instead waited until it lost its motion for summary
judgment.300 It then removed on the eve of trial and after the expiration of
the one-year period, arguing that the plaintiff’s fraudulent joinder of the
spoiler constituted bad-faith forum manipulation.301
D. Litigation Costs Incurred to Meet the “Actively-Litigating” Proxy
Another unintended and perverse consequence of the JVCA’s bad faith
exception is that it encourages plaintiffs to engage in unnecessary
discovery, motion practice, and consultation with experts in an attempt to
actively litigate claims against jurisdictional spoilers in an effort to avoid
removal after expiration of the one-year period. Even if the plaintiff can
reach a reasonable settlement with the jurisdictional spoiler after one year,
the plaintiff may still forego the settlement simply to preserve the state
court forum. Not only does this increase overall litigation costs, but also it
unfairly subjects the spoiler who otherwise might be dismissed to prolonged
prosecution of the claims against it.
Conclusion
The JVCA’s bad faith exception to the bar on removal of diversity cases
more than one year after commencement in state court has generated
unintended and undesirable consequences. Although the exception was
intended to protect defendants’ right to remove while also decreasing
litigation over forum, it has had the exact opposite effect. The exception has
escalated litigation over forum while only marginally protecting removal
297. Id. at *4, *16.
298. Id. at *8. Although the district court awarded plaintiff costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) and sanctioned defendant’s lawyer pursuant to Rule 11, these sanctions are rare and
do not adequately deter defendants from wrongfully removing cases to federal court. See
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
299. No. 5:15-CV-01397-ODW-SP, 2015 WL 6394474 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) (Case
No. 11 in Table B).
300. Id. at *1.
301. Id. at *1, *3.
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rights. Moreover, it has created perverse incentives (i) for plaintiffs to
actively litigate claims against spoilers simply to preserve jurisdiction in
state court and (ii) for defendants to wrongfully remove in cases where
there is no reasonable basis to allege that the plaintiff engaged in bad-faith
forum manipulation and to strategically remove once the state-court
litigation becomes ill-fated.
In the case of fraudulent joinder and fraudulent procedural misjoinder,
the bad faith exception is unnecessary because the forum manipulation is
obvious at the outset or easily discoverable within one year. In the case of
improper strategic joinder, the bad faith exception has little efficacy
because plaintiffs will simply retain the spoiler and continue to engage in
the minimal conduct necessary to satisfy the active-litigation inquiry,
causing the deleterious effect of increased litigation cost. Finally, in cases
where plaintiffs manipulate the amount in controversy, the exception may
effectively protect defendants’ right to remove in a handful of cases where
the defendant is not able to discover the extent of plaintiff’s damages.
However, the protection comes at a high, and arguably intolerable, cost. For
these reasons, Congress should abolish the bad faith exception and return to
an absolute bar on removal more than one year after the commencement of
proceedings in state court.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

642

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:595

Table A
Cases in Which the District Court Found Insufficient Evidence
of Bad Faith Forum Manipulation by the Plaintiff (136 Total)302
1.

Williams v. 3M Co., No. 7:18-CV-63-KKC, 2018 WL 3084710 (E.D. Ky.
June 22, 2018).
The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It noted
that much of the delay in the case was due to the discovery deadline falling
after the expiration of the one-year period. [1]
Filed Nov. 2, 2016; removed May 29, 2018; remanded June 22, 2018

2.

Podolski v. First Transit, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-7045, 2018 WL 3031940 (D. N.J.
June 19, 2018).
The district court remanded the case after finding insufficient evidence of bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiff did not act in
bad faith by naming the non-diverse driver of the vehicle who struck plaintiff,
even though the diverse defendant had admitted that the driver was acting
within the scope of employment and even though the plaintiff might not
recover from the driver. [2]
Filed June 16, 2015; removed Sept. 13, 2017; remanded June 19, 2018.

3.

RJO Invs., Inc. v. Crown Fin., LLC, No. 5:18-CV-05015, 2018 WL 2050165
(W.D. Ark. May 2, 2018).
The district court remanded. It noted that plaintiff’s claims against the nondiverse defendants were dismissed after plaintiff was unable to timely serve
the defendants. “In the instant case, Crown Financial has failed to put forth any
evidence of intentional conduct by the Plaintiffs designed solely to defeat
diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at *7. [16]
Filed Sept. 29, 2016; removed Jan. 29, 2018; remanded May 2, 2018.

302. Tables A-E are based on the author’s Westlaw search described in supra note 17.
The numbers in brackets indicates the number the case was on the list of 634 cases (starting
with the most recent).
* Indicates that the case was removed more than once.
** Indicates that the district court awarded attorneys’ fees and/or costs to the plaintiff
pursuant to Section 1447(c).
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Plaxe v. Fiegura, No. 17-1055, 2018 WL 2010025 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2018).
The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It noted
that the plaintiff’s explanation for not finalizing the settlement agreement with
the nondiverse defendant until the plaintiff settled with the diverse defendant
or the trial date was plausible. The plaintiff indicated that it maintained the
claim against the non-diverse defendant to avoid an “empty-chair” defense.
“The empty-chair defense is a well-recognized ‘trial tactic in a multi-party case
whereby one defendant attempts to put all the fault on a defendant who . . .
settled before trial or on a person who was . . . no[t] named as a party.’ Black’s
Law Dictionary 484 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “empty-chair defense”).” Id. at
*5. [18]
Filed Aug. 13, 2015; removed Feb. 22, 2017; remanded Apr. 27, 2018.

5.

Crosby v. Neuman, No. 2:17-cv-02474-JCM-PAL, 2018 WL 1831322 (D.
Nev. Apr. 17, 2018).
The district court remanded. It held that the “[d]efendant ha[d] not
demonstrated that [the] plaintiff acted in bad faith in order to prevent defendant
from removing the action.” Id. at *1. [21]
Filed June 27, 2016; removed Sept. 22, 2017; remanded Apr. 17, 2018.

6.

**

Steele v. Pro-Tech Found. Repair & Leveling, LLC, No. 18-542, 2018 WL
1603506 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2018).
The district court remanded the case. It found that the plaintiff’s agreement to
dismiss the non-diverse defendant nine years after commencement was not bad
faith. It also rejected the removing-defendant’s argument that the non-diverse
defendant had been fraudulently joined. It held that the bad-faith exception “is
not intended to allow a defendant to sit on its hands waiting for a plaintiff to
dismiss a non-diverse party, even if the defendant had been allegedly
fraudulently joined, or as Defendant put it, joined in bad faith.” Id. at *4. The
court awarded sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [24]
Filed Jan. 20, 2009; removed Jan. 17, 2018, remanded Apr. 2, 2018.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the JVCA
amendments.
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Herrera v. Wood, No. 2:18-CV55 JCM (PAL), 2018 WL 1419878 (D. Nev.
Mar. 22, 2018).
The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It
rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by
delaying surgery. The court observed that “[t]here are a potentially endless
number of reasons for which plaintiff could have delayed surgery that do not
constitute bad faith.” Id. at *3. [25]
Filed Jan. 27, 2016; removed Jan. 10, 2018; remanded Mar. 22, 2018.

8.

Moody v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17CV2029 HEA, 2018 WL 1397534
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2018).
The district court remanded the case finding that the plaintiff’s joinder of
non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not frivolous under existing
law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137
S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [26]
Filed June 13, 2016; removed after one-year period; remanded Mar. 20, 2018.

9.

McAdam Props., LLC v. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC, 290 F.
Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
Diverse defendant removed more than one year after commencement after
the plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse defendant. The diverse defendant
alleged that the plaintiff had fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant.
The district court found that the removing defendant failed to demonstrate
bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court held that fraudulent joinder
does not constitute bad faith absent some other intentional conduct by the
plaintiff. [32]
Filed May 25, 2016; removed Dec. 13, 2017; remanded Feb. 21, 2018.
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Hart v. Target Corp., No. 17-11267 (SRC), 2018 WL 447616 (D. N.J.
Jan. 17, 2018).
The case was removed more than year one year after commencement, after
the state court granted summary judgment to the non-diverse defendant store
manager in a slip-and- fall case. The diverse defendant argued that the
plaintiff fraudulently joined the manager and that the plaintiff did not
prosecute the claim against the manager in good faith because the plaintiff
did not notice the manager’s deposition until after the manager moved for
summary judgment. The district court remanded the case, finding that the
plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the manager and that the plaintiff’s
failure to depose the manager until after the manager moved for summary
judgment did not constitute a lack of good faith prosecution. [39]
Filed May 2016; removed Nov. 6, 2017; remanded Jan. 17, 2018.

11.

Klotz v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 17-3776, 2017 WL 5899248
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding that the “[d]efendant fail[ed] to meet its
burden to show that Plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent the removal of the
action.” Id. at *9. [44]
Filed Jan. 5, 2012; removed Apr. 21, 2017; remanded Nov. 30, 2017.
Note: Although the case was commenced before Jan. 7, 2012, the district
court applied the JVCA.

12.
*

Holman v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-0886-HE, 2017
WL 5514177 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 17, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The court noted there was
some evidence that the plaintiffs intended to seek damages from the nondiverse defendant and also noted that it could not “say that the basis for
dismissal of [the non-diverse defendant] was clear or obvious at a point
significantly prior to the date of dismissal.” Id. at *3. [46]
No dates regarding filing and removal. this was the second removal. The
diverse defendant removed the first time based upon fraudulent joinder. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the non-diverse defendant had
not been fraudulently joined.
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Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 17-0344-WS-N, 2017 WL 5496357
(S.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding no bad-faith manipulation of the
amount-in-controversy by the plaintiff, and noting that the plaintiff
responded to discovery requests prior to expiration of the one-year period
indicating that she claimed more than $100,000 in damages. [47]
Filed Aug. 15, 2015; removed July or Aug. 2017; remanded Nov. 16, 2017.

14.

Bank of N.Y. v. Consiglio, No. 3:17-cv-01408 (CSH), 2017 WL 4948069
(D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2017).

**
Pro se defendant removed more than nine years after commencement in
state court. The district court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The
district court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiff pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1447(c). [52]
Filed Mar. 2008; removed Aug. 18, 2017; remanded Nov. 1, 2017.
Note: Although the case was commenced in 2008, the district court applied
the JVCA.

15.

Johnson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2007-SNLJ, 2017 WL
4356900 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding “no evidence of bad faith that
would satisfy the exception to the one-year rule.” Id. at *2. The court found
that plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was
not frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [58]
Filed May 8, 2015; removed Jul. 19, 2017; remanded Oct. 2, 2017.
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Huffman v. Draghici, No. 2:16-CV-446, 2017 WL 4296966 (N.D. Ind.
Sept. 26, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding no evidence that the plaintiff acted
in bad faith by concealing the amount-in-controversy. The court noted that
the plaintiff made a settlement demand of $350,000 prior to expiration of the
one-year period. The court held that “Defendants [did] not present evidence
that they specifically asked Plaintiff about the amount in controversy or
about removal, nor have they shown that Plaintiff declined to furnish them
with that information upon request.” Id. at * 3. [62]
Filed Oct. 6, removed Oct. 17, 2016; remanded Sept. 26, 2017.

17.

Brown v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. A-17-CA-00733-SS, 2017 WL
4316104 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding no evidence of bad faith. Plaintiff sued
Home Depot and a nondiverse Home Depot employee, alleging that the
defendant employee and other employees assaulted him and falsely
imprisoned him on suspicion of shoplifting. The district court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff never intended to prosecute the case
against the non-diverse defendant employee, noting that the plaintiff had
deposed the employee and further noting that the employee remained a
defendant when the case was first called to trial in state court. The court was
unable to empanel a jury, so the case was reset for a later date. The court
noted that the defendant had urged plaintiff to dismiss the non-diverse
employee after expiration of the one-year period and represented that “the
case has now been pending for more than one year [and] cannot be removed
even if there is complete diversity.”
Id. at *1. [63]
Filed Nov. 20, 2015; removed Aug. 7, 2017; remanded Sept. 28, 2017.
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Hernandez v. State Farm Lloyds, No. DR-16-CV-164-AM/CW, 2017 WL
8131570 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that plaintiff did not act in bad
faith by concealing the amount-in-controversy. The court noted that
plaintiff’s “original petition and his initial disclosure response indicated
that he was seeking attorney’s fees and statutory penalties under the
DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code. At the point of the receipt of the
disclosure responses where plaintiff indicated he was also seeking
$62,782.06 in economic damages, it was unequivocally clear and certain
that [the plaintiff] was seeking a sufficient additional amount to reach the
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Statutory interest alone at eighteen
percent would amount to $11,000 per year.” Id. at * 3. [67]
Filed Aug. 18, 2014; removed Oct. 14, 2016; remanded Sept. 28, 2017.

19.

J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Caires, 2017 WL 3891663 (D. Conn.
Sept. 6, 2017).

*

The case was removed for the third time more than one year after
commencement. The district court remanded, finding no improper effort
by the counterclaim plaintiff to defeat diversity jurisdiction. [73]
Filed Dec. 3, 2009; removed for the third time on Aug. 2, 2017; remanded
Sept. 19, 2017.
Note: Although the case was commenced in 2009, the district court applied
the JVCA.

20.

Johnson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-02014-ERW, 2017 WL
3705233 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding “no indication Plaintiffs acted in
bad faith to prevent Defendants from removing this action within one year
of its commencement.” Id. at *2. The court found that the plaintiffs’ joinder
of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not frivolous under
existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [77]
Filed May 5, 2016; removed July 19, 2017; remanded Aug. 28, 2017.
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21.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. for Wells Fargo Asset Sec. Corp. v. Walbert,
3:17-cv-00991 (CSH), 2017 WL 3578553 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2017).

**

The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case to state court, finding no bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff and noting that it was clear from the face of the
plaintiff’s compliant that the plaintiff was seeking more than $75,000. The
court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c).
[79]
Filed June 18, 2013; removed June 16, 2017; remanded Aug. 18, 2017.

22.

Schmitz v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17 CV 1860 JMB, 2017 WL
3433628 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court held that the plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was
not bad faith and was not frivolous under existing law predating BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
“It is difficult to say that a party has acted in bad faith when the action was
consistent with the jurisprudence then in force.” Id. at *3. [80]
Filed Sept. 4. 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded Aug. 10, 2017.

23.

Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17CV0181 ERW, 2017 WL 3310698
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that although “[i]t appear[ed]
highly probable Plaintiffs engaged in forum shopping and sought to avoid
federal jurisdiction by joining certain plaintiffs from New Jersey and
California,” such joinder was permissible under existing law. “Plaintiffs
were not acting in bad faith by pursuing a strategy which proved to be
successful.” Id. at *2. [83]
Filed May 21. 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded Aug. 3, 2017
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Rantz v. Shield Coat, Inc., No. 17-3338, 2017 WL 3188415 (July 26, 2017)
(E.D. La. July 26, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. Even
though the plaintiff could not recover from the two named non-diverse
corporations because they had been dissolved more than three years prior to
the filing of the complaint, the court found that the plaintiff did not act in
bad faith to prevent removal. The court noted that defendants should have
removed based upon fraudulent/improper joinder prior to expiration of the
one-year period and further noted that the plaintiff took no action to prevent
the defendant from ascertaining early in the case that the non-diverse
defendants had been improperly joined. [87]
Filed Mar. 31, 2016; removed Apr. 12, 2017; remanded July 26, 2017.

25.

Forrest v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17CV-01855-JAR, 2017 WL
3087675 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case back to state court. The district court held that the
plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not
frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). “Plaintiffs clearly sought to
secure an advantageous forum in the state court and joined certain Plaintiffs
for the very purpose of avoiding federal jurisdiction over this case.” Id. at
*2. Given that such joinder was permissible at the time, however, plaintiffs
did not engage in bad faith. [88]
Filed Feb. 23, 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 20, 2017.

26.

Anglin v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01844-JAR, 2017 WL
3087672 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case back to state court. The district court held that the
plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not
frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [89]
Filed May 29, 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 20, 2017.
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Timms v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01859-JAR, 2017 WL 3087699
(E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case back to state court. The district court held that the
plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not
frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [90]
Filed Apr. 4, 2016; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 20, 2017.

28.

Dunn v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01846-JAR, 2017 WL 3087673
(E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs joined parties to
strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ joinder of parties was
consistent with existing law. [91]
Filed Nov. 7, 2014; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 20, 2017.

29.

Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1857 SNLJ, 2017 WL
3034696 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding no bad faith. Although the “plaintiffs surely secured
advantageous forums by manipulating the groups of plaintiffs in an attempt to
prevent federal jurisdiction…, this manipulation was legal within the confines
of federal statutes and case law at the time and was not done in bad faith.” Id.
at *2. [92]
Filed Aug. 20, 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017.

30.

Reppell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1858 SNLJ, 2017 WL
3034707 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs joined parties to
strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ joinder of parties was
consistent with existing law. [93]
Filed Jan. 19, 2016; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017.
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Livaudais v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1851 SNLJ, 2017
WL 3034701 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs
joined parties to strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’
joinder of parties was consistent with existing law. [94]
Filed Mar. 18, 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017.

32.
*

Sampson v. Miss. Valley Silica Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 918 (S.D. Miss.
2017).
Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against diverse and non-diverse
defendants and dismissed the non-diverse defendants prior to expiration of
the one-year period. The diverse defendants removed, but the case was
remanded because not all of the defendants had joined in the removal. After
the plaintiffs obtained a jury verdict, they moved to join a declaratoryjudgment action against the non-diverse defendant’s diverse insurer. The
insurer removed. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith. The
court noted that the plaintiffs had sued other non-diverse defendants who
were dismissed prior to expiration of the one-year bar and noted that even if
the plaintiff had originally included the diverse insurer, the case would not
have been successfully removed within one year, given that the removing
defendants failed to comply with the rule of unanimity. [95]
Filed Oct. 21, 2014; removed Mar. 22, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017.

33.

Swann v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1845 SNLJ, 2017 WL
3034711 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs joined parties to
strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ joinder of parties was
consistent with existing law at the time of joinder. [96]
Filed July 31, 2014; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017.
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Jackson v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-cv-01413-JAR (E.D.
Mo. June 22, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiffs’ amended
complaint adding additional non-diverse plaintiffs did not constitute bad
faith, given that the parties to the original complaint were not diverse. [104]
Filed Sept. 6, 2013; removed for the second time May 1, 2017; remanded June
22, 2017.

35.

Larue v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00001-GNS 2017
WL 2312480 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded. It noted that the plaintiff’s claims against the nondiverse defendants were colorable at the outset of the case, that the plaintiff
retained experts to support the claims against the non-diverse defendants,
and that if the plaintiff had prematurely dismissed the non-diverse
defendants, the jury might have been permitted to allocate fault to the nondiverse defendants (the empty-chair defendant conundrum). “It is difficult
to say in this instance that [the plaintiff’s] failure to voluntarily dismiss
KTC Defendants within one year, before discovery was complete,
amounted to bad faith.” Id. at *5. [106]
Filed Oct. 14, 2014; removed Jan. 3, 2017; remanded May 27, 2017.

36.

Ryan v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, No. 17-cv-287, 2017 WL 3080022
(W.D. La. May 26, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
removing defendant alleged that the plaintiff had fraudulently misjoined the
non-diverse defendants and that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith to prevent
removal. The magistrate recommended remand, finding incomplete diversity
because the plaintiff had not misjoined the non-diverse defendants. The
district court accepted the magistrate’s recommendation and remanded the
case. [107]
Filed Oct. 16, 2014; removed Feb. 17, 2017; remanded July 17, 2017.
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Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 6:16–cv–2020–Orl–37KRS, 2017 WL
2222790 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement, after the
plaintiff amended the complaint to add a bad faith claim against the insurer,
thereby increasing the amount-in-controversy. The insurer argued that the
plaintiff’s amendment was in bad faith to prevent removal, citing the JVCA.
The district court remanded, finding the bad faith exception inapplicable.
[109]
Filed Apr. 29, 2009; plaintiff amended complaint adding bad faith in
compliance with state law on Nov. 7, 2016; removed Nov. 18, 2016;
remanded May 22, 2017.
Note: Although the case was commenced in 2009, the district court applied
the JVCA.

38.

Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 17-71-BAJ-RLB, 2017 WL
2644259 (M.D. La. May 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
removing diverse insurer argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by
amending the pleadings more than two years after commencement to seek
more than $75,000. The magistrate refused to find bad faith because the
plaintiff’s original complaint named two nondiverse defendants who
remained in the case for more than year. Even if the plaintiff had amended the
complaint prior to expiration of the one-year period, the diverse defendant
could not have removed given that the plaintiff was still pursuing claims
against the non-diverse defendants. The district court adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation and remanded the case. [110]
Filed Apr. 15, 2014; removed Feb. 8, 2017; remanded June 19, 2017.
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Barajas v. Cont’l Tire of the Ams., LLC, 3:17–CV–00212–BR, 2017 WL
2213152 (D. Or. May 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined non-diverse
defendants to prevent removal and that removal more than one year after
commencement was proper under the circumstances. The district court
remanded, finding that the plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined the nondiverse defendants and that removal was untimely because it was not filed
within the requisite thirty-day period. [112]
Filed June 1, 2015; removed Feb. 8, 2017; remanded May 18, 2017.

40.

Jackson v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-974 (CEJ), 2017 WL 2021087
(E.D. Mo. May 12, 2017).

*
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding no bad faith. The court was not “persuaded by [the]
defendants' argument that the original plaintiffs joined the amended plaintiffs
in bad faith. Diversity jurisdiction did not lie before or after the amended
petition. Plaintiffs did not dismiss a diversity destroying party or otherwise
create complete diversity after the passage of the one-year deadline.” Id. at
*4. [113]
Filed Feb. 11, 2016; removed for the second time Mar. 16, 2017; remanded
May 12, 2017.

41.

NPV Realty, LLC v. Nash, No. 8:17–cv–636–T–30AEP, 2017 WL 1735101
(M.D. Fla. May 4, 2017).
The plaintiff sued a non-diverse insurance agent in state court. More than one
year after commencement, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add the
diverse insurer as an additional defendant. The defendant insurer removed.
The district court remanded, noting that the non-diverse agent was still a
defendant and that the plaintiff had actively litigated the case against the
agent. The court did not find that the agent had been fraudulently joined and
further found that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had acted in bad
faith to prevent removal. Id. at *3. [115]
Filed July 2, 2015; removed Mar. 16, 2017; remanded May 4, 2017.
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Parkview Gardens Bldg. Owners Ass’n v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 16-cv2673-WJM-CBS, 2016 WL 1611576 (D. Colo. May 3, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that
the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The plaintiff had sued a
diverse insurance company and a non-diverse insurance agency. The plaintiff
had filed a certificate of review regarding its professional negligence claim
against the non-diverse agency, propounded interrogatories and a request for
production, deposed the agent responsible for issuing the policy, and
appeared at a deposition noticed by the agency. Prior to that deposition, the
plaintiff and the defendant agency agreed to a settlement. The district court
remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff
acted in bad faith for the purpose of preventing removal. [116]
Filed Dec. 10, 2014; removed for the second time Oct. 28, 2016; remanded
May 3, 2017.

43.

Dutchmaid Logistics, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-857, 2017 WL
1324610 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the
plaintiff acted in bad faith and also failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff
fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. [122]
Filed Feb. 12, 2015; removed Sept. 7, 2016; remanded Apr. 11, 2017.

44.

Brown v. Roundpoint Mortg. Servicing Corp., No.: 3:17–CV–10, 2017
WL 1102657 (Mar. 24, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding that the defendant’s threadbare allegation of
bad faith was insufficient. [132]
Filed Jan. 11, 2016; removed Jan. 30, 2017; remanded Mar. 24, 2017.
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El Khoury v. Ilyia, No. 2:16-CV-01426-RAJ, 2017 WL 1089513 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 22, 2017).

**
The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the defendant was a resident of
Washington state. The defendant removed more than one year after
commencement, alleging that it was his intent to return to California (and that
he was therefore a California resident). The court remanded the case, finding
that “Plaintiffs did not act in bad faith by failing to question Defendant's own
admission of residency. Defendant repeatedly admitted he was a resident of
Washington, he owned a home in Washington, and he was domiciled in
Washington—in fact, for over a year from when this action commenced,
Defendant asserted his Washington residency.” Id. at *3. The court awarded
attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). [133]
Filed Apr. 9, 2015; removed Sept. 7, 2016; remanded Mar. 24, 2017.

46.

Traina v. Liberty Mut. Grp., No. 16-4991 (MAS) (TJB), 2017 WL 957849
(D. N.J. Mar. 10. 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith and noting that
both parties were responsible for litigation-related procedural delays in state
court. [137]
Filed Dec. 30, 2014; removed Aug. 15, 2016; remanded Mar. 10, 2017.

47.

Trokey v. Great Plains Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., No. 4:16–cv–01193–
ODS, 2017 WL 722607 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by settling with the nondiverse defendant more than one year after commencement (after the state
court denied the non-diverse defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim). The district court noted that the claim against the non-diverse
defendant was a valid claim evidenced by the state court’s ruling and the fact
that the diverse defendant had asserted a cross-claim against the non-diverse
defendant. [142]
Filed Sept. 4, 2015; removed Nov. 7, 2016; remanded Feb. 23, 2017.
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Hubbard v. Diaz, No. 16-3006 (CCC-JBC), 2017 WL 436252 (D. N.J. Jan.
31, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the defendants failed to show that the plaintiff
was intentionally deceptive regarding the amount of damages. The court
noted that the complaint contained sufficient allegations from which it could
be extrapolated that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. [150]
Filed Apr. 20, 2015; removed May 25, 2016; remanded Jan. 1, 2017.

49.

Kamal-Hashmat v. Loews Miami Beach Hotel Operating Co., Inc., No. 16cv-24864-GAYLES, 2017 WL 433209 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff actively litigated the claims against
the jurisdictional spoilers and that the defendant had no clear evidence of the
plaintiff’s bad faith. [158]
Filed Oct. 19, 2014; removed Nov. 21, 2016; remanded Jan. 27, 2017.

50.

Caires v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 16 Civ. 2694 (GBD) (RLE), 2017
WL 384696 (Jan. 27, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement (by the pro
se plaintiff/counter-defendant). The district court remanded, finding
insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the counter-plaintiff. [160]
Filed Dec. 3, 2009; removed Apr, 11, 2016; remanded Jan. 27, 2017.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the JVCA.
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County of Dimmit, Tex. v. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co., No. SA-16CA-01049RCL, 2017 WL 9360841 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The plaintiff
amended the state-court complaint more than two years after commencement
to add the diverse defendant. The diverse defendant removed, arguing that the
plaintiff had misjoined the claims against the non-diverse defendants and had
acted in bad faith by waiting so long to add the removing diverse defendant as
a party. The district court remanded, finding no evidence of bad faith and
further finding that the plaintiff had not misjoined the defendants. The court
noted that the plaintiff amended the complaint to add the diverse defendant
after the diverse defendant’s fault was identified in discovery responses to the
plaintiff’s interrogatories. The court also noted that there was no evidence that
the plaintiff was aware that the diverse defendant was potentially liable prior to
receiving the discovery responses. [164]
Filed May 13, 2013; removed after Aug. 24, 2016, remanded Jan. 19, 2017).

52.

Dumistrascu v. Dumistrascu, No. 15-CV-561-JED-FHM, 2017 WL 5241234
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding no conduct by the plaintiff that prevented the
defendant from removing within one year. [168]
Filed Oct. 25, 2012; removed Oct. 2, 2015; remanded Jan. 13, 2017.

53.

Zazueta v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 3:16-cv-05893-RJB, 2017 WL 74682
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff’s increased settlement demand (made
after expiration of the one-year period) did not constitute bad faith. The court
noted that the increased demand for attorneys’ fees was largely caused by
multiple court filings and hearings that occurred after expiration of the oneyear period. [171]
Filed May 12, 2015; removed Oct. 21, 2016; remanded Jan. 9. 2017.
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Herron v. Graco, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00653-NJR-SCW, 2016 WL 7239915
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s dismissal of one non-diverse defendant
after expiration of the one-year period and the plaintiff’s agreement not to
collect from the remaining two nondiverse defendants indicated bad faith and
fraudulent joinder. The district court remanded, finding that the defendant
failed to demonstrate bad faith and also failed to demonstrate fraudulent
joinder. The plaintiff indicated that one non-diverse defendant was dismissed
after it raised strong objections to venue in state court. The plaintiff entered
into an agreement with the other non-diverse defendants who also raised
venue objections that the plaintiff would not enforce any judgment against
them if they agreed to withdraw their venue objection and testify at a
deposition and at trial. [186]
Filed Feb. 9, 2015; removed June 15, 2016; remanded Dec. 15, 2016.

55.

Hubbard v. Daiz, No. 16-3006 (CCC), 2016 WL 8161624 (D. N.J. Dec. 2,
2016).
The defendants removed the case more than year after commencement,
alleging that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal by failing to
timely respond to discovery requests regarding the plaintiff’s alleged damages
arising from a dog attack. The court found no evidence that the delay was
caused by anything more than counsel’s carelessness or neglect and noted that
“Defendants fail[ed] to present any information regarding their attempts to
secure this discovery after service.” Id. at *2. [190]
Filed Apr. 20, 2015; removed May 25, 2016; remanded Dec. 2, 2016.

56.

Larson v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., CV 16–105–M–DWM, 2016
WL 6602639 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
found no bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs in an automobile accident case,
noting that the plaintiffs actively pursued the case against the state (the
jurisdictional spoiler) and settled with the state more than one year after
commencement in response to the state’s agreement to conduct feasibility
assessments of various speed limits. [191]
Filed Apr. 2015; removed Aug. 11, 2016; remanded Nov. 8, 2016.
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Bristol v. Ford Motor Co., No. 4:16-CV-01649-JAR, 2016 WL 6277198
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2016).
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The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff
had not actively litigated the case against the spoiler prior to settling with the
spoiler after expiration of the one-year period. The court also found no
evidence that the plaintiff acted for the purpose of preventing removal. [196]
Filed Aug. 20, 2015; removed Oct. 24, 2016; remanded Oct. 27, 2016.

58.

Angus v. John Crane Inc., No. 16-cv-03532-JST, 2016 WL 4423379 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 2016).

**
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
remanded the case. It found no evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith
where the plaintiff dismissed the jurisdictional spoiler more than one year
after commencement once it had reached a $10,000 settlement agreement.
Instead, the court found that the defendant acted in bad faith by removing just
prior to commencement of trial in state court. The court awarded attorneys’
fees and costs to the plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [204]
Filed July 9, 2014; removed June 23, 2016; remanded Aug. 22, 2016.

59.

Toro v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D. Mass.
2016).

**

The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
remanded the case, finding that the defendant had not timely removed within
the relevant thirty-day period and further finding that the defendant’s
allegation that the plaintiff concealed the amount in controversy in bad faith
was misplaced because it was clear from the outset that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000. The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to
the plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [207]
Filed May 2014; removed Mar. 2016; remanded Aug. 9, 2016.
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Heacock v. Rolling Frito-Lay Sales, LP, No. C16-0829-JCC, 2016 WL
4009849 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement and a few
weeks before trial was scheduled. The court found no bad faith prevention of
removal in a case where the plaintiff sued a diverse employer and a nondiverse employee for injuries arising from the employee’s alleged negligence.
The court found that the plaintiff actively litigated the case against the
employee. “Frito Lay's assertions similarly fail to meet the standard of inactive
litigation discussed by Ninth Circuit district courts. Heacock served Tally with
two discovery requests and deposed her. Even if Heacock's efforts constitute a
bare minimum effort to litigate against Tally, that is sufficient to qualify as
‘active litigation.” Id. at * 4. [210]
Filed Oct. 6, 2014; removed May 16, 2016; remanded July 27, 2016.

61.
*

Oakland v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00608-RAJ,
2016 WL 9415202 (W.D. Wash. July 26, 2016).
The case was removed for a second time more than one year after
commencement. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs
were to blame for the untimely removal. The court rejected the defendant’s
argument that it was prevented from conducting discovery while the case was
in federal court after the first removal and noted that the defendant offered no
reason why it could not have removed within the one-year period. Id. at *1.
[211]
Filed Oct. 2014; removed for the second time Apr. 27, 2016; remanded July 26,
2016.

62.

Shorraw v. Bell, No. 4:15-cv-03998-JMC, 2016 WL 3586675 (D. S.C. July 5,
2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
remanded the case, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith forum
manipulation on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiff
actively litigated the case against the jurisdictional spoiler by retaining an
expert in the spoiler’s field of expertise and surviving the spoiler’s motion to
dismiss in state court. [215]
Filed Apr. 13, 2013; removed for the second time Sept. 25, 2015; remanded July
5, 2016.
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Iqbal v. Normandin Transit, Inc., No. 15-CV-746-A, 2016 WL 3563218
(W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016).
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The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to prove the plaintiff’s bad
faith by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that the diverse
defendants acknowledged that it was “objectively clear in the circumstances
just a few months after the action was commenced that neither of the nondiverse municipal defendants named by the plaintiff were potentially liable.”
Id. at *1. [216]
[No dates.]

64.

Young v. White Castle Sys., Inc., No. 4:16-cv-00553-JCH, 2016 WL 3197305
(E.D. Mo. June 9, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. After the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed one non-diverse defendant, the diverse
defendant removed the case, arguing that the remaining non-diverse
defendant had been fraudulently joined and that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith. The district court remanded the case, finding that complete diversity
did not exist because the remaining non-diverse defendant had not been
fraudulently joined. [222]
Filed Aug. 5, 2014; removed Apr. 20, 2016; remanded June 9, 2016.

65.
**

Lujan v. Alorica, Inc., EP-15-CV-355-KC, 2016 WL 8857008 (W.D. Tex.
May 24, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in bad faith
because the plaintiff’s claim for damages (lost wages) at the time the case was
filed could not have exceeded $75,000. The court also noted that the defendant
failed to attempt to discover the amount in controversy until well after one year
had passed and found that the defendant’s lack of vigilance further supported
remand. The court awarded the plaintiff attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [226]
Filed Apr. 25, 2012; removed Nov. 30, 2015; remanded May 24, 2016.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

664

66.

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:595

White v. Lexington Court Apartments, LLC, No. DKC 16-0427,
2016 WL 1558340 (D. Md. Apr.
18, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in
bad faith to prevent removal. [236]
Filed Dec. 17, 2014; removed Feb. 16, 2016; remanded Apr. 18, 2016.

67.

Ellison v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 177 F. Supp. 3d 967 (S.D. W.Va.
2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
removing defendant argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The
district court remanded, finding that the amount in controversy
requirement was not met. [237]
Filed Feb. 27, 2015; removed more than 1 year later; remanded Apr. 14,
2016.

68.

Bryson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:16-CV-28, 2016 WL
1305846 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2016).
The district court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to
demonstrate the plaintiff acted in bad faith by dismissing the spoiler
more than one year after commencement. The spoiler had filed for
bankruptcy and the bankruptcy proceedings continued until shortly
before the plaintiff nonsuited the spoiler after reaching a settlement
agreement approved by the bankruptcy court. [239]
Filed Nov. 6, 2014; removed Jan. 28, 2016; remanded Mar. 31, 2016.
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69.

Federal Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Milasinovich, 161 F. Supp. 3d 981
(D. N. Mex. 2016).

**

The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
pro se defendant removed. The district court remanded, finding that
the defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith
to prevent removal. The court awarded plaintiff attorneys’ fees and
expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [241]
Filed July 20, 2009; removed for the second time on July 20, 2015;
remanded Mar. 30, 2016].

70.

Cesarin v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., No. 15-cv-06056-HSG, 2016 WL
720684 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded after finding insufficient evidence of bad faith.
Although the plaintiff dismissed the jurisdictional spoiler more than
one year after commencement, the plaintiff’s counsel and the
plaintiff’s private investigator submitted declarations indicating that
they had continued to search for evidence to support the plaintiff’s
claim against the spoiler. [251]
Filed Oct. 29, 2014; removed Dec. 24, 2015; remanded Feb. 24, 2016.

71.

Martinez v. Yordy, 16 Civ. 005 (BMC), 2016 WL 8711443 (E.D.
N.Y. Feb. 19, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case finding insufficient evidence that the
plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal by concealing the
amount-in-controversy. “[The Court] will not determine that [the]
plaintiff's failure to provide a bill of particulars was intended to
prevent removal where [the] defendants did not take action for five
months and did not move the court to compel that information before
the statutory time had passed.” Id. at *3. [252]
Filed July 21, 2014; removed Jan. 4, 2016; remanded Feb. 19, 2016.
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Miami Beach Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Ctr., Inc. v. UnitedHealthcare
Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-24041-UU, 2016 WL 8607846 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court found that the defendant’s removal was premature because the state
court had not granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in a
manner so as to seek more than $75,000. The court further indicated,
however, that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith in failing to seek to
amend prior to expiration of the one-year period, noting that the plaintiff’s
explanation was “consistent with a straightforward change in strategy.” Id. at
*5. [263]
Filed Jan. 27, 2014; removed Oct. 28, 2015; remanded Jan. 8, 2016.

73.

Safety Harbor Centre, Inc. v. Hancock Bank, No: 8:15–cv–2553–T–
36TGW, 2015 WL 13306197 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the
jurisdictional spoiler and noted that after hearing the spoiler’s motion to
dismiss, the state court requested additional briefing, suggesting that the nonviability of the claims against the spoiler was not as clear as suggested by the
removing defendant. [267]
Filed July 27, 2014; removed Oct. 29, 2015; remanded Dec. 28, 2015.

74.

ALC Holding v. Federated Ins. Co., No. CV-15-08162-PCT-GMS, 2015
WL 9312081 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff disclosed the amount in controversy
prior to the expiration of the one-year period when the plaintiff moved to
confirm an appraisal of more than $600,000. [268]
Filed May 6, 2014; removed Aug. 27, 2015; remanded Dec. 23, 2015.
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McDuffie v. Davidson, No. 1:15-CV-03360-CAP, 2015 WL 10960936
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 3. 2015).

*
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding “no proof that [the] plaintiff acted in bad
faith.” Id. at *2. [279]
Filed Dec. 18, 2014; removed for the second time on Sept. 24, 2015;
remanded Nov. 3, 2015.

76.

*

Educ. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Cadero, No. 5:15–CV–686 RP., 2015 WL
6690401 (W. D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in bad
faith. Despite the removing defendant’s contention that the amount-in
controversy exceeded $75,000, the plaintiff continued to assert that it did
not. “Defendant may disagree, but disagreement alone does not evince bad
faith.” Id. at *4. [280]
No dates. This opinion addresses the second removal.

77.

Johnson v. HCR Manocare LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00189, 2015 WL 6511301
(N.D.W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part
of the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiffs had deposed the
jurisdictional spoiler and found that the plaintiff’s counsel had not engaged
in systemic forum manipulation by dismissing jurisdictional spoilers on the
eve of trial in other similar cases because the plaintiff’s counsel contended
such dismissals were part of counsel’s trial strategy in those cases. [281]
Filed July 14, 2014; removed Oct. 26, 2015 (approximately one week before
trial); remanded Oct. 28, 2015.
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In re Boston Scientific Corp., No. CV 15-06764, et al., 2015 WL 6456528
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015).
This opinion involves mesh-implant litigation. The plaintiff filed suit in state
court and joined sixty-one plaintiffs who were diverse from the defendant
and three plaintiffs who were not diverse from the defendant. The defendant
removed, alleging fraudulent misjoinder. The district court remanded the
case. The state court severed the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendant
removed the 62 cases involving diverse plaintiffs more than one year after
commencement. The district court remanded 62 separate cases, finding that
the plaintiffs had not engaged in bad faith by joining nondiverse plaintiffs in
the original action. Although the state court found that the plaintiffs’ claims
were misjoined and severed the claims, the state court did not find that the
joinder was fraudulent or in bad faith. In addition, the district court observed
that the defendant could have obtained severance and removal within one
year of commencement but failed to do so. “Defendant has also not pointed
to any conduct preventing it from seeking severance prior to July 2015,
when it eventually attempted to sever the plaintiffs' claims. Additionally,
there is no evidence before the Court indicating that Defendant could not
have sought severance and removed the action within the one-year time
limit.” Id. at *6. [283]
Filed July 12, 2013; removed Aug. 28. 2013 based upon fraudulent
misjoinder; remanded; claims severed in state court Aug. 5. 2015; removed
for the second time more than one year after commencement; remanded Oct.
26, 2015.

79.

In re Boston Scientific Corp., No. CV 15-6666 PA (PLAx), et al., 2015 WL
5822582 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2015).

*
This opinion involves mesh-implant litigation. One case was filed in state
court on July 12, 2013 and involved the joinder of 66 plaintiffs, the large
majority of whom were diverse from the defendant. The other case was filed
in state court on December 20, 2013 and involved the joinder of 43
plaintiffs, the large majority of whom were diverse from the defendant. The
defendant removed both cases. The district court remanded both cases. By
order dated August 5, 2015, the state court severed all of the plaintiffs’
claims. The defendant then removed 102 of the claims brought by diverse
plaintiffs. The district court remanded 102 separate cases, finding that the
plaintiffs had not engaged in bad faith by joining non-diverse plaintiffs in
the original actions. The district court refused to find bad faith on the part of
the plaintiffs, noting that their joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs in the
original state court action was not egregious or fraudulent. [293]
Filed July 12, 2013 & Dec. 20, 2013; removed; remanded; claims severed in
state court on Aug. 5, 2015; removed for the second time between Sept. 1,
2015 and Sept. 4, 2015; remanded Sept. 20, 2015.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2

2019]

80.

THE JVCA’S BAD FAITH EXCEPTION

669

Alvarez v. Areas USA LAX, LLC, No. CV 15-5033-JFW (PLAx), 2015 WL
5050520 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part
of the plaintiff. The court held:
Not only did Plaintiff claim that the amount in controversy
exceeded $25,000 (which is a standard allegation, and not
nefarious as Defendant suggests), Plaintiff claimed that he “has
suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and
other employment benefits” and that he “has suffered humiliation,
emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish,” and
sought, for example, back pay, front pay, damages for emotional
distress, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. . . In fact, given
the nature and broad range of damages sought in Plaintiff’s
Complaint, Defendant may have been entitled to remove solely
based on the face of the Complaint, without any discovery.
Regardless, Defendant was certainly on notice that there was a
very strong likelihood that Plaintiff’s damages would exceed
$75,000. Despite this notice and for some unknown reason,
Defendant never specifically asked Plaintiff whether he sought
more than $75,000 in damages, never asked Plaintiff to stipulate
that he sought less than $75,000 in damages, and never directly
raised the issue of removal with Plaintiff.
Id. at *3.
The court further held, “More importantly, if Defendant had truly believed that
Plaintiff’s responses to its discovery requests were in any way insufficient or
made in bad faith to prevent removal, Defendant could have and should have
filed a motion to compel discovery well within a year of the commencement of
this action.” Id. at *3. [299]
Filed Apr. 1, 2014; removed July 2, 2015; remanded Aug. 26, 2015.

81.

Gastelum v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:15–cv–00126–JAD–VCF, 2015
WL 4928021 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2015).

*

The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff. The court noted that the defendant had largely directed the
progression of the case from the outset. [361]
Filed Oct. 16, 2013; removed for the third time Jan. 22, 2015; remanded Aug.
18, 2015.
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Ramirez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-CV-09131, 2015 WL 4665809
(S.D.W.Va. Aug. 6, 2015).
The plaintiff sued diverse manufacturers of transvaginal surgical mesh and
non-diverse doctor for injuries arising from complications after implantation.
The defendants removed more than one year after commencement and
argued that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse doctor and acted
in bad faith to prevent removal. The district court remanded, finding
insufficient evidence of bad faith. The court noted that the non-diverse
doctor remained a defendant almost three years after commencement and
further noted that the plaintiff had litigated her claim against the non-diverse
defendant by propounding discovery requests and retaining an expert whose
report addressed the non-diverse doctor’s conduct. [366]
Filed in 2012; removed June 8, 2015; remanded Aug. 6, 2015.

83.

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Franklin, No. 6:15–cv–1038–Orl–
37GLK, 2015 WL 4478127 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2015).
Bank sued the defendant for foreclosure in state court. The defendant
removed more than one year after commencement, alleging federal question
and diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded, finding no
jurisdiction and further finding that the plaintiff’s conduct did not warrant
equitable tolling. In so ruling, the court cited the JVCA’s “bad faith”
requirement for removal more than year after commencement. [374]
Filed in 2008; removed Jun. 24, 2015; remanded July 21, 2015).
Note: Although the case was filed in 2008, the district court applied the JVCA.

84.

Nationstar Mortg., LLC. V. DeMers, No. 3:14cv494/MCR/CJK, 2015 WL
4430990 (N.D. Fla. July 17, 2015).
The plaintiff sued the defendant for debt under a promissory note and
mortgage. The defendant removed more than one year after commencement.
The district court remanded, finding no evidence that the plaintiff acted in
bad faith to prevent the defendant from removing. [376]
Filed Jan. 2010; removed Sept. 19, 2014; remanded July 17, 2015.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2010, the district court applied the JVCA.
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Fruge v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. L.P., No. 2:14-CV-2382, 2015 WL
4134992 (W.D. La. July 7, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court affirmed the magistrate’s memorandum ruling and remanded the case,
finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It noted that the plaintiff ardently
pursued the clams against the non-diverse defendants and kept them in the
case well after the one-year period expired. It also noted that if the nondiverse defendants had been fraudulently joined (as argued by the removing
defendant), the defendant should have removed the case within the one-year
period. [378]
Filed May 4, 2012; removed July 25, 2014; remanded July 7, 2015.

86.

McHugh v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 4:15–cv–00046 (CDL),
2015 WL 4067599 (M.D. Ga. July 2, 2015).

**

The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding that it was not removed within 30 days and
that it was removed more than one year after commencement with no
evidence that the plaintiffs prevented removal in bad faith. The district court
found that the defendant’s counsel was aware of the plaintiff’s demand for
more than $75,000 almost nine months before the case was removed. The
district court ordered the defendant to pay more than $2,400 in expenses and
fees to the plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [379]
Filed Sept. 24, 2012; removed Mar. 27, 2015; remanded July 2, 2015.

87.

Birkner v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. SA–15–CA–172–OLG, 2015
WL 13048731 (W. D. Tex. June 5, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case after finding insufficient evidence that the plaintiff
acted in bad faith. The court noted that the plaintiff’s interrogatory responses
revealed the nature of the case within the one-year period. [385]
Filed Jan. 2, 2014; removed Mar. 15, 2015; remanded June 5, 2015.
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Matherne Instrumentation Specialists, Inc. v. Mighty Enters., Inc., No.
15–1159, 2015 WL 3505032 (E. D. La. June 3, 2015).
The plaintiff corporation sued diverse manufacturer and non-diverse retail
seller of lathes alleging fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices. The
plaintiff amended the complaint to add the individual diverse owner of the
manufacturer. The diverse defendants removed after obtaining an email
through discovery written by the president of the non-diverse retail seller
indicating that it was in full cooperation with the plaintiff in attempting to
place the blame on the diverse manufacturer. The removing defendants
argued that the email demonstrated collusion between the plaintiff and the
retail seller and that the plaintiff did not intend to collect upon any
judgment that might be entered against the retail seller. The district court
remanded, finding that the defendant could not even prove that the plaintiff
fraudulently joined the retail seller by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court further held that the relevant inquiry was whether the plaintiff
intended to obtain a judgment against the non-diverse defendant, not
whether the plaintiff intended to collect upon such judgment. [386]
Filed Apr. 8. 2014; removed more than one year later; remanded June 3, 2015.

89.

Tallman v. HL Corp. (Shenzhen), No. 14–5550(WHW)(CLW), 2015 WL
3556348 (D. N.J. May 27, 2015).

*
The diverse defendant first removed the insurance indemnity action
alleging that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the in-state defendant. The
district court remanded after finding no fraudulent joinder. After
conducting additional discovery, the defendant removed a second time
more than one year after commencement. The district court remanded a
second time, finding that the removing defendant failed to demonstrate bad
faith. The removing defendant alleged that the in-state defendant was not
the supplier of the product in question. The district court noted some
evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegations. [389]
Filed Mar. 17, 2014; removed for the second time Apr. 1, 2015; remanded
May 27, 2015).
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Moris v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, No. 14–4981 (SRN/SER), 2015 WL 2373457
(D. Minn. May 18, 2015).

*
The plaintiff sued various entities for the wrongful death of his wife after she
died from injuries sustained while operating her Chrysler minivan. The
defendants removed. The plaintiff moved to remand. The parties stipulated to
remand and agreed to the dismissal of Chrysler Canada without prejudice
subject to the plaintiff’s right to refile against Chrysler Canada at the close of
discovery. After discovery, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add
Chrysler Canada. Chrysler Canada then removed more than one year after
commencement. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith on the part
of the plaintiff given the parties’ stipulation that the plaintiff could re-file the
claim against Chrysler Canada after the close of discovery. [393]
Filed in 2013; removed for the second time on Dec. 11, 2014; remanded May
18, 2015.

91.

Lare v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 15–1231, 2015 WL 2116490 (E.D.
Pa. May 6, 2015).
The plaintiffs filed pro se action against their homeowner’s insurer seeking
less than $50,000 pursuant to their insurance policy. The case proceeded to
arbitration and the arbitrator awarded plaintiffs more than $35,000. The insurer
appealed the arbitration award and demanded a jury trial. Facing the prospect
of a jury trial, the plaintiffs retained counsel who amended the complaint more
than two weeks prior to the expiration of the one-year period to add a claim for
insurance bad faith. The amended complaint alleged that the insurer’s frivolous
appeal of the arbitration award constituted bad faith and sought extracontractual and punitive damages in addition to the contractual damages that
were sought in the original complaint. The defendant insurer removed after
expiration of the one-year period. The district court remanded the case, finding
that the defendant had not demonstrated deceptive conduct by the plaintiffs,
noting that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was primarily motivated by the
insurer’s appeal of the arbitration award and further noting that the plaintiffs’
amended complaint was filed two weeks before expiration of the one-year
policy, leaving the defendant sufficient time to remove within one year. [397]
Filed Mar. 4, 2014; removed Mar. 11, 2015; remanded May 6, 2015.
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Mintz & Gold LLP v. Daibes, No. 15 Civ. 1218(PAE), 2015 WL 2130935
(S.D. N.Y. May 6, 2015).
Law firm sued its client in state court seeking more than $75,000. More than
four years later, the appellate court entered an order directing the trial court
to enter partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Two days later,
the defendant removed based upon diversity jurisdiction and asserted bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff. The district court remanded, finding no
evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, given that the case was
removable based upon the original complaint. The court further noted that
the defendant was apparently engaged in improper forum shopping given
that it removed the case immediately after the trial court had been ordered to
enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The district court awarded
the plaintiff costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and sanctioned the
defendant’s lawyer pursuant to Rule 11. [399]
Filed Apr. 11, 2011; removed Feb. 19, 2015; remanded May 6, 2015.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the JVCA.

93.

Delaney v. CasePro, Inc., No. 9:14–cv–4355–DCN, 2015 WL 1862871 (D.
S.C. Apr. 23, 2015).
The plaintiff sued a diverse defendant and an in-state defendant. After the instate defendant was granted summary judgment more than one year after the
case was filed, the diverse defendant removed. The district court remanded
the case, finding that no evidence of bad faith was presented and noting that
bad faith will not be presumed simply because summary judgment was
granted to the non-diverse defendant. [403]
Filed Nov. 1, 2012; removed Nov. 10, 2014; remanded Apr. 23, 2015.

94.

Rulis v. LA Fitness, No. 13–1582, 2015 WL 1344745 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24,
2015).

*
The state court granted summary judgment to the non-diverse defendant. The
diverse defendant then removed more than one year after commencement.
The district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to
engage in discovery with respect to the non-diverse defendant within the
one-year period did not signal bad faith given that the state court discovery
deadline was set well after expiration of the one-year period. [421]
Filed Feb. 27, 2013; removed for the second time on Jan. 20, 2015; remanded
Mar. 24, 2015.
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Gonzales S. Tex. Elec. Corp. v. Jeffrey C. Stone, Inc., No. H–14–2216, 2014
WL 7072437 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court found no evidence that the plaintiff manipulated the forum, noting that a
party other than the plaintiff created complete diversity by dismissing its
claims against the plaintiff. Note that this case is unusual because the original
defendant was realigned as a plaintiff after dismissal of claims against him.
Third-party defendants actually removed the case and argued that the original
defendant (later realigned as a plaintiff) had prevented removal jurisdiction.
[443]
Filed July 18, 2012; removed Aug. 8, 2014; remanded Dec. 12, 2104.

96.

Hamilton San Diego Apartments, LP v. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC, No.
14cv01856 WQH (BLM), 2014 WL 7175598 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014).
The plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse defendant more than two months after
expiration of the one-year period. The diverse defendant removed more than
one month later. The district court remanded, finding that the defendant had
not demonstrated bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court held that the
plaintiff’s lawyer had plausible explanations for the failure to pursue
discovery from the non-diverse party and for the timing of non-diverse
party’s dismissal. [445]
Filed Apr. 10, 2013; removed Aug. 6, 2014; remanded Dec. 11, 2014.

97.

Campbell v. R.E. Garrison Trucking, Inc., No. 8:14–cv–2270–T–23MAP,
2014 WL 6801827 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2014).

*

The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court for damages in excess of
$15,000. The defendant removed. The district court remanded, finding no
evidence to support the defendant’s assertion that the amount in controversy
exceeded $75,000. The defendant removed a second time, after expiration of
the one-year period, and argued that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith. The
district court remanded the case finding no evidence to support bad faith and
further finding that the amount in controversy requirement had not been met.
[451]
Filed Aug. 27, 2013; removed for the second time Sept. 11, 2014; remanded
Dec. 2, 2104.
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WBCMT 2007-C33 Office 7870, LLC v. Breakwater Equity Partners LLC,
No. 1:14–CV–588, 2014 WL 6673712 (Nov. 24, 2014).
The plaintiff brought breach-of-contract claims against various borrowers who
owned the property at issue. The plaintiff also named the county treasurer as a
defendant in his individual capacity. After settling with the borrowers, the
plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint almost a month before
expiration of the one-year period. The court granted the plaintiff leave to
amend after expiration of the one-year period and the plaintiff field amended
the complaint naming four new diverse defendants. The amended complaint
did not name the non-diverse treasurer. The defendants removed. The district
court remanded, finding no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court held
that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the in-state treasurer and that,
therefore, even if the plaintiff had brought suit against the diverse defendants
prior to the expiration of the one-year period, removal would not have been
proper due to the non-diverse treasurer’s presence as a defendant. [453]
Filed June 7, 2013; removed July 17, 2014; remanded Nov. 24, 2104.

99.

Escalante v. Burlington Nat. Indem., Ltd., No. 2:14–CV–7237–ODW
(JPRx), 2014 WL 6670002 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014).
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against non-diverse the defendants and a
Cayman Island citizen. The plaintiffs spent more than a year effectuating
process on the foreign defendant. After the expiration of the one-year period,
the non-diverse defendants moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs
dismissed the non-diverse parties and the foreign defendant removed. The
district court remanded, finding no bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs. The
court found that the plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined the non-diverse
defendants because the plaintiffs had been misled to believe that they had a
cause of action against the non-diverse defendants. The court noted that even if
the plaintiffs had been able to serve the foreign defendant prior to expiration of
the one-year period, removal would not have been proper because the nondiverse defendants were still parties to the litigation at that time. [454]
Filed Jan. 16, 2013; removed Sept. 16, 2014; remanded Nov. 24, 2104.
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Houlik v. Santander Consumer, USA, Inc., No. 14–1101–KHV, 2014 WL
6632951 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2104).
The plaintiffs borrowed money to purchase a pick-up truck. After the pick-up
truck was wrongfully repossessed, the plaintiffs sued the diverse lender and
the non-diverse entity the lender had hired to repossess the plaintiffs’ truck.
Although the non-diverse defendant had not answered or entered an
appearance, the plaintiffs had not filed a motion for default judgment. The
diverse defendant removed after expiration of the one-year period, arguing that
the plaintiff had acted in bad faith by abandoning the claim against the nondiverse defendant and by concealing the true amount in controversy. The
district court remanded after finding no bad faith. The plaintiffs demanded
more than $75,000 in their initial petition and had not abandoned their claim
against the non-diverse defendant. The plaintiffs’ attorney explained that,
pursuant to state law, it was much more efficient in a multi-party case to delay
the default judgment hearing on damages until trial against the remaining
party. [456]
Filed Dec. 20, 2012; removed Apr. 3, 2014; remanded Nov. 21, 2014.

101.

Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. N. Mex. 2014).
The district found that the plaintiffs did not engage in improper strategic
joinder by naming non-diverse defendants and retaining some in the lawsuit
beyond the one-year period. This is one of the most thorough opinions
addressing the bad faith exception. For a thorough discussion of the case, see
supra notes 187-211. and accompanying text. [460]
Filed May 24, 2012; removed Apr. 29, 2014; remanded Oct. 31, 2014.

102.

Bajaba, LLC v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, No. 14–CV–4057,
2014 WL 5363905 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2014).
The plaintiff sued a diverse seller of a steel building and the seller’s
non-diverse authorized dealer and builder. More than two years later,
the plaintiff moved to non-suit the nondiverse defendants for lack of
service. The diverse defendant then removed. The district court
remanded, finding no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court
noted that the plaintiffs had attempted to locate and serve the nondiverse defendants. The defendant moved the district court to
reconsider. The district court denied the motion. See Case No. 5 in
Table E. [464]
No dates.
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Hall v. Leisure Time Prods., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-465, 2014 WL 5019687 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 7, 2014).

*
The plaintiff sued several defendants, including one non-diverse LLC, for
injuries allegedly caused by hardware used to support a child’s swing set.
After the nondiverse LLC’s designated representative testified by deposition
after expiration of the one-year period that it had no responsibility for the
product at issue, the plaintiff non-suited the non-diverse defendant. The
diverse defendants removed. The district court remanded, finding
insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted
that the plaintiff had not strategically withheld any information from the
defendants and that the defendants could have alleged fraudulent joinder as a
basis for removal from the outset. The court further noted that the diverse
defendant had ample opportunity to engage in discovery prior to the
expiration of the one-year period in order to establish the non-diverse LLC’s
lack of responsibility. [468]
Filed Mar. 4, 2013; removed for the second time on June 25, 2014; remanded
Oct. 7, 2014.

104.

Sanchez v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., No. 14–CV–702 JAP/GBW,
2014 WL 10298033 (D. N. Mex. Oct. 6, 2014).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the
non-diverse defendant and further finding no evidence of bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff. [469]
Filed June 10, 2013; removed Aug. 8, 2014; remanded Oct. 6, 2014.
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Day v. W. World Ins. Co., No. 14–00348–BAJ–SCR, 2014 WL 4373301
(M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014).
The plaintiffs sued diverse defendants, including in-state defendants, for
damages sustained in a tractor-trailer accident. More than four years later
and shortly before trial was set, the plaintiffs added an additional diverse
excess insurer who then removed, arguing that complete diversity existed
because the plaintiffs had reached settlement agreements with the in-state
defendants. The court applied the Tedford equitable exception, which it said
was governed by the same standards as the JVCA amendment, and found
that the defendants had not demonstrated bad faith. Although the newly
added defendant argued that plaintiffs should have added it as party sooner,
the court noted that removal would have been improper at an earlier point
because the plaintiffs had pending viable claims against the in-state
defendants. [475]
Filed Feb. 5, 2010; removed June 3, 2014; remanded Sept. 3, 2014.
Note: The case was filed in 2010. The court applied the Tedford equitable
exception and found no bad faith.

106.

Tran v. Thompson, No. 14–263–SDD–SCR, 2014 WL 4161784 (M.D. La.
Aug. 19, 2014).
Parents sued school board, school employee, and two insurers after their
daughter injured herself falling from a wheelchair while receiving
instruction from the school employee. The plaintiffs settled with the school
board, school employee, and one insurer. Before the dismissal order was
entered, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming four additional
defendants. The defendants removed, arguing that the amended complaint
was a new cause of action and also arguing bad faith on the part of the
plaintiffs. The district court remanded. The court applied the Tedford
equitable exception, which it said was governed by the same standards as
the JVCA amendment, and found that the defendants had not demonstrated
bad faith. The court noted that even if plaintiffs had added the additional
four defendants at an earlier point, the case would not have been removable
given that the plaintiffs were pursuing viable claims against the in-state
defendants. [479]
Filed Aug. 21, 2008; removed May 1, 2014; remanded Aug. 19, 2014.
Note: The case was filed in 2008. The court applied the Tedford equitable
exception and found no bad faith.
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107.

HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. v. DeGeorge, No. 3:14–cv–217–J–32JBT, 2014
WL 3721273 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2014).

*

The plaintiff bank sued the defendant in state court for an alleged breach of a
credit card agreement and sought $51,129.38 in damages plus interest. The
district court remanded the case the first time, finding that the pro se
defendant had failed to establish bad faith and had further failed to establish
the jurisdictional amount. The district court remanded a second time, again
finding that the defendant failed to establish any bad faith or the required
amount in controversy. [482]
Filed Sept. 24, 2009; removed for a second time; remanded July 28, 2014.

108.

Green v. Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc., No. 2:14–cv–00014–
MEF–TFM, 2014 WL 2862894 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2014).
Employee sued employer and Korean drill press manufacturer for injuries
sustained while using the drill at work. After expiration of the one-year
period, the plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse employer after it settled the
plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. Although the plaintiff immediately
sought the assistance of a company in serving foreign entities, the plaintiff
did not serve the Korean manufacturer until after expiration of the one-year
period. The district court remanded, finding that the plaintiff did not act in
bad faith so as to delay service on the foreign manufacturer. [491]
Filed May 22, 2012; removed Jan. 3, 2014; remanded June 24, 2014.

109.

Public Serv. Towers, Inc. v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 28 F. Supp. 3d 1313
(M.D. Ga. 2014).
The plaintiff sued the defendant in federal court, alleging that the defendant’s
retaining wall encroached on its property. The case was remanded after the
plaintiff determined it was unlikely to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement – in part, due to the declining property values. More than five
years later, the defendant removed, claiming the amount in controversy
requirement was met based upon its receipt of a settlement demand for
$160,000. The district court remanded finding no evidence that the plaintiff,
who had originally filed the case in federal court, made any misrepresentation
regarding the amount in controversy, given that the property values had
declined. [492]
Filed July 3, 2008; removed Apr. 16, 2014; remanded June 24, 2014.
Note: The case was filed in 2008. The district court applied the Tedford
equitable exception and found no bad faith forum manipulation.
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Estate of Morris v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. 4:13CV2134, 2014 WL
2803477 (N.D. Ohio June 19, 2104).
The plaintiff sued diverse insurer and in-state adjuster for breach of contract
and breach of the duty of good faith. The case was removed based upon
fraudulent joinder. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to
remand. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no fraudulent joinder. After
the case was remanded, the state court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims
against the adjuster for failure to state a claim and the diverse insurer
removed more than one year after commencement. Although the court
refused to recognize a common law exception to the one-year bar, the court
found that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith given that the Seventh
Circuit had decided that the adjuster had not been fraudulently joined in
light of the fact that state law was less than clear with respect to an
adjuster’s liability. [495]
Filed Aug. 1, 2011; removed the first time based upon alleged fraudulent
joinder of the adjuster; remanded based upon the appellate court’s finding
no fraudulent joinder; removed for the second time on Sep. 26, 2013;
remanded June 19, 2014.
Note: The case was filed in 2011. The court refused to recognize an equitable
exception but further found that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith.

111.

In re Zoloft Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 2342, et al., 2014 WL
2445799 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2014).
The plaintiff sued an in-state drug manufacturer and added a diverse drug
manufacturer five years later, by which time the original defendant had
changed citizenship and was no longer a citizen of the forum state. The
newly added defendant removed. The JVCA did not apply. The court held
that even if it were to recognize an equitable exception, the defendant had
failed to prove bad faith prevention of removal. [498]
Filed in 2007; removed in late 2012 or early 2013; remanded May 29, 2014.
Note: The case was filed in 2007. The court held that even if it were to
recognize an equitable exception, the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith.
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NKD Diversified Enters., Inc. v. First Mercury Ins., No. 1:14–cv–00183–
AWI–SAB, 2014 WL 1671659 (Apr. 29, 2014).
The plaintiffs sued a diverse insurer for breach of contract and breach of the
duty of good faith and a non-diverse insurer for negligent misrepresentation.
More than one year after commencement, the plaintiffs dismissed the nondiverse defendant and the diverse defendant removed. The district court
remanded after finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate bad faith on
the part of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs stated a claim against the non-diverse
party and propounded discovery. Moreover, the plaintiffs explained that they
determined to dismiss the non-diverse defendant after obtaining admissions
from the diverse defendant that made their theory of recovery against the nondiverse defendant unnecessary. The district court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the plaintiffs only conducted minimal discovery with respect to
the non-diverse defendant. [508]
Filed Nov. 2, 2012; removed Feb. 10, 2014; remanded Apr. 29, 2014.

113.

Petrie v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. H–14–411, 2014 WL 1621781 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 22, 2014).

*
The plaintiffs sued diverse and non-diverse parties for breach of contract and
unfair debt collection related to a foreclosure. The defendants removed,
asserting federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction based upon
alleged fraudulent joinder of the nondiverse party. The case was remanded.
The state court judge denied summary judgment to the non-diverse party but
allegedly commented at the hearing that he did not believe the plaintiffs would
be able to prevail on their claims against the non-diverse defendant in front of
a jury. The plaintiffs then non-suited the non-diverse defendant and the
remaining diverse defendants removed for the second time, arguing bad faith
on the part of the plaintiffs. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith
because the plaintiffs’ decision to non-suit the non-diverse defendant was in
reaction to the state court judge’s comment and their decision not to incur
additional discovery expenses on a weak claim. [513]
Filed May 1, 2012; removed for the second time Feb. 19, 2014; remanded Apr.
22, 2014.
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Highfield v. The Kroger Co., No. 1:14-CV-649-AT, 2014 WL 12115990
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2014).
The plaintiff sued a diverse grocery store owner for injuries arising from a slipand-fall. The defendant removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. “In response
to Defendant's request for an itemized list of expenses and special damages
related to the case, Plaintiff submitted the names of nine healthcare providers
and listed approximately $47,500 of expenses owed to two of the providers.
Plaintiff indicated he was ‘still obtaining’ medical expenses for the remaining
seven providers, and noted that expenses were ‘still accruing’ for two
providers.” Id. at *1. The court found that the plaintiff’s discovery responses
made nine months prior to expiration of the one-year period and the fact that
the plaintiff was alleging a head injury should have put the defendant on notice
that damages might exceed $75,000. [515]
Filed Dec. 14, 2013; removed Feb. 24, 2014; remanded Apr. 16, 2014.

115.

Xiong v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 13–CV–790–JED–FHM,
2014 WL 12706999 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 9, 2014).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. The court
noted that the plaintiff attempted to serve the non-diverse defendant, that the
defendant did not propound discovery regarding the plaintiff’s claims against
the non-diverse defendant until after the one-year period expired, and that the
defendant did not support its argument that the plaintiff had a duty to disclose a
settlement agreement with the non-diverse defendant. The record does not
indicate when the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nondiverse defendant. The plaintiff indicated that the release had not yet been
executed, that the nondiverse defendant had not been dismissed, and that the
non-diverse defendant had not paid the settlement amount. [517]
Filed Sept. 18, 2012; removed Dec. 13, 2013; remanded Apr. 9, 2014.

116.

McDonald-Lerner, M.D. v. Neurocare Assocs., P.A., No. RWT 14-cv-0942,
2014 WL 1356602 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2014).
Upon learning that the plaintiffs intended to dismiss the non-diverse defendants
after expiration of the one-year period, the diverse defendants removed and
asserted bad faith. The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of
bad faith. The court noted that the plaintiffs contended that the timing for the
dismissal was based upon the defendants’ failure to cooperate in responding to
discovery requests. The court also noted that the non-diverse defendants had
not yet been dismissed and that complete diversity did not yet exist. The court
also noted that the case was removed just six weeks before trial was scheduled.
[519]
Filed Feb. 25, 2013; removed Mar. 26, 2014; remanded Apr. 4, 2014.
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Mansilla-Gomez v. Mid-South Erectors, Inc., No. 0:14–cv–00308–JFA,
2014 WL 1347485 (D. S.C. Apr. 3, 2014).
The plaintiff sued the defendant and the defendant removed more than one year
after commencement, asserting that the plaintiff concealed his legal citizenship
and residency from the defendant because no such information was included in
his state court complaint and because the plaintiff denied requests for admission
within the one-year period and did not timely respond to other discovery. The
district court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to prove bad faith. It
noted that the plaintiff was not required to include citizenship or residency
information in the state court complaint and further found that the requests for
admission were compound requests that could have yielded a variety of
responses. The court further noted that the plaintiff’s responses regarding legal
citizenship may have been motivated by reasons other than bad faith prevention
of removal. [520]
Filed Dec. 13, 2012; removed Feb. 5, 2014; remanded Apr. 3, 2014.

118.

Grabicki v. Bays, No. 13–CV–0406–TOR, 2014 WL 535044 (E.D. Wash.
Feb. 10, 2014).
Trustee for bankruptcy estate sued the defendants. The defendants removed
more than one year after commencement. The district court remanded the case,
finding no evidence of bad faith and no evidence that the bankruptcy trustee
had conspired with the state court to prevent the defendants from filing for
removal. [530]
Filed Oct. 9, 2012; removed Dec. 5, 2013; remanded Feb. 10, 2014.

119.

Kidwai v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. SA–13–CV–972–XR, 2014 WL
252026 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2014).
The plaintiff sued diverse and non-diverse mortgage entities in state court. The
state court dismissed the non-diverse defendant more than one year after
commencement and the diverse defendant removed. The district court remanded,
finding that the plaintiff had asserted potentially viable claims against the nondiverse defendant and further finding that the plaintiff pursued the claims against
the non-diverse defendant and was not solely responsible for delay in the
resolution of the non-diverse defendant’s motion for summary judgment. [533]
Filed Aug. 24, 2012; removed Oct. 17, 2013; remanded Jan. 22, 2104.
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Ehrenreich v. Black, 994 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).
The plaintiffs sued the defendants for personal injury in state court. The
plaintiffs were driving or occupying the middle car in a three-car accident. The
non-diverse defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was the
lead driver and was rear-ended. The plaintiffs responded with an affidavit
stating that the lead driver was driving while intoxicated and stopped abruptly.
The court dismissed the non-diverse driver and the diverse defendant then
removed. The district court remanded the case, finding that the non-diverse
driver was not fraudulently joined and further finding that the plaintiffs had
actively prosecuted the case against the non-diverse driver before and after the
one-year period. [534]
Filed Nov. 8, 2012; removed Dec. 17, 2013; remanded Jan. 21 2014.

121.

Markham v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. CV 13–8431–GHK (JCGx), 2014
WL 117102 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2014).
The plaintiff sued Home Depot in state court and Home Depot removed. The
district court remanded the case after the plaintiff amended the complaint to
add non-diverse defendants. Home Depot stipulated to the plaintiff’s
amendment. More than one year later, the plaintiffs dismissed the non-diverse
defendants after learning that Home Depot was contractually responsible for
the maintenance of the floor that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Home Depot
removed. The district court remanded, finding that Home Depot failed to
prove bad faith. The court further found that by consenting to the amended
complaint Home Depot had implicitly acknowledged that the non-diverse
defendants were not fraudulently joined for the purpose of destroying
diversity. [538]
Filed June 7, 2011; removed for the second time Nov. 14, 2013; remanded Jan.
10, 2014.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the JVCA
.
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Bader v. Schmidt Baking Co., No. 13–5697 (RBK/KMW), 2014 WL
116365 (D. N.J. Jan. 10, 2014).
The plaintiff, a bakery employee, sued a co-employee and the employer for
damages arising from an accident in which the co-employee struck the
plaintiff in the knee with a hand truck. The plaintiff responded to some
discovery and was deposed within the one-year period. After expiration of the
one-year period, and in response to a request for a statement of damages, the
plaintiff claimed damages of $1.2 million. The defendants removed. The
defendants had previously twice requested a statement of damages from the
plaintiff but failed to follow-up when the plaintiff did not respond within five
days as required by state procedural rules. The district court remanded,
finding that the defendants had not demonstrated bad faith. Noting that within
the one-year period, the plaintiff had disclosed information indicating that (i)
his lost wages were almost $45,000; (ii) his worker’s compensation carrier
already had a lien for more than $30,000 for amounts paid; and (iii) the scope
of his medical treatment to date and the need for future medical treatment.
The court concluded that the defendants could have easily determined that the
amount in controversy requirement was met within the one-year period based
upon existing discovery and information. [539]
Filed May 16, 2012; removed Sept. 24, 2013; remanded Jan. 10, 2014.

123.
**

Bennett v. Miller, No. CIV 13–1016, 2014 WL 60092 (D. S.D. Jan. 7,
2014).
The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court to foreclose on a contract for
deed. The defendant removed more than one year after commencement,
claiming to have received an updated discovery response from the plaintiff
demonstrating that the amount in controversy was more than $75,000. The
district court remanded the case finding that the defendant had not shown that
the plaintiff acted in bad faith or that the amount in controversy requirement
had been met. Instead, the court found that the defendant had acted in bad
faith and awarded attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff. [541]
Filed Aug. 17, 2012; removed Aug. 26, 2013; remanded Jan. 7, 2014.

124.

Maldonado v. Yokohama Tire Corp., No. 2:13–CV–300, 2013 WL
5967044 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2013).
The plaintiff passenger sued the non-diverse driver and the diverse tire
manufacturer after he was injured in a single-vehicle tire de-tread accident.
The tire manufacturer removed the case more than one year after
commencement, alleging that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse
driver. The district court remanded the case finding that the tire manufacturer
failed to prove that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the driver in bad faith.
[551]
No dates included.
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HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., v. DeGeorge, No. 3:12–cv–1192–J–32MCR,
2013 WL 4734099 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2013).
The plaintiff bank sued the defendant in state court for an alleged breach of a
credit card agreement and sought $51,129.38 in damages plus interest. The
defendant removed the case more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the defendant had failed to
establish bad faith and had further failed to establish the jurisdictional
amount. [571]
Filed Sept. 24, 2009; removed Oct. 20, 2012; remanded Sept. 23, 2013.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the
JVCA.

126.

Bush v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 13–0550–CV–W–ODS, 2013
WL 3755776 (W.D. Mo. July 16, 2013).
State Farm removed more than one year after the case was commenced in
state court. The district court found that State Farm had “no basis for arguing
any party acted in bad faith.” Id. at 1.[580]
Filed Aug. 1, 2011; removed Apr./May 2013; remanded July 16, 2013.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the
JVCA.

127.

Nele v. TJX Cos., Inc., No. 11–07643, 2013 WL 3305269 (E.D. Pa. July 1,
2103).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court found no bad faith manipulation on the part of the plaintiff, given that
the non-diverse defendant had not been fraudulently joined. [587]
Filed Mar. 28, 2007; removed Dec. 15, 2011; remanded July 1, 2013.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the
JVCA.
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Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 13–CV–0607JLR, 2013 WL
3242529 (W.D. Wash. June 24, 2013).
State Farm removed more than one year after the case was commenced in
state court and argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith because the
plaintiff’s counsel had assured defense counsel that he would not object to
removal. The plaintiff’s counsel responded that there was no such agreement.
The district court found no basis to warrant removal after expiration of the
one-year period. [591]
Served Mar. 21, 2012; removed Apr. 4, 2013; remanded June 24, 2013.

129.

Kulaas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C13–485RSM., 2013 WL
2627138 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2013).
A pro se plaintiff sued his insurer for $50,000 allegedly owed to him pursuant
to his Underinsured Motorist Coverage. Five months later, the plaintiff
retained counsel, who began conducting discovery regarding the claims.
More than fourteen months after commencement of the case, the plaintiff
filed an amended complaint adding claims for bad faith and other extracontractual claims that brought the amount in controversy above $75,000.
The defendant then removed, arguing that the only logical explanation for the
timing of the plaintiff’s amended complaint was plaintiff’s bad faith
manipulation of removal jurisdiction. The district court granted the plaintiff’s
motion to remand, finding that the JVCA did not apply to the case at hand
because the case had been commenced before the effective date of the JVCA.
The court further found that the defendant’s conclusory assertions failed to
establish bad faith on the part of the plaintiff and further observed that the
“plaintiff's care in determining a factual and legal basis for the additional
claims [before amendment of the complaint] suggests proper practice, not bad
faith.” Id. at *3. [592]
Filed Dec. 29, 2011; removed Mar. 15, 2013; remanded June 11, 2013.
Note: The case was filed in 2011. The court refused to recognize an equitable
exception but further found that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith.
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Mahaffey v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., Ltd., No. 3:13CV150 DPJ-FKB,
2013 WL 7863752 (S.D. Miss. May 2, 2013).
The district court applied the Tedford equitable exception and found removal
untimely. The court found insufficient evidence that the plaintiff attempted to
manipulate removal, noting that the plaintiff pursued the claim against the
non-diverse party for more than two years and only agreed to dismiss the
spoiler in exchange for its agreement to dismiss its interlocutory appeal. [604]
Filed Dec. 28, 2010; removed March 13, 2013; remanded May 2, 2013.
Note: The district court noted the JVCA did not apply but applied the Tedford
equitable exception and concluded that the result would be the same under the
JVCA.

131.

Vielma v. ACC Holding, Inc., No. EP–12–CV–501–KC, 2013 WL
3367494 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2013).
The plaintiff sued the defendant for employment discrimination pursuant to
state law. The plaintiff’s lawyer stated at the plaintiff’s deposition that the
plaintiff was not seeking more than $75,000. More than one month before
expiration of the one-year period, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
indicating that, pending the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter, the
plaintiff intended to add a claim of retaliation based upon events that
transpired the day after the plaintiff’s deposition. The plaintiff’s amended
complaint did not limit the damages sought to less than $75,000. Shortly after
expiration of the one-year period, the plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint asserting the original claims as well as the retaliation claim. The
second amended complaint did not limit the plaintiff’s damages. More than
one month later, the plaintiff’s counsel mailed defense counsel a letter, noting
that the second amended complaint did not limit the damages sought. The
defendant removed within 30 days of receipt of the letter. The court held that
the plaintiff’s original complaint was removable despite the plaintiff’s
allegation that the plaintiff was not seeking more than $75,000 because the
value of the claims, which included claims for back pay, front pay, benefits
and attorneys’ fees, exceeded $75,000, noting that the plaintiff’s annual
salary was $87,000. The court observed that the plaintiff’s limitation of
damages in the initial pleading was not binding under Texas law. The court
granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding no basis to warrant the
Tedford equitable exception because there was insufficient evidence of forum
manipulation by the plaintiff and again emphasizing that the case was clearly
removable based upon the original complaint. [610]
Filed Oct. 18, 2011, removed Jan. 3, 2013, remanded Apr. 16, 2013.
Note: The district court noted the JVCA did not apply but applied the Tedford
equitable exception.
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Kuepper v. Terragroup Corp., No. CV 13–00264–RGK (MRWx), 2013
WL 12205042 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013).

*
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case finding no evidence of bad faith. It noted that
“Plaintiff consistently answered that he [was] unable to ascertain the true
amount in controversy, given Defendant's refusal to provide Plaintiff with the
Detailed General Ledger summarizing all transaction records and Plaintiff's
limited financial knowledge.” Id. at *2. [611]
Filed Sept. 6, 2011; removed for the second time Jan. 14, 2013 (just three
weeks before trial); remanded May 2, 2013.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the
JVCA’s “bad faith” amendment.

133.

WMCV Phase, LLC v. Tufenkian Carpets Las Vegas, No. 2:12–cv–
01454–RCJ–PAL, 2013 WL 1007711 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2013).

**

The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
found that the plaintiff did not act in bad faith by waiting more than one year
to add the removing defendant because the evidence indicated that the
plaintiff had only recently learned through discovery that the removing
defendant may have been an alter ego of the other defendants. The court
further held that there was not complete diversity because, contrary to the
removing defendant’s allegations that LLC’s are treated like corporations for
purposes of citizenship, LLCs are citizens of every state in which their
owner/members are citizens. 2012 WL 5198479 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2012). In
this opinion, the district court awarded the plaintiff attorneys’ fees pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), finding that the defendant had no objectively
reasonable basis upon which to remove. [614]
Filed June 26, 2009; removed Aug. 16, 2012; remanded Oct. 18, 2012.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the
JVCA.
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Medley v. Infantino, LLC, No. 12–3877, 2013 WL 857369 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
1, 2013).

**
The plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim against the diverse corporation
that had manufactured the allegedly defective infant carrier in which her
child was being carried when the child died. The plaintiff also sued two retail
stores and the non-diverse managers of those stores and alleged that she
purchased two infant carriers for her twins, one at each store, but had no way
of knowing which carrier was being used at the time of the child’s death. The
plaintiff alleged that both retailers were subject to liability based upon the
alternative liability theory recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
More than two years later, the state court granted summary judgment to the
retailers and their managers, after which the diverse manufacturer removed.
The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the
one-year limitation applied because the case was commenced before the
JVCA became effective. The court went on, however, to dismiss defendant’s
allegations of bad faith forum manipulation by the plaintiff. The court found
that, contrary to the defendant’s assertion otherwise, the plaintiff had not
abandoned her claims against the non-diverse defendants after passage of the
one-year deadline for removal. The court observed that the plaintiff pursued
discovery from the non-diverse defendants and continued to actively oppose
their motions for summary judgment well after the one-year deadline. The
court awarded the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), finding that the defendant’s allegation of bad faith forum
manipulation by the plaintiff was not objectively reasonable. [616]
Filed June 7, 2010, removed July 10, 2012, remanded Mar. 1, 2013.
Note: The case was filed in 2010. The court noted that the JVCA
amendments did not apply but then found no bad faith.

135.

Corinthian Marble & Granite, Inc., v. T.D. Bank, N.A., No. 12–cv–3744,
2013 WL 272757 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013).
The court acknowledged that the JVCA did not apply but then held that it
would determine whether the equitable exception to the one-year bar applied.
The court found no basis for an equitable exception, rejecting the defendant’s
argument that the plaintiffs had not vigorously pursued the case against the
non-diverse defendant and also rejecting the defendant’s argument that the
plaintiff manipulated the one-year bar. The court noted that the non-diverse
defendant was dismissed by court order three months after the expiration of
the one-year period. Finally, the court observed that even if the non-diverse
defendant had been fraudulently joined, the defendant failed to remove
within 30 days. [628]
Filed Mar. 28, 2011; removed July 30, 2012; remanded Jan. 24, 2013.
Note: The case was filed in 2011. The district court applied the Tedford
equitable exception.
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Firewheel Surgical Sales, LLC v. Exact Surgical, Inc., No. 3:12–CV–
1971–L, 2013 WL 139548 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2013).
The plaintiff sued a diverse defendant and a non-diverse defendant, and then
more than two years later amended the complaint to drop the non-diverse
defendant and add another diverse defendant who then removed. The
defendants acknowledged that the case was not governed by the JVCA but
argued that removal more than one year after commencement of the case
should be permitted based upon the policy behind the statute. The court
rejected this argument but then applied the Tedford equitable exception and
found insufficient evidence of forum manipulation. The court also found that
the removing defendant failed to demonstrate the amount in controversy. [633]
Filed Jan. 28, 2010; removed June 21, 2012; remanded Jan. 11, 2013.
Note: The case was filed in 2010. The district court applied the Tedford
equitable exception.
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Table B

Cases in Which the District Court Found Bad
Faith Forum Manipulation by the Plaintiff (24 Total)
1.

Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-780-A, 2017 WL 4481168 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 5, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, finding bad faith on the part of
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued a diverse defendant and two non-diverse
defendants, alleging that their construction activities negligently caused a pool
of water on the highway which caused an accident, killing their husband and
father. Within one year of commencement, the state court granted summary
judgment to one of the non-diverse defendants. Two days after expiration of
the one-year period, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining nondiverse defendant. The diverse defendant then removed. The plaintiffs
attempted to explain the timing of the dismissal by stating that they had been
involved in discussions with the remaining non-diverse defendant and
determined to dismiss the non-diverse defendant prior to trial for strategic
reasons. The court found the plaintiffs’ affidavit conclusory and lacking in
detail regarding the timing of dismissal. The court also found evidence that the
plaintiffs had known for months that the evidence would not support a claim
against the remaining non-diverse defendant. The court did not address the
extent to which the voluntary/involuntary rule applied in light of the summary
judgment in favor of the other non-diverse defendant. The court noted that the
plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege any claim against the remaining nondiverse
defendant and did not allege that it was responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries.
[55]

Filed Sept. 20, 2016; summary judgment granted in favor of one diverse
defendant on May 17, 2017; plaintiff non-suited remaining non-diverse
defendant on Sept. 22, 2017; removed Sept. 27, 2017.
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Vallecillo v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Fin., Inc., No. 5:16-CV-935-DAE,
2017 WL 9935522 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2017).
The plaintiffs sued a diverse bank for fraud, negligence, abuse of the elderly,
and misrepresentation. In response to discovery conducted within the one-year
period, thre plaintiffs admitted that the amount in controversy did not exceed
$75,000. The plaintiffs offered to settle the case for less than $75,000
throughout the early stages of litigation. More than two years after
commencement, the plaintiffs disclosed that they were seeking $175,000 in
damages. Defendant removed. The district court found bad faith on the part of
the plaintiffs. It rejected the plaintiffs’ explanation for the timing of their
increased demand, finding the plaintiffs’ explanation that they had erred in
acting pro se insufficient to negate the inference of bad faith that arises from an
increased demand outside of the one-year period. In so ruling, the court cited
no precedent for its holding that an inference of bad faith arises when the
plaintiff increases his or her demand more than one year after commencement.
[69]
Filed June 28, 2013; removed Sept. 20, 2016.

3.

Massey v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., No. 2:17-cv-01922, 2017 WL
3261419 (S.D. W.Va. July 31, 2017).
The plaintiff sued non-diverse driver and her diverse UM insurance carrier.
Almost two years after commencement, the plaintiff settled with the driver and
the insurer removed. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand,
finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The court noted
that the plaintiff never served the driver, never propounded discovery to the
driver, and did not depose the driver. The court also noted that the plaintiff left
a settlement offer outstanding beyond the one-year mark to prevent removal
because the plaintiff’s counsel sought confirmation from the insurer that it
would not attempt to remove if the plaintiff accepted the driver’s settlement
offer. [84]
Filed May 21, 2015; removed Mar. 17, 2017.
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Perrin v. Dillard’s Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00201-DRH-DGW, 2017 WL 2984128
(S.D. Ill. July 13, 2017).
The plaintiff filed a personal injury slip-and-fall case against the defendant as
an arbitration proceeding in state court (where, for purposes of jurisdiction, the
amount-in-controversy may not exceed $50,000). The plaintiff characterized
her original complaint as one seeking damages for, what was believed to be at
the time, a soft tissue back injury. Not long after suit was filed, and while the
case was still on the arbitration docket, the defendant propounded an
interrogatory asking the dollar amount of damages sought, and the plaintiff
responded that the amount was within the jurisdictional limit for the arbitration
docket. During the arbitration proceedings (prior to expiration of the one-year
period), the plaintiff testified that she had learned from her physician that she
had suffered three herniated discs and that her surgeon believed she would
benefit from back surgery. The plaintiff then moved to have the case
transferred to the law docket because the amount-in-controversy exceeded the
jurisdictional amount of the arbitration docket. The plaintiff did not supplement
her prior interrogatory response. The court found that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith to prevent removal by “deliberately failing to disclose an amount in
controversy in excess of the jurisdictional requirement within the 1-year
timeframe following the commencement of the action. The court's decision is
chiefly grounded in the fact that no information regarding increased damages
surpassing the $75,000.00 mark was communicated to defendant” within one
year of commencement. Id. at *6. [97]
Filed Mar. 2015; removed Feb. 27, 2017.

5.

Partin v. Marmic Fire & Safety Co., Inc., No. 16–CV–647–JED–FHM,
2017 WL 2931401 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2017).
Although the case was removed more than one after commencement, the
plaintiff did not argue that removal was untimely because of the one-year bar.
Instead, the plaintiff argued that removal was untimely because the case was
not removed within the 30-day time period and further argued that removal
was improper because the amount-in-controversy was not met. Although the
court was not required to find bad faith (given that the defendant had not
raised it), the court characterized the plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts to avoid
revealing the amount-in-controversy as improper gamesmanship. [99]
Filed May 11, 2015; removed Oct. 19, 2016.
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In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 16-cv-02408, 2016 WL
4264193 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
found no basis for the plaintiffs’ joinder of the jurisdictional spoiler. The court
did not address the fact that the defendant could have removed much earlier,
given the lack of merit in support of the plaintiff’s claim. [205]
Filed Mar. 11, 2014; removed May 17, 2016.

7.

Taylor v. Foremost Ins. Co., No. 5:15-CV-00164 (LJA), 2016 WL
11083156 (M.D. Ga. June 24, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
found bad faith where the plaintiff amended the complaint to increase the
damages sought pursuant to a property insurance policy from $73,500 to
$150,000 more than one year after commencement in state court. Despite the
fact that the plaintiff had sent a demand letter prior to filing suit in which the
plaintiff valued the claim at the policy limits of $150,000, the court found that
the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. [219]
Filed July 23, 2013; removed May 11, 2015.

8.

Heller v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. CV 15-9771 DMG (JPRx), 2016 WL
1170891 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2016).
The plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse defendant without prejudice more than
one year after commencement in an apparent response to the state court’s order
to show cause why the non-diverse defendant had not been served. The diverse
defendant removed. The federal district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to
remand. It held that the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate diligent efforts to
serve the non-diverse defendant within one year and the plaintiff’s inconsistent
explanation for why the spoiler had not been dismissed earlier constituted bad
faith. [244]
Filed May 21, 2014; removed Dec. 18, 2015.
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Calvary Baptist Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV-15-1283M, 2016 WL 543239 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2016).
The district court found bad faith on the part of the plaintiff where the
plaintiff indicated it was seeking less than $75,000, was unresponsive to
the defendant’s discovery requests regarding damages, and clarified
that it was seeking damages of $90,503.66 more than one year after
commencement. [257]
Filed Oct. 2, 2014; removed Nov. 18, 2015.

10.

Chavez v. Time Warner Cable LLC, No. CV 12–5291–RGK (RZx),
2016 WL 7647559 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016), aff’d, 728 F. App’x 645
(9th Cir. 2018).
The district court applied the Tedford equitable exception and found
that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by amending the complaint to seek
additional damages after expiration of the one-year period. [262]
Filed Jan. 7, 2011; removed June 18, 2012.
Note: The JVCA did not apply but the court made findings regarding
bad faith pursuant to the Tedford equitable exception.

11.

Godoy v. WinCo Holding, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-01397-ODW-SP, 2015
WL 6394474 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015).
On the eve of trial and just after having lost its motion for summary
judgment in state court, the defendant removed the case more than one
year after commencement. The district court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to remand, finding that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith by
naming a jurisdictional spoiler as a defendant even though the claim
against the spoiler was administratively time-barred. Although the court
observed that the defendant could have removed within one year based
upon fraudulent joinder, it held that the defendant had “no affirmative
duty to do so.” Id. at *3. [284]
Filed Feb. 28, 2014; removed July 13, 2015.
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Comer v. Schmitt, No. 2:15-CV-2599, 2015 WL 5954589 (S.D. Ohio Oct.
14, 2015).
The district court found bad faith where the plaintiff settled with the
jurisdictional spoiler prior to expiration of the one-year period but did not
dismiss the spoiler or inform the removing defendant of the settlement until
after expiration of the one-year period. Counsel for the non-diverse
defendant had informed counsel for the diverse defendant that the plaintiff
would not consummate the settlement agreement because the plaintiff did not
want the diverse defendant to remove. [288]
Filed Feb. 11, 2014; removed July 10, 2015.

13.

Van Tassel v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 4:14–CV–2864, 2015 WL 4617241
(S.D. Tex. July 31, 2015).
The plaintiff sued State Farm Lloyds, Inc. and an in-state insurance adjuster
in state court on Nov. 15, 2012. State Farms Lloyds, a different entity than
State Farm Lloyds, Inc. and the actual insurer, answered the complaint and
removed the case, arguing that the adjuster had been improperly joined. The
district court found that the adjuster was improperly joined because the
claims against him were identical to the claims against the insurer. The
district court then retained jurisdiction of the case and discovery proceeded
and revealed that State Farm Lloyds, rather than State Farm Lloyds, Inc., was
the proper defendant. The plaintiff filed a second motion to remand,
indicating that he intended to sue State Farm Lloyds, Inc. and that State Farm
Lloyds had never been made a party to the case and therefore had no
standing to remove. The district court remanded the case, finding that the
plaintiff had not substituted State Farm Lloyds for State Farm Lloyds, Inc.
and further finding that State Farm Lloyds, Inc. was not diverse. After
remand and in response to a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed
an amended petition substituting State Farm Lloyds for State Farm Lloyds,
Inc., after which State Farm Lloyds removed. The district court found an
exception to the one-year bar based upon the plaintiff’s misrepresentations
and delay in substituting the real party in interest. [371]
Filed Nov. 15, 2012; removed Oct. 8, 2014.
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Mitchell v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14–2766, 2015 WL 1608670 (E.D.
La. Apr. 10, 2015).
The plaintiff sued her insurance company for breach of contract and bad faith
and alleged that it failed to pay her for the property damage to the contents of
her building. More than one year after commencement, the plaintiff
responded in opposition to the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and
alleged that she was owed more than $70,000 for her remaining property
damage claims. The district court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to
prevent removal because the plaintiff had responded to an earlier
interrogatory by indicating that the amount in controversy did not exceed
$50,000. The court noted that the plaintiff provided no explanation for her
delay in notifying the insurer of the amount of her claim. [406]
Filed Aug. 30, 2013; removed Dec. 5, 2014.

15.

Woods v. Georgia Pacific, LLC, No. 14–CV–1062, 2015 WL 1538227
(Apr. 7, 2015).
The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court and did not include allegations
regarding the plaintiff’s citizenship. The defendant attempted to discover the
plaintiff’s citizenship via discovery requests for six months but the plaintiff
did not respond to such requests until after expiration of the one-year period.
The district court found that the defendant’s removal ten days after learning
the plaintiff’s citizenship was timely based on the plaintiff’s bad faith. [410]
Filed Oct. 31, 2013; removed Nov. 24, 2014.

16.

Hiser v. Seay, No. 5:14-CV-170, 2014 WL 6885433 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5,
2014).
The plaintiffs sued diverse and non-diverse defendants for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. The plaintiff settled with the non-diverse
defendants after expiration of the one-year period and the diverse defendants
removed. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, finding
that they acted in bad faith. The plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that he did not
finalize the settlement terms until after expiration of the one-year period in an
effort to keep the case in state court. [450]
Filed Dec. 19, 2012; removed Aug. 26, 2014.
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Hill v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (M.D. Fla.
2014), aff’d, 693 Fed. Appx. 855 (11th Cir. 2017).
The plaintiff sued a diverse defendant in state court for slander and tortious
interference and demanded damages less than $75,000. After expiration of
the one-year period, the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to add
another party as a nominal plaintiff and to demand more than $75,000. The
defendant removed. The district court found that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith in the absence of any explanation for the sudden increase in damages.
[467]
Filed Feb. 8, 2013; removed June 18, 2014.

18.

Consol. Grain & Barge, Inc. v. Anny, No. 11–2204, et at., 2014 WL
1364736 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2014).
After ARTCO purchased land in Louisiana, it discovered that Anny had
constructed a road and fence on the property and demanded that he cease
and desist activity on its property. Anny then filed a lawsuit against the
heirs of Albert Dubourg, who had been listed as the owner of the adjacent
property in a survey. Anny claimed to have inherited property adjacent to
Dubourg’s property from the Estate of Martin. Anny sought a declaratory
judgment that some of the adjacent property previously owned by Dubourg
had been acquired by the estate by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
ARTCO then brought a separate action against Anny in state court for
trespass. Anny’s wife then intervened in his lawsuit, asserting claims
against Anny and the heirs of Dubourg, asserting that she had purchased
the property in question from the estate. Anny’s wife then added ARTCO
as an additional defendant to her claims. ARTCO removed the case. The
court disregarded the claims by Anny and his wife against the heirs of
Dubourg, finding there was no evidence that Dubourg ever held title to the
property. The court then realigned Anny’s wife as a plaintiff despite her
claim against Anny and found complete diversity. The court found that
Anny’s wife acted in bad faith because she could have intervened in the
other states lawsuit to assert her interest in the property but failed to do so.
[518]
Filed Aug. 9, 2011; removed more than one year later.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the
JVCA.
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Lawson v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 4:13-cv-923-O, 2014 WL 1158880
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2014).

*
The plaintiff sued her diverse former employer and a non-diverse former coemployee and brought state law claims for sexual harassment, unlawful
retaliation, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The employer removed based upon diversity. The district court remanded
based upon the presence of the non-diverse former co-employee. More than
fifteen months after commencement of the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of
non-suit against the non-diverse former co-employee, after which the diverse
employer removed. The court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith
because: (i) the plaintiff did not serve the non-diverse defendant until seven
months after filing the complaint; (ii) the plaintiff did not take a default
judgment against the non-diverse defendant; (iii) the plaintiff did not serve
the non-diverse defendant with any discovery requests; (iv) the plaintiff
nonsuited the non-diverse defendant approximately fifteen months after
discovery; and (v) the non-diverse defendant was not required to pay plaintiff
any money as settlement. [523]
Filed July 5, 2012; removed for a second time Nov. 18, 2013.

20.

Forth v. Diversey Corp., No. 13-CV-808-A, 2013 WL 6096528 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 20, 2013).
The plaintiffs sued diverse defendants and a non-diverse defendant for
injuries allegedly arising from one plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals. After the
plaintiffs stipulated to a discontinuance with respect to the non-diverse
defendant more than one year and six months after commencement, the
diverse defendants removed. The district court held that the defendant must
prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence and further held that such
evidence had been presented. The president of the non-diverse defendant had
submitted an affidavit stating that he informed the plaintiffs’ attorney about
six months after commencement that his company was not a proper defendant
and that plaintiffs’ attorney assured him that the company would be released.
The plaintiffs argued that their attorney determined not to dismiss the nondiverse defendant based upon the president’s pre-answer representations and
further determined that additional discovery was needed prior to dismissal.
After briefly discussing the case with the non-diverse defendant’s attorney,
who represented that her client did not sell the product at issue, the plaintiffs
filed a stipulation of discontinuance. The district court noted that the
plaintiffs did not controvert the affidavit of the non-diverse defendant’s
president and further noted that they conducted no discovery before agreeing
to the discontinuance. The court found plaintiffs’ explanation for the timing
of the dismissal to be implausible. [548]
Filed Jan. 18, 2012; removed Aug. 6, 2013.
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Patel v. Kroger Co., No. 1:13-CV-02901-JOF, 2013 WL 12068988
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2013).
The court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by failing to respond to
the defendant’s request for a settlement demand within the one-year period.
The court did not articulate why the plaintiff had a duty to respond to
defendant’s request. Nor did the court find that the plaintiff had provided
inaccurate information in response to interrogatories regarding incurred
medical expenses. The court suggested that the defendant had no duty to
investigate the amount in controversy. [550]
Filed July 12, 2012; removed more than one year after commencement.

22.

Carey v. Allstate Ins., No. 2:13–cv–2293, 2013 WL 5970487 (W.D. La.
Nov. 7, 2013).

*
The plaintiffs sued Allstate for breach of contract. Allstate removed, and
the case was remanded because the amount-in-controversy requirement
was not met. Allstate moved for summary judgment. In an attempt to
survive Allstate’s motion, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add
additional claims, including one for statutory penalties and attorney’s fees.
Allstate removed a second time, arguing that the plaintiffs acted in bad
faith in failing to amend their complaint prior to expiration of the one-year
period. The district court found that the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith by
failing to amend their complaint so as to add additional claims establishing
the amount-in-controversy until after expiration of the one-year period.
[552]
Filed before 2012; removed July 17, 2013.
Note: Although the JVCA amendments did not apply, the court applied the
Tedford equitable exception and found bad faith.
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Thompson v. Belk, Inc., No. 1:13–cv–1412–WSD, 2013 WL 5786587 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 28, 2013).
The plaintiff sued the defendants for injuries sustained when the plaintiff
tripped and fell in their store. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the
complaint and the plaintiff, represented by new counsel, refiled it within six
months. The defendants removed the case after receiving discovery responses
regarding the amount of the plaintiff’s damages. Pursuant to state law, cases
dismissed without prejudice and refiled within six months are deemed to have
commenced on the date the first action was commenced. Thus, the
defendants’ removal was after expiration of the one-year period. The district
court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by concealing the amount-incontroversy during the one-year period. The court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that she should not be held responsible for her prior counsel’s
failure to timely respond to discovery in the original action. [554]
Filed Nov. 22, 2011; removed Apr. 26, 2013.
Note: The case was commenced before 2012. The court applied the bad faith
equitable exception.

24.

Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
The plaintiff, who had been injured in a collision, sued diverse defendants in
state court on Nov. 9, 2011, and alleged that the amount at issue was less than
$50,000. The plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and
medical expenses. On May 31, 2012, the plaintiff supplemented discovery
responses by providing the defendants with work excuse disability slips for
Nov. 26, 2011 through May 31, 2012. The plaintiff also attached an inventory
of medical expenses totaling more than $62,000. Shortly thereafter, the
plaintiff sent the defendants a copy of a July 9, 2012 physician consult in
which her doctor recommended surgery. On August 9, 2012, the plaintiff
again supplemented her discovery responses and indicated her medical
expenses totaled more than $91,000. Thus, within the one-year period, the
plaintiff supplemented her discovery responses to indicate medical expenses
of more than $91,000, past lost wages (in an unspecified amount), and the
need for future surgery (at an unspecified cost). On November 13, 2012, the
plaintiff’s counsel sent a settlement demand letter for $575,000. The parties
unsuccessfully mediated the case in December 2012. The day after mediation
failed, the defendants removed. Despite the information provided by the
plaintiff prior to the expiration of the one-year period, the trial court held that
the case did not become removable until the defense received the $575,000
demand letter and further held that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in failing to
amend the complaint to seek more than $50,000. [625]
Filed Nov. 9, 2011; removed Dec. 12, 2012.
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the JVCA.
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Table C

Cases That Were Removed More Than One Year After
Commencement and Resolved Without Findings Regarding Bad
Faith (179 Total)
1.

Allen v. ESA Mgmt., LLC., 2018 WL 2948534 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2018).
The district court remanded the case, finding that the one-year bar applies to
later-added defendants. [3]

2.

Nunez v. U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc., 2018 WL 2770458 (W.D. La. June 8,
2018).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable because an unserved
defendant may remove at any time pursuant to 28 U.C.S. § 1446(b)(1). [4]

3.

Taylor v. United Road Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 2412326 (E.D. Cal. May 29,
2018).
The district court noted that the one-year bar on removal does not apply to
CAFA cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). [7]

4.

Homestreet Bank v. Caba, 2018 2709371 (D. Haw. May 17, 2018).
The defendants removed pursuant to federal questions jurisdiction and raised
diversity jurisdiction in their response to plaintiff’s motion to remand.
Defendants did not allege bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs. [12]

5.

Joo Yun Chung v. Safeway, Inc., 2018 WL 1794720 (D. Haw. Apr. 16,
2018).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
denied plaintiff’s motion to remand but did not reach the question of bad
faith. [22]
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla. v. ADCAHB Med. Coverages, Inc., 2018
WL 3599009 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2018).
Insurer sued judgment debtors and settled with them in exchange for their
rights under an insurance policy. Insurer then filed a supplemental complaint
against the diverse insurance company more than one year after
commencement. The diverse insurer removed. The district court remanded,
finding the one-year bar applicable because the claim against the diverse
insurer was not an independent action. [28]

7.

Druivenga v. Hillshire Brans Co., 2018 WL 1115935 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 1,
2018).
Although the case was removed more than one year after the complaint was
filed, the district court found that, for purposes of determining whether the
thirdparty defendant timely removed within one year, the date on which the
thirdparty complaint was filed commenced the relevant one-year period. [30]

8.

Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. White, 2018 WL 650372 (D. Conn.
Jan. 31, 2018).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding that removal based upon diversity was
improper because the defendant was a citizen of the forum state. Given the
lack of removal jurisdiction, it was not necessary for the district court to
address plaintiff’s alleged bad faith. [35]

9.

Lare v. Caldwell, 2018 WL 573474 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018).
Pro se defendant removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, noting that defendant did not allege that
plaintiff acted in faith to prevent removal. [37]

10.

Jaligam v. Pochampally, 2018 WL 417559 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2018).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
remanded the case, finding no evidence that plaintiff acted in bad faith and
noting that the defendant did not allege that plaintiff acted in bad faith. [40]
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Ossello v. Swift Rock Fin., Inc., 2017 WL 4842371 (D. Mont. Oct. 26,
2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement but based
upon an argument other than bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [53]

12.

Lilly v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 2017 WL 4836539 (M.D. La. Sept. 18, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement but the
plaintiff did not move to remand based upon untimely removal. The court
noted that the timeliness of removal is procedural and is waived if not timely
raised by the plaintiff. [70]

13.

Florida Health Science Ctr., Inc. v. GEICO, 2017 WL 3720880 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 7, 2017).
This case was removed more than one year after commencement. The case
involved the intra-district split within Florida district courts over whether the
filing of the initial claim for coverage or the later filing of the insurance bad
faith claim triggers the one-year period in which to remove. The district court
remanded, finding that the bad faith claim could not be removed separately
from the civil action in which it was filed and further finding that the oneyear period was triggered by the initial filing – not the filing of the claim for
insurance bad faith. [81]

14.

Ossello v. Swift Rock Fin., Inc., 2017 WL 3276884 (D. Mont. July 27,
2017).
The case involved the issue of when the one-year period begins to run. The
removing defendants did not allege bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs. [86]

15.

Shaffer v. Green Earth Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 2628883 (W.D. Tex. June
19, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement, but the
district court found the one-year bar inapplicable because the bar applies only
to cases that are not initially removable. “[T]his case was initially removable
when Plaintiff filed it, and the one-year limitation simply does not apply for
that reason.” Id. at *3. [105]
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The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the one-year bar did
not prohibit the later-added defendant from removing. [108]

17.

Todesco v. Wainright, 2017 WL 1375286 E.D. La. April 17, 2017).
The case was removed more than year after commencement, but removal was
based on federal question jurisdiction. The case was remanded due to lack of
jurisdiction. [120]

18.

La Forte v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 5642469 (S.D. Fla.
April 7, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The issue
was whether an insurance bad faith claim may be removed as a separate
action after coverage has been determined. The district court remanded,
finding that “the removal of a bad faith claim is untimely unless it occurs
within one year after the commencement of the underlying action in which
the bad faith claim is asserted.” Id. at *2. [124]

19.

Alber v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 1045504 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The issue
was whether plaintiff’s insurance bad faith claim could be removed as a
separate action. The district court found removal proper but then vacated the
decision on reconsideration. 2017 WL 2172188 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2017).
[135]

20.

Ala. Mun. Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. P.R. Diamond Prods.,
Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 1165 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district found the one-year bar inapplicable to cases that were initially
removable. [146]
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Shannon v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 2017 WL 534348 (D. Or.
Feb. 8, 2017).
The case removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded. The removing defendants did not allege bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff. [147]

22.

Washington v. GEICO, 2017 WL 490541 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2017).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. It
addressed whether an insurance bad faith claim may be removed as a
separate action after coverage has been determined. [148]

23.

Bank of Am. NA v. Koola, 2016 WL 7469595 (D. S.C. Dec. 28, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement but the
JVCA did not apply because the case was commenced before Jan. 6, 2012.
The court found the Tedford equitable exception inapplicable, noting that
“[d]efendant slept on his right of removal—if this case ever was
removable—and equity does not favor those who sleep on their rights.” Id.
at *3. [177]

24.

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Farah, 2016 WL 8674607 (D. N.J. Dec. 16,
2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, noting that the defendant had not alleged
bad faith. [185]

25.

Fields v. Expedited Logistics Sols. LLC, 2016 WL 7173370 (D.
S.C. Dec. 9, 2016).
There was a question whether removal was more than one year after
commencement. The court remanded the case without determining
the issue because the removing defendant failed to establish
complete diversity based on fraudulent joinder. [187]
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Yoder v. Williams, 2016 WL 7165723 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement, but the
district court concluded that the relevant one-year period began when the
claim was filed by the intervening plaintiff. [188]

27.
Westmoreland v. Wawona Packaging Co., LLC, 2016 WL 7165959
(E.D. N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016).
Although the case was removed more than one year after commencement,
the court did not address the alleged bad faith on the part of the plaintiff
because the defendants violated the rule of unanimity. [189]

28.

AMI Global Meeting Sols., Inc. v. Fin. Brand, LLC, 2016 WL 9347150
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2016).
The district court found that the one-year bar was inapplicable to the instant
case because it was removable when originally filed. [194]

29.

Higgins v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 6304740 (N.D. Okla.
Oct. 27, 2016).
The case was remanded more than one year after commencement. The
removing defendant did not argue bad faith on the part of the plaintiff but
instead argued that the case could be removed pursuant to the Tedford
equitable exception based upon factors other than bad faith forum
manipulation by the plaintiff. The district court remanded the case, rejecting
defendant’s argument that the Tedford equitable exception applied. [195]

30.

Lee v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2016 WL 6246911 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2016).
The court remanded the case, fining that it was removed more than one year
after commencement. In so ruling, the court fund that the plaintiff’s
amendment to add an insurance bad faith claim was part of the original
lawsuit subject to the one-year bar. Defendant had argued that the relevant
one-year period began when the insurance bad faith claim was filed. [197]
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Eclipse Aesthetics LLC v. Regenlab USA, LLC, 2016 WL 4800342 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 12, 2016).
The court found that the one-year bar was inapplicable to the instant case
because it was removable when originally filed. [202]

32.

Gates at Williams-Brice Condo. Assoc’n v. Quality Built, LLC, 2016
WL 4646258 (D. S.C. Sept. 7, 2016).
The court remanded the case without addressing the one-year bar because it
found defendant’s joinder in removal defective and untimely. [203]

33.

Thompson v. Target Corp., 2016 WL 4119937 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016).
The case involved removal pursuant to CAFA. [208]

34.

Gates at Williams-Brice Condo. Assoc’n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2016 WL
4035450 (D. S.C. July 28, 2016).
The district court remanded the case finding that counterclaim defendant
does not have the right to remove. [209]

35.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cioffi, 2016 WL 3962818 (D. Mass. July 21,
2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding that a counterclaim defendant may not
remove. [212]

36.

Air Comfort Co., Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 2016 WL 3951158 (S.D. Ala.
July 20, 2016).
The case was properly removed based upon federal question jurisdiction.
After dismissal of the federal question claim, the court remanded the
remaining claims. [213]
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Rosenberg v. Webber, 2016 WL 3125155 (D. Md. June 3, 2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded, finding that removal was “untimely under the 30day general filing requirement and the one-year deadline applied to diversity
jurisdiction cases.” Id. at *3. The court further found that it should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction. [223]

38.

MBLH Props., Ltd. v. Vulcan Constr. Materials, LP, 2016 WL
10933058 (E.D. Tex. May 13,2 016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The
district court remanded the case, finding that the case commenced in state
court upon filing. The removing defendant did not argue bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff but instead argued that the case commenced upon
service. [229]

39.

Kitchell v. OSF Okla., Inc., 2016 WL 1651825 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25,
2016).
The district court remanded the case, noting that the removing defendant
had not even alleged bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [231]

40.

Stigleman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 1611577 (C.D. Ill. Apr.
22, 2016).
The district court remanded the case, rejecting defendant’s argument that the
oneyear bar was inapplicable to the second removal. The removing
defendant had not alleged bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [232]

41.

Boomerang Recoveries, LLC v. Guy Carpenter & Co., LLC, 2016 WL
1594954 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2016).
The court remanded the case (which was apparently removed more than one
year after commencement), finding that the forum defendant had not been
fraudulently joined. [233]

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

711

712

42.

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:595

Gonzalez v. Starwood Hotels, 2016 WL 1611576 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2016).
Although it appears the case was removed more than one year after
commencement, the district court did not address application of the one-year
bar in its opinion denying plaintiff’s motion to remand. [234]

43.

South Cent. Coal Co. Inc. v. Houston Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 WL
9414095 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2016).
The district court remanded the case, finding that the one-year bar applied.
The removing defendant apparently ignored the one-year bar and did not
attempt to establish the bad faith exception. [235]

44.

BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Claudet, 2016 WL 1743353 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 13, 2016).
The case was removed more than six years after commencement. The
magistrate recommended remand. The district court judge accepted the
recommendation and remanded. 2016 WL 1732675 (M.D. Fla., May 02,
2016). The removing defendant did not allege bad faith. [238]

45.

H. v. Pfizer Inc., 2016 WL 1247480 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2016).
The court remanded the case without addressing bad faith. [242]

46.

Lopez v. Allied Packing & Supply, Inc., 2016 WL 1176395 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2016).
The district court remanded the case. The defendant removed more than one
year after commencement but argued unsuccessfully that the one-year time
period started over when plaintiff amended the complaint to include a
wrongful death claim. [243]

47.

Breiding v. Wilson Appraisal Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 1175257 (N.D. Va.
2016).
The district court remanded the case, finding no federal question or diversity
jurisdiction. [245]
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Combs v. Shapiro & Burson LLP, 2016 WL 1064459 (D. Md. Mar. 14,
2016).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case, finding removal was procedurally improper without
addressing bad faith. [246]

49.

Graveline v. Reynolds, 2016 WL 3573039 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2016).
The federal district court remanded the case based on considerations other
than a lack of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [253]

50.

In re Engle Progeny Cases Tobacco Litig., 2016 WL 1402908 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 16, 2016).
The federal district court remanded the case. The case was removed more
than one year after commencement but the removing defendant did not argue
bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [256]

51.

Ross v. Lee, 2016 WL 521529 (W.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2016).
The district court found that the one-year bar didn’t apply because the case
was removable from the outset. [259]

52.

Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 277768 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 22, 2016).
The court found that plaintiff’s insurance bad faith claim was removable as a
separate cause of action upon the filing of the claim and found the one-year
bar inapplicable. [260]

53.

Card v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2016 WL 8904950 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2016).
The federal district court remanded the case because the removing defendant
improperly removed only one of several claims. [261]
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Newton v. Comcast of Md., LLC, 2016 WL 94250 (D. Md. Jan. 7,
2016).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand. It did not address
bad faith. It appears that the plaintiff did not argue untimely removal in the
motion to remand. [265]

55.

Smith v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2015 WL 13260403 (D. N. Mex. Dec. 17,
2015).
The district court denied the motion to remand, finding that the claim at
issue was a separate and independent claim that reset the one-year period.
[270]

56.

Clark v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 7272305 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18,
2015).
The district court remanded the case but did not consider whether the
defendant’s removal was timely because plaintiff waived timeliness by
failing to raise it in plaintiff’s original motion to remand. [276]

57.

Deutsch Bank Nat’l Co., v. Brader, 2015 WL 9872070 (S.C. Oct. 28,
2015).
The magistrate recommended remand because complete diversity was not
established. The magistrate judge noted that the plaintiff did not raise the
timeliness of defendant’s removal and therefore waived any such
procedural defect. [282]

58.

Reeves v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 6438898 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
22, 2015).
This case involved an attempted removal by the plaintiff proceeding in
forma pauperis. [285]

59.

Carmona v. Johnson & Johnson, 2015 WL 13229429 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
2015).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding removal
timely on grounds other than plaintiff’s bad faith. [286]
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Skelton v. Johnson & Johnson, 2015 WL 13236734 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2015).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding removal timely
on grounds other than plaintiff’s bad faith. [287]

61.

Gumbodete v. Ayati-Ghaffari, 2015 WL 13297960 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6,
2015).
The district court remanded the case based upon lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and untimeliness after it was removed by a pro se litigant. It
does not appear that the removing defendant alleged bad faith on the part
of the plaintiff. [291]

62.

Gore v. Robertson, 2015 WL 5749459 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015).
The district court found that plaintiff’s products liability claim against GM
(asserted in an amended pleading) commenced on a different date than the
date plaintiff filed a negligence complaint against other defendants. Thus,
the court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [292]

63.

Nguyen v. Sam’s West, Inc., 2015 WL 5092689 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2015).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand but did not address bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff. [297]

64.

Handshumaker v. Vangilder, 2015 WL 5032054 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 2015).
The district court found the one-year bar did not prohibit removal because
it found that the garnishment action triggered a new one-year period in
which to remove. [300]

65.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052377 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [301]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050530 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [302]

67.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071920 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [303]

68.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071878 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [304]

69.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071892 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [305]

70.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052403 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [306]

71.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071924 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [307]

72.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050536 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [308]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052406 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [309]

74.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050538 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [310]

75.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071835 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [311]

76.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052391 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [312]

77.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050529 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [313]

78.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050524 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [314]

79.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050532 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [315]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050543 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [316]

81.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071919 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [317]

82.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071875 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [318]

83.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050540 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [319]

84.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071850 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [320]

85.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052392 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [321]

86.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071860 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [322]

87.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071916 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [323]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [324]

89.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052393 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [325]

90.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071877 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [326]

‘
91.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071909 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [327]

92.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052407 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [328]

93.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071876 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [329]

94.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071914 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [330]

95.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071885 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [331]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071923 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [332]

97.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071879 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [333]

98.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050535 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [334]

99.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050531 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [335]

100.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050534 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [336]

101.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [337]

102.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071922 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [338]

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2

2019]

103.

THE JVCA’S BAD FAITH EXCEPTION

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052387 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [339]

104.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050523 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [340]

105.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5057667 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [341]

106.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050541 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [342]

107.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050542 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [343]

108.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052410 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [344]

109.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071921 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [345]

110.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052399 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [346]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071925 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [347]

112.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071918 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [348]

113.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071926 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [349]

114.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052381 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [350]

115.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050527 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [351]

116.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071881 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [352]

117.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071900 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [353]
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052397 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [354]

119.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071880 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [355]

120.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052383 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [356]

121.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052378 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [357]

122.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052402 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [358]

123.

In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071869 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2015).
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [359]

124.

HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Assn. v. Bobrowski, 2015 WL 4506824 (M.D. Fla.
Jul. 23, 2015).
The district court remanded the case without addressing bad faith, finding no
federal question or diversity jurisdiction. [372]
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Brace v. AIG Centennial Ins. Co., 2015 WL 3793792 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 18,
2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. It was
remanded based upon defendant’s failure to remove within 30 days of notice
that the case became removable. [382]

126.

Countrywide Mortg. v. Lowe, 2015 WL 3562646 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 5, 2015).
The case was removed more than three years after commencement. The district
court remanded the case based on its untimely removal but noted that the
defendant did not allege that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. [384]

127.

Canizales v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2015 WL 2183783 (May 8, 2015).
The case was apparently removed more than one year after commencement.
The district court remanded, finding no fraudulent joinder. It noted that neither
party considered the application of the one-year bar. [396]

128.

Brown v. Rivera, 2015 WL 2153437 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, noting that the defendant did not even attempt to show that the
plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. [398]

129.

Morgan v. Mumma, 2015 WL 2070227 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2015).
The defendant removed in 2015 after judgment was entered against defendant
in estate proceedings that had begun in 1986. The district court remanded the
case, finding removal untimely. The defendant apparently did not assert
plaintiff’s bad faith as justification for the untimely removal. [400]

130.

Millennium Chems., Inc. v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobsen
LLP, 2015 WL 1959039 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2015).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded the case for lack of complete diversity without determining
whether removal was timely. [401]
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Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lebreton, 2015 WL 2226266 (D. N.M. Apr. 20, 2105).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court
found that the one-year bar was procedural rather than jurisdictional and had
been waived by plaintiff’s failure to file a timely motion to remand. [404]

132.

Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1422569 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015).
The case was removed case after expiration of the one-year period. The district
court remanded the case, finding that the amount in controversy did not exceed
$75,000. [415]

133.

Columbian Chems. Co. v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co., 2015 WL 12755709
(N.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2015).
Although the case was removed more than one year after it was filed, the
district court found that the third-party defendant removed within one year of
the filing of the third-party complaint. [417]

134.

Perez v. Summers, 2015 WL 1887273 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 20, 2105).
The case was removed case after expiration of the one-year period. The
magistrate judge recommended that the district court remand because only
defendants may remove. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation. 2015 WL 1887111 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 24, 2015). [422]

135.

Mims v. Deepwater Corrosion Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 1185817 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 16, 2015).
The defendant removed the Jones Act claim after expiration of the one-year
period. The district court remanded, finding that removal of the Jones Act
claim was not proper absent complete diversity. [424]

136.

Flahaut v. Johnson, 2015 WL 1137602 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2015).
The defendant removed after expiration of the one-year time period. The
district court remanded the case, finding incomplete diversity and untimely
removal. The court did not specifically consider any argument that the plaintiff
acted in bad faith. [425]
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Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C. v. Milasinovich, 2015 WL 11111303, (D. N.
Mex. Feb. 17, 2015).
The district court remanded the case based in part on the one-year bar. The
defendant did not allege bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [431]

138.

S.D. Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Chief Indus., Inc., 2014 WL 7537066 (D. S.D.
Dec. 22, 2104).
Although the case was removed more than year after commencement, the
district court found that the one-year bar did not apply because the case was
removable when filed in state court. [441]

139.

Willison v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2014 WL 7005267 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 11, 2014).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district
court remanded, finding removal untimely because it did not comply with the
applicable thirty-day limit. The district court did not consider the issue of bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff. [446]

140.

Joynt v. Volusia Cty., 2014 WL 6908433 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2014).
The defendant excess insurer removed after expiration of the one-year period
and while case was on appeal to state appellate court. The district court
remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the instate defendant. [449]

141.

IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Cokeing, 2014 WL 12618118 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30,
2014).
The pre se defendants removed more than six years after commencement. The
district court remanded finding removal based upon diversity untimely. It does
not appear that the defendants argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. [462]

142.

Citibank, N.A. v. Lebreton, 2014 WL 11512597 (D. N. Mex. Oct. 16, 2014).
The district court remanded the case after the defendant removed pro se. The
defendant had not alleged bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [466]
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Garcia v. Target Corp., 2014 WL 4105228 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014).
The plaintiff sued Target for personal injury and Target removed after
expiration of the one-year period but did not allege or prove bad faith. The
district court remanded the case. [478]

144.

First Bank and Trust v. Jones, 2014 WL 4072116 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014).
The defendant removed after expiration of the one-year period. The district
court remanded without addressing the issue of bad faith. Apparently,
defendant had not asserted plaintiff’s bad faith as justification for the untimely
removal. [480]

145.

Creadeur v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2014 WL 2999261 (W.D. La. Jul. 3,
2014).
The defendants removed after expiration of the one-year time period, arguing
that the “revival exception” applied. The district court remanded, finding that
the “revival exception” inapplicable and finding the removal untimely as a
result of the one-year bar. The district court did not address bad faith. [485]

146.

IKB Intern S.A. in Liquidation v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2014 WL
2933043 (S.D. N.Y. June 27, 2014).
The district court remanded the case. The removing defendant did not allege
bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [490]

147.

Caliaro v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1779265 (M.D. Fla.
May 5, 2014).
Plaintiff sued non-diverse uninsured motorist for negligence and her diverse
UM insurer for breach of contract. Plaintiff settled with the non-diverse
motorist and then amended her complaint to include a bad faith claim against
the insurer. The bad faith claim was stayed pending resolution of UM
coverage. After partial judgment was entered against the UM insurer on the
claim for coverage, the court lifted the stay on the bad faith claim and the
insurer removed, claiming that it removed the case within 30 days of
commencement of the bad faith claim, which it argued was commenced only
after the stay was lifted. The district court remanded, finding that the bad faith
claim was commenced when it was included in the amended complaint and
further finding that defendant failed to remove within 30 days of the case
becoming removable. The court did not address the issue of bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff. [503]
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Harrington, 2014 WL 1767592 (D. N.J. May 2,
2014).
Pro se defendant removed the case for second time years after commencement.
The district court remanded the case, finding that removal was untimely and
that the case lacked diversity. The district court did not address the issue of bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff. [504]

149.

Noyes v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2111695 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 30, 2014).
Plaintiff sued diverse and non-diverse defendants. Diverse defendant removed
more than one year after commencement, arguing that the plaintiff had
fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. The district court remanded,
after reconsidering its earlier order (Noyes v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
3 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014). See case # 151 below. Although
the court found that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant,
the court found the removal untimely since it was not filed within 30 days of
being served with the complaint. [506]

150.

Jenkins v. Movin on Transp., Inc., 2014 WL 1653248 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 24,
2014).
The case was removed more than one year after commencement based on
federal question jurisdiction. The district court remanded because defendant
failed to remove within 30 days of the case becoming removable. [512]

151.

Noyes v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (M.D. Fla.
2014).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the plaintiff
had acted in bad faith by fraudulently joining a non-diverse party. The court
reversed its ruling on reconsideration, finding that defendant’s removal was
untimely because the fraudulent joinder was evident from the outset. Noyes v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2111695 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2014).
See case # 149 above. [525]
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KUM & GO, L.C. v. Veeder-Root Co., 2014 WL 11514687 (S.D. Iowa Feb.
24, 2014).
The court found the one-year bar inapplicable because the complaint was
removable from the outset. [528]

153.

Estate of Kerr v. S. Cal. Reg’l Rail Auth., 2014 WL 1606316 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2014).
The case was remanded after the district court found no federal question
jurisdiction. [531]

154.

GeoVantage, Inc. v. SimWright, Inc., 2014 WL 183667 (Jan. 16, 2014).
Defendant removed more than one year after commencement. The district court
remanded for failure to timely remove within 30 days and did not address the
issue of bad faith. [537

155.

Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 60044 (W.D. Va. Jan, 7, 2014).
Plaintiff sued Wal-Mart in state court and demanded $70,000. Plaintiff served
defendant nine months after filing the complaint and did not respond to
discovery or defendant’s request for a settlement demand until after expiration
of the oneyear period. Plaintiff then made a settlement demand of $200,000,
after which defendant removed. Although the court found that the plaintiff
acted in bad faith in refusing to respond to discovery within one year, the court
further found that plaintiff’s ad damnum request for $70,000 was in good faith.
The court noted that plaintiff assured the court that he would not amend his
complaint to demand a greater amount and further noted that the parties had
reached a tentative settlement agreement at $45,000 that was not finalized due
to concerns regarding responsibility for Medicare liens. Thus, the court
determined that the amount in controversy requirement was not met and
remanded the case. [540]

156.

Yalda v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 2013 WL 12072532 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1,
2013).
The court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [553]
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Powell ex rel. Powell v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2013 WL 5377852
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013).
After expiration of the one-year period, defendants removed the case for a
second time based upon diversity. When ruling on plaintiff’s motion to
remand, the district court considered whether an equitable exception to the
one-year bar should be applied under the circumstances and found that it did
not. The removing defendant had not alleged bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff as a basis for an equitable exception, but instead argued that the
district court legally erred in remanding the case the first time. [562]

158.

Fong v. Beehler, 2013 WL 5194023 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013).
The district court remanded the case based upon untimely removal but not
address bad faith. [563]

159.

Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 2013
WL 4854770 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2013).
The case was remanded based upon the district court’s finding that it could not
assert jurisdiction over an ancillary proceeding given that action was still
pending in state court. [566]

160.

Cammarota ex rel. Hallock v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2013 WL
4787305 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013).
Defendant removed a second time after expiration of the one-year period and
argued that the equitable exception should apply. The only basis for an
equitable exception urged by defendant was its lack of responsibility for any
delay in removal. Defendant did not allege bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.
The district court remanded, finding no basis for the application of an equitable
exception. [567]

161.

First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunter, 2013 WL 12092558
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2013).
The district court remanded the case but did not address bad faith. The
court rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s amended complaint
revived defendant’s right to remove. [577]
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Barroso v. Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 1, 2013).
The plaintiff sued a diverse insurer and amended the complaint to add a claim
for insurance bad faith after expiration of one-year period. The district court
remanded, finding that the insurance bad faith claim was not a separate and
distinct action that started the one-year clock over again. [578]

163.

Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 2013 WL 3974675 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 31, 2013).
The district court remanded the case but did not address bad faith. The court
rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s amended complaint revived
defendant’s right to remove. [579]

164.

Jordan v. Lowery, 2013 WL 3479655 (E.D. Okla. July 10, 2013).
The defendants removed, relying upon the JVCA even though it clearly did not
apply to the case. The district court remanded based upon the one-year bar. It
refused to recognize an equitable exception and therefore made no findings
regarding bad faith. [582]

165.

Duffield v. Penn Life Corp., 2013 WL 2607480 (S.D. W.Va. June 11, 2013).
The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death claim against the decedent’s diverse
employer and the decedent’s alleged supervisor, a non-diverse defendant. The
diverse employer removed the case the first time, alleging that the non-diverse
defendant had not been the decedent’s supervisor and that therefore his joinder
was fraudulent. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, in part based
upon affidavit testimony that the non-diverse defendant was a foreman on the
job with supervisory capacity. Upon remand back to state court, the parties
engaged in discovery. Fifteen months after remand, the diverse employer
removed a second time, again arguing fraudulent joinder and further arguing
that retroactive application of the JVCA was appropriate even though the JCVA
itself clearly indicates that it applies to cases commenced on or after the date of
passage of the JVCA. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ second motion to
remand, observing that, after the first remand, the defendants had six months in
which to conduct discovery in an effort to support their fraudulent joinder
allegations but failed to do so and “missed the one-year deadline by over nine
months.” The court noted that, pursuant to Fourth Circuit precedent, removal
after one year was absolutely barred by the earlier version of the statute. [593]
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Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Park Ave. at Metrowest,
Ltd., 2013 WL 2477236 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2013).
The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation and
remanded the case because the defendant failed to demonstrate the amount in
controversy, as well as other requirements for diversity jurisdiction. [595]

167.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’n Ass’n v. Hayes, 2103 WL 2407121 (D. S.C.
June 3, 2013).
A pro se in-state defendant removed a foreclosure action more than one year
after commencement of the case and argued that removal was proper pursuant
to the bad faith exception in the JVCA. The magistrate recommended that the
case be remanded because the defendant was an in-state defendant, making
removal based upon diversity improper. The magistrate also noted that the “bad
faith” exception to removal of diversity cases did not apply because the case
had been commenced before the passage of the JVCA. [597]

168.

Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2013 WL 2406320 (M.D. Fla. June 3,
2013).
The court remanded the case after finding that the case was commenced more
than one year prior to removal when plaintiff filed a complaint for insurance
benefits and alleged bad faith. [598]

169.

Rader v. Safeco Ins. Co. 2013 WL 10186944 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2015).
Plaintiff sued insurer and then later added a claim for bad faith. Defendant
removed. The district court remanded, finding that the bad faith claim was not a
separate and independent claim that restarts the removal period. [599]

170.

Cotton Cloud, Inc. v. Covein Licensing, LLC. 2013 2154386 (D. Nev. May
17, 2013).
The district court remanded, finding removal untimely because the notice of
removal was not filed within the applicable 30-day time period. [601]
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Calchas LLC v. Toucet, 2013 WL 12094327 (Apr. 29, 2013).
The district court remanded the case. The removing defendant did not allege
bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [605]

172.

Ingram v. Forbes Co., LLC, 2013 WL 1760202 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013).
Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim against a diverse store and a nondiverse store manager. More than three years after commencement, the state
court granted summary judgment to the store manager, after which the
remaining diverse defendants removed, apparently arguing that the JVCA’s
bad faith exception applied and that plaintiff had fraudulently joined the store
manager. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, noting
that the JVCA did not apply to the case. The court further observed that the
diverse store should have been able to establish the store manager had no
personal responsibility for the incident within one year and could have
removed based upon fraudulent joinder at that juncture. Thus, the district court
determined that even if the equitable exception were to be recognized, it would
not apply to the instant case because the defendant did not timely preserve the
right to remove and the case had substantially progressed in state court. [606]

173.

Brioli v. Premier Buick Pontiac GMC, 2013 WL 1314865 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 28, 2013).
Plaintiff sued a diverse car dealer in state court for compensatory and
punitive damages arising from her purchase of an allegedly defective
vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was aware of the vehicle’s
numerous infirmities prior to her purchase and that she had been unable
to remedy the defects. More than one year later and less than one
month before trial, plaintiff filed a pre-trial statement claiming
compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $335,000. Defendant
then removed just two days before trial. The trial court granted the
plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the one-year limitation was
absolute because the JVCA was inapplicable to the case given that the
case was commenced before the JVCA was passed. [612]
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Denman Tire Corp. v. Tornel, 2013 WL 12119663 (Feb. 28, 2013).
The third-party defendant removed. The defendant moved for remand but did not
challenge the removing third-party defendant’s invocation of the Tedford
equitable exception to the one-year bar. [618]

175.

Auld v. Sun West Mortg. Co., Inc., 2013 WL 656891 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2013).
The district court remanded the case holding that: (i) a plaintiff cannot remove,
and (ii) removal was untimely because it was after the 30-day time period and
the oneyear time period. [620]

176.

Richfield Hosp. Inc. v. Charter One Hotels and Resorts, Inc., 2013 WL
561256 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2013).
Plaintiff sued defendants in state court. Defendants removed. The district court
remanded, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate complete diversity
and the amount in controversy. After the one-year deadline, the defendants
removed a second time arguing that the plaintiff manipulated removal in bad
faith by concealing its damages until after expiration of the one-year period. The
district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the “bad
faith” exception was clearly inapplicable given that the case was commenced in
May of 2011. [623]

177.

Posey v. McKesson Corp., 2013 WL 361168 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013).
The district court remanded the case based, in part, upon the one-year bar,
observing that the removing defendant had not asserted the bad faith exception.
[626]

178.

Summit Contractors, Inc. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 12153593
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2013).
The district court found third-party defendants’ removal of the third-party claim
timely, finding that the relevant date of commencement was the date on which
the third-party claim was filed. [627]
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Thykkuttathil v. Keese, 2013 WL 208931 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2013).
The district found that plaintiff waived application of the one-year bar because
plaintiff did not raise it in the motion to remand. [630]
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Table D

Cases That Did Not Involve Removal Based Upon Diversity
More Than One Year After Commencement
(283 Total)
1. Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc’y Ins., 2018 WL 2463213 (S.D. Ind.
June 1, 2018). [5]
2. Cox v. Air Methods Corp., 2018 WL 2437056 (S.D. W. Va. May 30,
2018). [6]
3. Shirk v. Gonzales, 2018 WL 2411601 (D. N. Mex. May 29, 2018).
[8]
4. Tharpe v. Affinion Benefits Grp., LLC, 2018 WL 3352940 (S.D.
Tex. May 22, 2018). [9]
5. Bernal-Diaz v. MXD Grp., Inc., 2018 WL 3193245 (D. N.J. May 21,
2018). [10]
6. Hagan v. Leon, 2018 WL 2292756 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2018). [11]
7. Torres v. Johnson & Johnson, 2018 WL 2271019 (D. Mass. May 17,
2018). [13]
8. White v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2244721 (S.D. Miss. May 16,
2018). [14]
9. Jian-Ming Zhao v. RelayRides, Inc., 2018 WL 2096854 (May 7,
2018). [15]
10. Moon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2041736 (May 2,
2018). [17]
11. Davis v. Clayman, 2018 WL 1959805 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2018).
[19]
12. Brumfield v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2018 WL 1955216 (E.D. N.Y.
Apr. 25, 2018). [20]
13. Adkins v. Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, 2018 WL 1611592 (E.D. Ky. Apr.
3, 2018). [23]
14. Thomas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 2018 WL 1548897
(W.D. La. Mar. 14, 2018). [27]
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15. Manesh v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1887291 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 2, 2018). [29]
16. Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc’y Ins., 2018 WL 1069440 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 23, 2018). [31]
17. Flynn v. Target Corp., 2018 WL 773889 (W.D. N.Y. Feb. 8. 2018).
[33]
18. Narayan v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 2018 WL 746402 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 6, 2018). [34]
19. Edison Ranch, Inc. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 2018 WL
582578 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 26, 2018. [36]
20. Estate of Martin ex rel. Jozwiak v. Metlife Ins. Co. USA, 2018 WL
563835 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2018.) [38]
21. Kaitlin Youell v. Magellan Health Servs. of N.M., Inc., 2018 WL
344959 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 9, 2018). [41]
22. Jian-Ming Zhao v. RelayRides, Inc., 2017 WL 6336082 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 12, 2017). [42]
23. Sleezer v. Podzic, 2017 WL 6025328 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2017).
[43]
24. Archila v. Integon Nat’l Ins. Co., 2017 WL 5633103 (D. R.I. Nov.
21, 2017). [45]
25. Byrd v. Norman, 2017 WL 5986470 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2017).
[48]
26. Vincent v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2018 WL 5297949 (N.D. W. Va.
Nov. 13, 2017). [49]
27. Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 2017 WL
5197145 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017). [50]
28. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Farzan, 2017 WL 5047900 (D.
N.J. Nov. 3, 2017). [51]
29. Nevils v. CIT Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 4616905 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16,
2017). [54]
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30. Nw. Ry. Museum v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 2017 WL 446661
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2017). [56]
31. Mary v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 7735066 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
5, 2017). [57]
32. Padilla v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1234 (D. N.
Mex. 2017). [60]
33. Franklin v. Lanter, 2017 WL 7194850 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2017).
[61]
34. Marzette v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 2017 WL 4273305 (W.D.
Ky. Sept. 26, 2017). [64]
35. Pho An, LLC v. Capital One, N.A., 2017 WL 4231137 (E.D. La.
Sept. 25, 2017). [65]
36. Kaiser v. Fed Ex Cargo Claims Dep’t, 2017 WL 4480743 (D.
Minn. Sept. 21, 2017). [66]
37. Ford v. Jolly Shipping, Inc., 2017 WL 4451148 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 19,
2017). [68]
38. Villenurve v. New River Shopping Ctr., LLC, 2017 WL 5147659
(M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2017). [71]
39. Chapman v. Trinity Highway Prods., LLC, 2017 WL 3923554
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2017). [72]
40. Cherry v. Stallworth, 2017 WL 3868220 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2017.
[74]
41. Hall v. Capers, 2017 WL 7805413 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2017. [75]
42. Macho v. First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 3712906 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 29, 2017). [76]
43. Lighthouse Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Rogers, 2017 WL 3634593 (D. S.C.
Aug. 22, 2017). [78]
44. Hoarau v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 3328078 (D. Ariz. Aug.
4, 2017). [82]
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45. Allison v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 225992 (E.D.
Pa. July 31, 2017). [85]
46. Leon v. Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) SE, 2017 WL 7735212 (S.D.
Tex. July 11, 2017). [98]
47. Hughes v. Flicker, 2017 WL 5643240 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 10, 2017). [100]
48. Petropolous v. FCA US, LLC, 2017 WL 2889303 (S.D. Ca. Jul. 7,
2017). [101]
49. Pylant v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 3446536
(M.D. La. June 29, 2017). [102]
50. Mendoza v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. N.A., 2017 WL 2778250 (S.D. Tex.
June 27, 2017). [103]
51. Koerner v. GEICO Cas. Co., 2017 WL 2180357 (M.D. Pa. May 18,
2017). [111]
52. Russo v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 2017 WL 1832341 (M.D. Pa. May
8, 2017). [113]
53. Lopez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 1550520 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
28, 2017). [117]
54. Perez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 1550517 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
28, 2017). [118]
55. Heyman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3274452 (W.D. Ky.
Apr. 27, 2017). [119]
56. Battaglia v. Shore Parkway Owner LLC, 249 F. Supp. 3d 668 (E.D.
N.Y. 2017). [121]
57. Murray v. Murray, 2017 WL 1351407 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 10, 2017).
[123]
58. Dewey v. Geico Ins. Agency, Inc., 2017 WL 1316941 (D. Mont. Apr.
7, 2017). [125]
59. Lopez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5202883 (W.D. Tex. Apr.
6, 2017). [126]
60. De La Torre v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5202880 (W.D.
Tex. Apr. 6, 2017). [127]
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61. Molina v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5244451 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 6, 2017). [128]
62. Chaparro v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 1738401 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 6, 2017). [129]
63. Gaither v. Beam Partners, LLC, 2017 WL 121766 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31,
2017). [130]
64. Bellman v. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1082
(D. N. Mex. 2017). [131]
65. Lobley v. Guebert, 2017 WL 1901796 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2017).
[134]
66. Kier v. Lowery, 2017 WL 1015319 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2017).
[136]
67. Patty v. FCA US, LLC, 2017 WL 950491 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017).
[138]
68. Jones v. G2 Secure Staff, LLC, 2017 WL 877293 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2017). [139]
69. Stiny v. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., 2017 WL 787114 (D.C. Cal.
Mar. 1, 2017). [140]
70. Kriete Family Ins. Trust v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3273580
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2017). [141]
71. Avila Metro. Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex., 2017 WL 1232529 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 21, 2017). [142]
72. Wilson v. Badejo, 2017 WL 663544 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2017).
[144]
73. Perry v. Safeco, 2017 WL 655172 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2017). [145]
74. Picaretta v. Chief Oil & Gas, LLC, 2017 WL 468229 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
3, 2017). [149]
75. Prado v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274897 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 2017). [151]
76 Poblano v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274896 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 31, 2017). [152]
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77. Perez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274894 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 2017). [153]
78. Munoz v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5178044 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 2017). [154]
79. Rodriguez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275573 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 31, 2017). [155]
80. Gutierrez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274358 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 31, 2017). [156]
81. Garcia v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275563 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 2017). [157]
82. Chavez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274899 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
27, 2017). [159]
83. Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275565 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
261, 2017). [161]
84. Vargas v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5240901 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
26, 2017). [162]
85. Vasquez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 515069 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
24, 2017). [163]
86. Sarabia v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274913 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
19, 2017). [165]
87. de la Torre v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275567 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 18, 2017). [166]
88. Sandoval v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275570 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 18, 2017). [167]
89. Medina v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3288513 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
11, 2017). [169]
90. Martinez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3309096 (N.D. Tex.
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Table E

Other Cases (12 Total)
1.

Bank of New York v. Consiglio, 2017 WL 9480197 (D. Conn. Oct. 2,
2017).
The magistrate recommended remand, finding that defendant’s allegations of
plaintiff’s “gamesmanship” do not relate to an improper effort to defeat
diversity jurisdiction, but rather to the merits and conduct of the state court
foreclosure action.” Id. at *4. The magistrate’s report and recommendation
were adopted, 2017 WL 4948069 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2017). See Case No. 14
in Table A. [59]

\
2.

Caires v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., 2016 WL 8673145 (S.D. N.Y.
Nov.
4, 2016).
The magistrate recommended remand, finding that the removing
counterplaintiff failed to demonstrate bad faith forum manipulation by the
counterdefendant. The magistrate’s report and recommendation were
adopted, 2017 WL 384696 (Jan. 27, 2017) See Case No. 50 in Table A.
[192]

3.

Lopez v. Allied Packing & Supply, Inc., 2016 WL 3068392 (N.D. Cal.
June 1, 2016).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). The district court had previously remanded the case. 2016
WL 1176395 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016). See Case No. 47 in Table C. [224]

4.

Calkins v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2016 WL M.D. Fla. May 10, 2016).
The opinion addressed plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint after the
case had been removed more than one year after commencement. [230]
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5.
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Bajaba, LLC v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, 2015 WL 3448422
(W.D. Ark. May 29, 2105).
Plaintiff sued diverse seller of a steel building and the seller’s non-diverse
authorized dealer and builder. More than two years later, plaintiff moved to
non-suit the non-diverse defendants for lack of service. The diverse
defendant then removed. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith
on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted that plaintiff had attempted to
locate and serve the non-diverse defendants. Defendant moved to
reconsider and the district court affirmed its remand. This opinion ruled
upon defendant’s motion to reconsider its earlier order remanding the case.
2014 WL 5363905 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2014). See Case No. 102 in Table
A. [387]

6.

Gore v. Robertson, 2015 WL 11112415 (M.D. La. May 27, 2015).
This is the magistrate’s report and recommendation which was rejected by
the district court. 2015 WL 5749459 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015). See Case
No. 62 in Table C. [388]

7.

Fruge v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. L.P., 2015 WL 4131353 (W.D.
La. Mar. 30, 2015).
This opinion contains the magistrate’s memorandum order, which was
affirmed by the district court. (W.D. La. July 7, 2015). See Case # 85 in
Table A. [412]

8.

Wiles v. Cat, 2014 WL 12591891 (N.D. W. Va. June 27, 2014).
The case was commenced in 2011 and removed in 2013. The district court
found that the JVCA was inapplicable. [489]

9.

Darragh v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Is. Co., 2014 WL 4791992 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 29, 2014).
The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion to remand. It
found plaintiff’s bad faith insurance claim was a separate and independent
claim that was timely removed. The district court rejected he magistrate’s
report and recommendation in part and remanded the case, finding that the
bad faith claim was not timely removed because it was part of the case that
was commenced eight years earlier in state court. 2014 WL 4791993
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2014). [507]
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Housing & Tax Consultants, LLC v. Olsen, 2013 WL 6074129 (N.D.
Okla. Nov. 18, 2013).
The case was commenced before 2012, so the district court found the “bad
faith” exception inapplicable and the defendant’s removal untimely. [549]

11.

Verduzco v. Ford Motor Co., 2013 WL 5739094 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22,
2013).
This case was a CAFA case to which the one-year bar is inapplicable. [557]

12.

Allen v. Resto, 2013 WL 5532785 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2013).
The court ruled on plaintiff’s motion to reconsider dismissal of plaintiff’s
case. [560]
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